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Abstract 
This thesis aims to shed light on the impact of the so-called Pay as You Save® (PAYS ®) or on-
bill programmes for energy efficiency improvements in the building sector. These 
programmes are based on an innovative financing model that was developed to overcome 
several barriers to the up-take of energy efficiency measures by households and businesses. 
From the consumer’s side, these barriers include high up-front costs often paired with a lack 
of available capital, inertia, disincentives due to long pay-back periods, risk aversion, split 
incentives between landlords and tenants and high transaction costs. 
Despite increasing attention to innovative financing schemes for energy efficiency 
improvements, very little is known about the impacts of on-bill programmes. To fill this 
knowledge gap, an analysis comprised of three steps is carried out. Firstly, the intervention 
theory of the original PAYS ® system, as it was developed by the Energy Efficiency Institute, 
Inc. is analysed.  Secondly, in an ex-post evaluation the How$mart® programme in Kansas 
(U.S.) and the Green Deal (UK) are portrayed and compared to the PAYS ® intervention 
theory with regards to their effectiveness in overcoming market barriers. The programmes are 
also compared between each other, inter alia the sources and scale of administrative and 
transaction costs. Thirdly, identified lessons learned are transferred to the German context 
where the introduction of new market-based instruments, in which on-bill programmes could 
play a role, is currently debated. 
The findings suggest that carefully designed on-bill programmes, and particularly a sub-group 
of programmes that offers the installation and financing of energy efficiency measures as a 
service instead of a loan, are able to overcome market barriers such as high up-front costs, 
lack of finance, or the split incentive dilemma. The research results also highlight several 
limitations including low participation rates, limited ability to work as a purely market driven 
instrument, and high rebound effects, particularly in low-income households, that reduce the 
applicability for those consumers most in need.  
A prerequisite for unsubsidised on-bill programmes to have an impact is that the costs of 
energy efficiency measures as well as programme costs can be financed through energy cost 
savings. Policy-makers and programme operators should therefore focus on reducing 
transaction and administrative costs attached to on-bill programmes by implementing simple 
and streamlined programme designs. Seeking access to low cost capital is another crucial 
facilitating factor. 
 
Keywords: Energy efficiency, market barriers, on-bill, Pay as You Save, Green Deal, 
How$mart, transaction costs, market-based instruments, financing, split incentives 
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Executive Summary 
To prevent dangerous levels of climate change it will be of key importance to change current 
patterns of energy use. According to a wide body of literature, there are significant untapped 
energy saving potentials that – if leveraged – could result in large greenhouse gas emissions 
abatements. The question arises why potentially cost-effective energy saving potentials have 
not been exploited to a larger extent. This apparent paradox has been often entitled as the 
“Energy Efficiency Gap”, describing numerous market aspects and barriers that hinder the 
diffusion of profitable efficient technologies. The thesis at hand aims to shed light on so-
called Pay as You Save® or on-bill programmes for energy efficiency improvements in the 
building sector. These programmes are based on an innovative financing model that was 
developed to overcome several barriers that inhibit the up-take of energy efficiency measures 
by households and businesses. Barriers that should be addressed on the consumer’s side are: 
inertia, lack of available capital, disincentives due to long pay-back periods, risk aversion, the 
split incentive dilemma between landlords and tenants and high transaction costs. The Pay as 
You Save® (PAYS®) system also aims to reduce high administrative, transaction and financing 
costs on the provider’s side.  
Many states in the United States have introduced on-bill programmes. Each programme is 
unique in its design. However, all programmes have in common that costs are paid back by 
the consumer through a charge on the energy bill. While some programme operators offer to 
finance energy efficiency improvements at no up-front costs for the consumer in form of a 
loan that is repaid on the energy bill, others structure their product as an energy efficiency 
service. An innovative element is that the repayment obligation is not tied to one person, but 
to the energy meter of the building. If the first programme participant moves out the charge 
will be transferred to the next resident’s energy bill. As the new resident will also enjoy the 
benefits from the installed energy efficiency measure, the overall energy bill should not be 
higher than before the measure’s installation. With the Green Deal, the United Kingdom has 
been the first European country to introduce a policy framework that encourages private 
actors to offer on-bill models to residential customers.  
Despite the growing interest in on-bill programmes, little is known about their performance 
and the emerging literature is rather fragmented. In fact, no comparative assessment has been 
carried out if or how on-bill programmes differ in their effectiveness in overcoming the 
identified market barriers due to their design as a loan or service. Furthermore, no 
transregional analysis has been published yet that compares the UK Green Deal with a 
programme in the U.S. The research objective of this thesis is to close this knowledge gap by 
carrying out a comparative ex-post evaluation of the Green Deal (policy driven) and the 
How$mart programme (private initiative), which was introduced by Midwest Energy, an 
energy cooperative in Kansas.  
Given the fact that Germany has shown great interest in new market-based instruments, the 
thesis identifies lessons learned for policy-makers and transfers them to the German context. 
So far, no ex-ante evaluation has been carried for policy instruments encouraging on-bill 
programmes in the German context. The following research questions lay the foundation for 
the research design:  
(1) Which critical factors have facilitated or hindered on-bill financing programmes’ 
effectiveness in overcoming market barriers to energy efficiency improvements in the 
building sector? What can future on-bill programmes learn from existing on-bill 
experiences? 
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(2) Could a policy instrument that encourages on-bill financing programmes complement 
the German energy efficiency instruments mix in an effective manner and if so, how 
should a policy instrument be designed to accelerate the take-up of energy efficiency 
measures in Germany? 
Methodological choices were driven by policy and programme evaluation literature. The 
research questions are addressed in a three-step analysis. First, the intervention theory of the 
original PAYS® system as it was developed by the Energy Efficiency Institute Inc. is analysed. 
It lays down the framework for a theory-based evaluation of two on-bill programmes. Second, 
the currently operating How$mart programme in Kansas and the UK Green Deal are 
described in detail and assessed against the PAYS® intervention theory. Furthermore, it is 
analysed how effective these two on-bill programmes have been in overcoming several 
barriers to investments in energy efficiency faced by small energy consumers. In a third step, 
the lessons learned are transferred to the German context. Here, the objective is to contribute 
to the debate on new market based instruments for energy efficiency improvements. Based on 
a multi-criteria framework an ex-ante evaluation is carried out to assess different policy design 
options that could be suitable for promoting on-bill programmes in Germany. 
The findings from the ex-post as well as the ex-ante evaluation are based on secondary and 
primary research. A thorough review of the existing on-bill and wider energy efficiency and 
related economic literature was carried out, comprising academic publications as well as grey 
literature. Sixteen semi-structured interviews were carried out with experts on the Pay as You 
Save® system, the How$mart programme, as well as stakeholders from the UK and German 
energy efficiency policy arena, industry and civil society. These sources of qualitative data were 
complemented by a survey sent out to 45 Green Deal providers in the UK and Midwest 
Energy, the utility that runs the How$mart® programme in the U.S. The survey produced 
quantitative data on transaction, administrative and marketing costs related to the provision of 
on-bill programmes.  
The main results can be summarised as follows. First, the findings from the ex-post evaluation 
show that carefully designed on-bill programmes can be regarded as a suitable instrument to 
overcome certain barriers to energy efficiency investments. Based on empirical findings as well 
as theoretical considerations, it can be argued that programmes that provide the installation 
and financing of energy efficiency measures as a service are more effective in overcoming 
market barriers than programmes providing on-bill loans. Overall, having the up-front costs 
covered by a third-party and attaching the payment obligation to the building’s electricity or 
gas meter can be identified as the two essential facilitating factors for encouraging the up-take 
of efficiency improvements. If total costs can be recovered through energy savings, there is no 
need for the consumer to invest from his or her own pocket. Here, the barrier high-up front 
costs paired with lack of available finance can be overcome. Furthermore, by strictly tying the 
repayments to the beneficiary of the energy savings incentives can be aligned in a manner that 
solves the split incentives dilemma between landlords and tenants. Seeing an immediate 
benefit in form of lower energy bills and tying the payment obligation to the building’s meter, 
reduces disincentives with regards to long pay-back periods. This is a particularly relevant 
design feature for consumers who face a high uncertainty how long they will occupy the same 
home or apartment. Even though not all consumers react to economic incentives, aligning the 
timing of cost and benefits can be regarded as a facilitating factor for reducing high levels of 
inertia related to consumers’ implicit discount rates for future savings. If programmes are able 
to overcome consumers’ risk aversion is highly dependent on the design in terms of required 
warranties and other mechanisms for consumer protection. Neither the analysed How$mart 
programme, nor the Green Deal delivers the kind of “unworried round the clock service 
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package”, envisaged by the PAYS® system, as programme operators do not provide warranties 
for installed products over the entire payback period.  
Second, from a provider’s perspective investments made under on-bill programmes can be 
regarded as relatively secure. The rate of non-payment is usually below 1% as programme 
participants risk to be disconnected from utility services in case of non-payment. A limitation 
from a provider’s perspective is on-bill programmes’ limited ability to deliver a significant rate 
of return on investments made. However, it can still be regarded as a highly suitable 
instrument for yielding indirect benefits, such as gaining competitive advantage by increasing 
customer loyalty, image campaigning and experimenting with new business areas.  
Third, the gathered data strongly suggests that on-bill programmes should be designed in a 
simple and streamlined manner in order to reduce transaction costs as far as possible. This 
leaves more financial resources for the energy efficiency investment itself. The survey results 
show that participating companies in the UK Green Deal face very high administrative and 
transaction costs as a result of an overly complex policy instrument design, a high number of 
involved actors, multiple and partly competing sources of finance and time consuming 
contractual sequences. Costs related to the accreditation process, marketing, administration 
and other transactions (such as contract negotiations) may exceed the total investments made 
in energy efficient technologies and their installation. Against this background, it is not 
surprising that interviewed Green Deal providers reported to be struggling to make a business 
case. In comparison, under How$mart programme costs only account for roughly 3% of total 
investments made. This large deviation can be explained by the Green Deal’s highly complex 
policy design and related requirements in comparison to the simpler, utility-driven How$mart 
programme.  
Fourth, even though no quantitative data could be gathered regarding transaction costs faced 
by consumers, these costs are assumed to be relatively high under the Green Deal for the 
same reasons. While more than 55% of customers taking decisions on programme 
participation signed up for the How$mart programme, only 1.2% of Green Deal assessments 
have translated into Green Deal financing plans. Overall, penetration rates of target 
populations ranged from 0.43% per year under How$mart to 0.006% per year under the 
Green Deal. This suggests that establishing a first contact to potential customers still seems to 
pose a major barrier to the scalability of on-bill programmes. 
Fifth, the results of the ex-ante evaluation suggest that on-bill financing could complement the 
German energy efficiency instruments mix in an effective manner. It could target cost-
effective energy saving potentials that are neither addressed by energy minimum performance 
standards, nor by the ambitious standards required under the KfW’s soft loan programmes for 
energy efficiency improvements. Furthermore, if on-bill financing programmes are designed as 
a service agreement, it could be appealing to households and business that are unwilling or 
unable to take out a loan for investing in efficiency technologies.  
It can be concluded that even though certain market barriers can be reduced through on-bill 
models, both analysed programmes, How$mart and the Green Deal are not able to show 
participation rates and the type of energy efficiency measures that would be needed to reduce 
energy use and related CO2 emissions for meeting the EU’s or Germany’s efficiency and 
climate targets. On-bill financing models should therefore not be regarded as a “silver bullet” 
for leveraging finance into energy efficiency markets, but as one suitable instrument that can 
contribute to the tapping of unexploited energy saving potentials. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the reader to the background of this thesis, the identified research 
problem and the resulting research objectives and research questions. Furthermore, it lays out 
the scope as well as the limitations of the research design.  
1.1 Background to this thesis 
Despite more and more stakeholders from the local to global level being engaged in climate 
change mitigation, global greenhouse gas emissions grew on average by 1.0 gigatonne carbon 
dioxide equivalent (GtCO2eq) per year between 2000 and 2010, compared to 0.4 GtCO2eq per 
year from 1970 to 2000. Without additional efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG), the global mean surface temperature is likely to increase by 3.7°C to 4.8°C until 2100 
compared to pre-industrial levels (IPCC, 2014b). Risks of death, injury, ill-health or disrupted 
livelihoods disproportionally rise with every additional centigrade of global temperature 
increase. Even if the 2°C target will be reached many species and ecosystems will be extinct, 
undermining the well-being of humans relying on these systems (IPCC, 2014c).  
The increasing demand for energy currently drives an energy system that is largely based on 
the combustion of fossil fuels. It generates 35% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions 
(IPCC, 2014a). As humans do not demand energy per se, but the services energy provides us 
with, there are two major energy related strategies to reduce the likelihood of dangerous 
climate change. First, the combustion of fossil fuels needs to be drastically reduced by 
switching to renewable energies and other low carbon energy carriers (IPCC, 2014b). Second, 
the demand for energy services can be lowered by (1) increasing technological efficiency, (2) 
changing the structure of demand, e.g. by substituting physical mobility with electronic 
communications, and (3) reducing the absolute level of energy services demand, e.g. reducing 
travel needs by living closer to work and behavioural change towards voluntary sufficiency, 
e.g. by lowering the room temperature (Lopes, Antunes, & Martins, 2012; Notter, Meyer, & 
Althaus, 2013; Riahi et al., 2012). One sector where all of these strategies need to be 
significantly intensified is the building sector. According to the International Energy Agency 
(IEA, 2014), residential and commercial buildings account for one third of the global final 
energy demand. Without further action, by 2050 emissions from the global building stock may 
double or even triple by 2050, mostly due to increased access to housing at adequate standards 
as well as a rise of modern commercial buildings in low- and middle income countries.  
The good news is that the potential for energy savings is vast (Jeffries, Deng, Cornelissen, & 
Klaus, 2012; Riahi et al. 2012). If today’s cost-effective technologies and best practices are 
broadly diffused, the global trend of a rising energy demand could be turned around and 
absolute levels of energy use might be lower by mid-century than today (Barney et al., 2012; 
IPCC, 2014a). Saving potentials do not only lie in low- and middle income countries. 
According to a study carried out by Fraunhofer ISI (Boßmann, Eichhammer, & Elsland, 
2012), the final energy demand of the European household sector could be reduced cost-
effectively by 71% by 2050. Half of this potential lies in energy efficient refurbishments of 
building shells in existing homes.1 Compared to other studies, this can be classified as one of 
the most optimistic estimates (European Commission, 2006, 2011; Tuominen, Klobut, 
                                                 
1 The study is based on a technology-specific bottom-up simulation that was already applied in Eichhammer et al. (2009). The 
saving potential is derived by comparing the projected demand under the high efficiency scenario to the official baseline 
for energy demand used by European Commission from 2008. Only those technologies have been included where 
„financial savings for the avoided fuel procurement exceed the additional investments required to implement the efficiency 
technology“ (Boßmann et al., 2012). A caveat is that cost-effective energy saving potentials were derived by assuming no 
transaction costs and perfect access to capital markets. 
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Tolman, Adjei, & de Best-Waldhober, 2012; WBCSD, 2009). Nevertheless, most studies come 
to the conclusion that there are significant cost-effective energy saving potentials, which have 
not been leveraged yet. The challenge of tapping these potentials has been acknowledged, but 
policy-makers struggle to meet politically defined efficiency targets. The European Union is 
not expected to achieve its indicative target of a 20% reduction in energy demand by 2020 
compared to 1990 levels without further actions (European Commission, 2013). At the same 
time EU’s member countries with the largest building stock, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, are struggling to meet their national energy efficiency and climate targets (BMWi, 
2014; DECC, 2012a; Löschel, Erdmann, Staiß, & Ziesing, 2014; Tuominen et al., 2012). 
This raises the question why potentially cost-effective energy saving potentials have not been 
exploited to a larger extent. This apparent paradox has been often entitled as the “Energy 
Efficiency Gap”, describing the gap between “actual and optimal energy use” (Jaffe & Stavins, 
1994, p. 804). There has been a heated debate around the notion of optimality, which is 
related to questions surrounding market barriers and failures as well as appropriate private and 
social discount rates for investments in efficiency improvements (Gates, 1983; Jaffe & Stavins, 
1994; Sanstad & Howarth, 1994; Sutherland & Ronald, 2014). Sutherland & Ronald (2014) 
argue that there is no “Efficiency Gap”, as observed consumer behaviour is privately optimal. 
Rational consumers apply high discount rates for energy efficiency investments due to their 
illiquid nature and a lack of risk diversification. Therefore, many apparent cost-effective 
efficiency measures would reveal themselves as unattractive under “real” market conditions. 
This view has been contested by many economists (Howarth & Sanstad, 1995; Jaffe & Stavins, 
1994; Sanstad & Howarth, 1994; Tuominen et al., 2012). One major argument is that if market 
participants would maximise utility as predicted by economic theory, implicit discount rates 
for investments in energy efficiency would equal the rate-of-return of alternative investments 
with similar characteristics. However, consumers’ applied discount rates significantly exceed 
market rates for both borrowing and saving (Dubin & Mcfadden, 1984; Howarth & Sanstad, 
1995).2 It is argued that these high implicit discount rates deviate from what would be 
suggested by standard economic theory, but can be (at least partially) explained by market 
barriers. New institutional economic theory explains the “Energy Efficiency Gap” with 
transaction costs (TCs) that move apparently cost-effective energy saving potentials into the 
uneconomic zone. Sources of TCs are related to information creation, collection and 
absorption, costs that are often not reflected in engineering studies calculating large energy 
saving potentials (Howarth & Sanstad, 1995; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994; Joskow & Marron, 1992). 
Other sources of TCs are related to due diligence, contract negotiations and monitoring of 
energy use and cost savings (Kiss, 2013; Mundaca, Mansoz, Neij, & Timilsina, 2013). TCs are 
particularly relevant in the residential sector where consumers’ knowledge about levels of 
energy use as well as about costs and benefits of efficiency improvements are often limited 
(Stieß & Dunkelberg, 2013). Complex ownership structures and numerous small-scale energy 
saving opportunities further increase TCs. Another barrier are high up-front investment costs 
for energy efficiency measures, often combined with a lack of access to capital. Particularly 
low-income households are frequently required to pay risk premia or are unable to seek any 
kind of finance (Sanstad & Howarth, 1994). In addition, the illiquid and irreversible nature of 
most energy efficiency investments combined with payback periods of up to forty years create 
disincentives, particularly for consumers who face high uncertainty if they will see the long-
term benefits, such as older people or tenants who tend to move more often (Berlo et al., 
2011; Guertler & Royston, 2013). In the rental sector the “investor-user” or “principal-agent” 
                                                 
2 Empirical research found discount rates ranging from 20% for room air conditioners, space heating and water heating 
investments (Dubin & Mcfadden, 1984; Hausman, 1979) over 45% to 300% for refrigerators (Gately, 1980) up to 800% 
for heating and cooling equipment (Ruderman, Levine, & McMahon, 1987). 
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dilemma, where the landlord (the investor) bears the costs, but the tenant (the user) enjoys a 
lower energy bill, further inhibits the introduction of energy efficiency (Guertler & Royston, 
2013; Tuominen et al., 2012). 
These barriers related to potentially high TCs and financing issues are complemented by 
consumers’ bounded rationality in taking investment decisions. Even where high levels of 
subsidies are offered, consumers show a surprising level of inertia (Krarup & Russell, 2005). 
This phenomenon could be ascribed to high TCs related to solving “complex optimization 
problems” (Sanstad & Howarth, 1994, p. 815). However, research revealed systematic 
deviations from cost minimizing behaviour due to other factors such as the incapacity of 
processing information, loss aversion, reciprocity, habituation or self-identity affect decisions. 
These behavioural phenomena cannot be explained by information deficits alone (Gowdy, 
2008; Gsottbauer & Bergh, 2010; Sanstad & Howarth, 1994; Zundel & Stieß, 2011). 
1.2 Problem definition 
Based on an analysis of the above described market barriers, so-called “on-bill programmes” 
were developed, which are based on an innovative financing model for energy efficiency 
measures. The financing model was designed to overcome many of the well-known barriers to 
efficiency improvements, such as uncertainties regarding long pay-back periods and high up-
front costs. On-bill models bear some conceptual similarities to "energy performance 
contracting", which can be defined as “a contractual arrangement between the beneficiary and 
the provider (normally an Energy Service Company (ESCO)) of an energy efficiency 
improvement measure, where investments in that measure are paid for in relation to a 
contractually agreed level of energy efficiency improvement” (Marino, Bertoldi, & Rezessy, 
2010, p. 5). As under contracting models, it is not the consumer who pays for the up-front 
costs, but a third party, e.g. a utility or an ESCO. This should eliminate the barrier high up-
front costs for energy users, which is often paired with a lack of capital. However, on-bill 
models share additional innovative characteristics that aim to eliminate other barriers that are 
still persistent under contracting. First, after the installation of the measure no new payment 
stream with the contractor or a bank is established. Instead a charge is put on the consumer’s 
energy bill, which is not allowed to exceed the estimated energy cost savings yielded by the 
efficiency improvement. Seeing energy cost savings on the energy bill from the very start of 
the payback period, should provide consumers with an immediate benefit. Second, the 
payment obligation is not tied to the consumer, but to the building’s energy meter. If the 
consumer moves out, the liability is transferred to the new resident (Bell, Nadel, & Hayes, 
2011; Bell & Nadel, 2012; Cillo & Lachman, 2013; Lachman, 2013; UK-GBC, 2009).  
Over the last decade on-bill programmes were introduced in more than twenty U.S. states. 
While some programmes were introduced voluntarily, others were mandated by policy-makers 
(Bell & Nadel, 2012; Cillo & Lachman, 2013; Hayes, Nadel, Granda, & Hottel, 2011). In 2013, 
the UK became the first European country to introduce a policy framework for encouraging 
the up-take of on-bill programmes through the so-called Green Deal3 (Rosenow & Eyre, 
2013). In practice, on-bill programmes differ in many aspects. One major distinction should 
be made: on-bill financing (OBF) is often based on the original Pay as You Save® (PAYS®) 
system, developed by the Energy Efficiency Institute, Inc. in Vermont, U.S. The essential 
feature of OBF is that the on-bill product is not designed as a loan, but as a service provided 
by the utility. This means that programme participants technically do not take out debt. The 
charge on the consumer’s bill is a tariffed service charge. On-bill repayment (OBR) refers to 
                                                 
3 The UK Green Deal relates to one specific policy framework for energy efficiency improvements in homes and businesses. 
It should not be confused with the “Green New Deal” discourse surrounding green economy and stimulus packages. 
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finance products that are based on a loan. Here, charges on the energy bill are loan instalments 
(Burr, 2013). 
Despite the growing interest in on-bill programmes, little is known about their performance 
and the emerging literature about their impact is rather fragmented. In fact, no comparative 
analysis has been carried out if or how OBF and OBR programmes differ in their 
effectiveness in overcoming the identified market barriers. Furthermore, no transregional 
analysis has been published yet that compares the UK Green Deal with a programme in the 
U.S. This research gap will be filled by carrying out a comparative theory-based evaluation of 
the UK Green Deal (OBR) and the How$mart® programme in Kansas (OBF), which was 
introduced by the energy cooperative Midwest Energy, Inc. Out of the existing twelve OBF 
programmes in five U.S. states the How$mart® programme was chosen for three reasons: (1) 
its implementation closely follows the PAYS® system, (2) it is one of the more mature 
programmes dating back to 2007, (3) it is showing one of the highest participation rates (Bell 
& Nadel, 2012).  
Other countries, such as Germany, have demonstrated a high interest in innovative market-
based instruments for leveraging energy efficiency improvements. Germany was chosen as a 
particularly interesting case for an ex-ante evaluation. It is often cited as a forerunner in energy 
efficiency policies (IEA, 2013a). Nevertheless, Germany is currently struggling to meet its 
ambitious energy efficiency targets that are anchored in the “Energy Transition” towards a 
low carbon energy system (BMWi, 2014; Löschel et al., 2014). Against this background the 
government is discussing the introduction of new policy instruments. While there is a wider 
body of literature on the potential introduction of an energy company obligation or a 
tendering system (see: Becker et al., 2014; Bürger, Rohde, Eichhammer, & Schlomann, 2012; 
Dinges, Petersdorff, & Boeve, 2014; Schlomann, Becker, & Bürger, 2012), no ex-ante 
evaluation has been carried out for policy instruments that encourage on-bill programmes. 
This gap is closed by this thesis. The research objectives and questions are presented below.  
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
The overall research objective of the thesis at hand is to improve our knowledge about on-bill 
programmes for energy efficiency improvements. The aim is, based on ex-ante and ex-post 
policy evaluations, to generate knowledge about empirical and expected impacts about this 
emerging financing model in the field of energy and climate policy. As such, the thesis is 
policy oriented, which means that it is directed towards solving societal problems through 
improved public policies (F. Fischer, 1995; Hakim, 2000). The evaluation of the chosen cases 
aims to provide insights regarding critical market and policy conditions affecting the 
performance of on-bill programmes. While the How$mart® programme has been regarded as 
relatively successful (Johnson, Willoughby, Shimoda, & Volker, 2012), the Green Deal fell 
short of initial targets (Rosenow & Eyre, 2014). The differing performance raises questions 
about the design of the programmes and their effectiveness in overcoming the identified 
barriers such as high transaction costs or accessibility of low-cost finance.  
Based on the lessons learned from Kansas and the UK, it will be analysed if the introduction 
of on-bill programmes could be an interesting option for tapping parts of the unexploited 
energy efficiency potential in Germany. It will be explored if on-bill financing could be 
embedded in the existing policy mix and be aligned with potential upcoming policies. An 
analysis of the German context will be accompanied by a bottom-up estimation of potential 
energy savings achieved by an introduction of on-bill programmes by all German electricity 
and gas providers. Against this background, the following research questions arise:  
 (1) Which critical factors have facilitated or hindered on-bill programmes’ effectiveness in overcoming 
market barriers to energy efficiency improvements in the building sector? What can future on-bill 
programmes learn from existing on-bill experiences? 
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(2) Could a policy instrument that encourages on-bill programmes complement the German energy 
efficiency instruments mix in an effective manner and if so, how should a policy instrument be designed 
to accelerate the take-up of energy efficiency measures in Germany? 
To answer the research questions an analysis comprised of three steps is carried out. Firstly, 
the underlying intervention theory of the Pay as You Save® (PAYS®) system, as it was 
developed by the Energy Efficiency Institute, Inc. (EEI) is analysed. This analysis is carried 
out at the theoretical level. Secondly, in an ex-post evaluation the How$mart® programme in 
Kansas (U.S.) and the Green Deal (UK) are portrayed and compared to the original PAYS ® 
intervention theory with regards to their effectiveness in overcoming the identified barriers to 
investments in energy efficiency measures. The programmes will also be compared between 
each other, for example regarding the sources and scale of transaction costs. Thirdly, in light 
of the findings from the ex-post analysis, an ex-ante evaluation is carried out for the German 
context that is built on the multi-criteria framework laid down in chapter 2.1.3. 
1.4 Research scope and (de)limitations 
The initial research interest in the design and performance of on-bill models had to be 
narrowed to the case specific analysis of the Green Deal and the How$mart® programme. Five 
U.S. states have OBF programmes in place that are based on the PAYS ® system (see Annex 
IV) and there are many more OBR programmes in the U.S., which would have been very 
interesting to scrutinize as well in more detail. Due to time constraints, the geographical focus 
had to be narrowed on the How$mart® programme in Kansas. It was chosen as it is one of the 
more mature on-bill programmes and its design, targeting energy efficiency measures in 
households and business, matches the research interest in overcoming energy efficiency 
barriers for small energy consumers. 
No further on-bill programmes for energy efficiency investments have been identified outside 
the U.S., besides the UK’s Green Deal, which is more a policy framework than a government 
run energy efficiency programme. The choice of cases for a transregional comparative analysis 
was therefore restricted by the novelty of this innovative financing model. It needs to be 
acknowledged that comparing two countries with an Anglo-Saxon legal tradition (common 
law) reduces the transferability of the lessons learned to other jurisdictions, such as Germany. 
Furthermore, it was out of scope of this thesis to account for cultural differences between the 
three cases, U.S., UK and Germany, which might affect the acceptance and participation rates 
in on-bill programmes.  
Another limitation regarding the interpretation of the differing performance of the analysed 
cases is that no in-depth comparative analysis of energy standards in the existing building 
stock and markets for energy efficiency technologies could be carried out in this thesis. To 
evaluate if a significant energy saving potential could be addressed by on-bill programmes in 
the ex-ante analysis for the German context, this limitation was addressed by an economic 
assessment of specific energy efficiency measures. This allowed to identify if under given 
conditions on-bill programmes might leverage cost-effective saving potentials in households 
and small businesses. 
Regarding the access to data, there is a significant amount of grey literature, such as 
government reports, and a smaller amount of peer reviewed literature on on-bill programmes. 
The existing publications were complemented by primary data in form of interviews and a 
survey, designed for Green Deal Providers and Midwest Energy. While no major obstacles 
were faced in finding interview partners among researchers, policy-makers and also private 
actors, it proved to be difficult to gather quantitative data, particularly regarding the scale of 
administrative and transaction costs faced by on-bill providers. While some market actors 
Sarah Kloke, IIIEE, Lund University 
6 
were reluctant to report data, as it was regarded as confidential, others faced difficulties in 
providing disaggregate estimates of transaction and investment costs due to internal 
accounting procedures. Overall, the results of the survey are not statistically reliable and can 
only give an indication of the sources and scale of transaction costs faced by providers. 
1.5 Audience 
This thesis is directed towards an academic audience, policy-makers and other stakeholders 
from the policy arena that are interested in innovative financing models for energy efficiency 
improvements. Furthermore, it should provide interesting insights to market actors, such as 
utilities and energy service providers that are open for new ideas and business models.  
1.6 Disposition 
In chapter 2, the reader will be introduced into the theoretical background of this thesis as 
well as into methods for data collection and analysis. Chapter 3 lays down the intervention 
theory of the Pay as You Save® system. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the ex-post 
evaluation of How$mart® and the Green Deal. Based on the insights from the ex-post 
evaluation, the results of an ex-ante analysis for the German context are presented in chapter 
5. The results of this thesis will be embedded in the wider energy efficiency related academic 
literature in chapter 6. Here, methodological choices and key observations will be discussed as 
well. Chapter 7 concludes with the main findings and policy recommendations. 
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2. Methodology 
This chapter introduces the reader to the underlying conceptual framework of this thesis. An 
overview over the theoretical background will be given, followed by an introduction into the 
specific analytical framework for the ex-post and the ex-ante evaluations, which lay down the 
method for data analysis. Furthermore, the methods for data collection are presented.  
2.1 Methods for data analysis 
The chosen methodology was driven by the concepts of policy-oriented research and policy 
evaluation. It is based on Vedung’s approach that “Evaluating engenders looking backwards 
to improve forward direction. The specific role of evaluation is to systematically amass and 
assess information on intervention outcomes, outputs, and administration to produce 
adjustments, or more rational future decisions” (Vedung, 2009, p. 15). In this thesis, public 
policy is defined as “a political agreement on a course of action or (inaction) designed to resolve 
or mitigate problems on the political agenda” (Fischer, 2003, p. 50). Based on this definition, 
policies comprise government interventions as well as non-interventions. According to 
Mickwitz (2003, p. 419) interventions can be categorised as three types of policy instruments:  
regulatory instruments “aim at modification of the set of options open to agents”, economic 
instruments “aim at altering the benefits and/or the costs of the agents”, information  instruments 
aim “at altering the priorities and significance agents attached to environmental issues”. There 
is a comprehensive body of literature giving guidance on methods for policy evaluation 
(Bardach, 2005; Blumstein, Goldstone, & Lutzenhiser, 2000; F. Fischer, 1995; Mickwitz, 2003; 
Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004; Vedung, 2009). Among the different streams of policy 
evaluation, this research is locating itself in the post-positivist position by adapting a critical 
view of the “fact-value dichotomy” principle. The “fact-value dichotomy” demands a strict 
separation of facts and values, by isolating empirical research from the normative context or 
implications (Fischer, 1998). This thesis is analysing on-bill programmes for energy efficiency 
improvements in light of a social problem, the unsustainable patterns of energy production 
and usage. It aims to produce ‘knowledge for action’, in this case for climate change 
mitigation, and is therefore clearly embedded in a normative context. 
The unit of analysis will be the case study. The strength of case study research lies in an 
empirical enquiry of complex contemporary phenomena (cases) in their context by providing 
in-depth insights and fostering the understanding of how, when and why certain events occur 
(Yin, 2014). The analytical framework for the two cases, How$mart® and the Green Deal, that 
will be studied in an ex-post evaluation is presented the following section. The multi-criteria 
framework for studying the third case, Germany, is presented in section 2.1.3. Background 
information on the three cases will be introduced in section 4.1.1., 4.3.1. and 5.1. 
2.1.1 A theory-based framework for the ex-post evaluation 
The introduction of on-bill models is not necessarily policy driven. Certain design elements, 
e.g. tying the payment obligation to the building’s meter, usually require a legal foundation, but 
programmes may not necessarily be triggered by public policy. For example, Midwest Energy 
voluntarily introduced the How$mart® programme and then lobbied for a change in the 
legislative framework that allows to structure the on-bill product as a tariffed service. Policy 
evaluation frameworks (e.g. Mickwitz, 2003) would not have been applicable for the ex-post 
evaluation of this programme. After a review of evaluation frameworks, a theory-based 
approach has been chosen, as it was regarded as particularly suitable for the evaluation of 
programmes that seek social change, without mandating the initiator of the programme to 
come from the public policy arena (Kahan, 2008). The underlying assumption of theory-based 
evaluations is that well targeted policies and programmes need to be grounded in a plausible 
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theory establishing how the policy or programme is intended to achieve its desired effect 
(Blumstein et al., 2000). The theory, also called intervention theory (Vedung, 2009), is basically 
an explanation of the causal mechanism that makes a programme work. If a programme or 
intervention does not produce its desired outcome, the two plausible explanations are that the 
underlying theory has had flaws or that the theory was not implemented correctly in practice. 
The task of the evaluator is to dig into the case and find what made the programme work and 
what inhibited its success. With a focus on the identification of causal linkages, theory-based 
approaches attempt to go beyond a simple goal-attainment evaluation, which primarily 
compares the measured outcome of a policy with the pre-defined goal (Blumstein et al., 2000). 
Pawson’s and Tilley’s (1997) framework Realistic Evaluation is applied to the theory-based 
analysis of the PAYS® system and the ex-post evaluation of the How$mart® programme and 
the Green Deal. The framework was chosen as it was developed to systematically identify 
strengths and weaknesses of programmes that seek social change. The framework has been 
applied by the authors for the evaluation of crime prevention programmes. Since Realistic 
Evaluation has been published in 1997, it was cited more than 3000 times and has been applied 
for evaluating programmes in various contexts, such as healthcare, rehabilitation and 
education (GoogleScholar search, September 9, 2014).  
Pawson and Tilley established guidance for a “realistic explanation of programs [which] 
involves an understanding of their mechanisms, contexts, and outcomes, and so requires 
asking questions about the reasoning and resources of those involved in the initiative, the 
social and cultural conditions necessary to sustain change, and the extent to which one 
behavioural regularity is exchanged for another” (Pawson & Tilley, 1997; p. 154). Instead of 
asking “does a program work?” it is asked “what is it about a program that works for whom?”. 
This is done by “identifying mechanisms [which] involves the attempt to develop propositions 
about what it is within the program which triggers a reaction from its subjects” (Pawson & 
Tilley, 1997; p. 66). The underlying rationale is that outcomes can only be understood by 
analysing the mechanisms constituting regularities by an interplay of structure of agency and 
the context in which these mechanisms turn causal potential into causal outcome. It is 
acknowledged that programs are embedded in an existing set of social conditions that are of 
crucial importance for understanding the success or failure of social programmes. The basic 
realist formula can be expressed as: 
mechanism + context = outcome. 
Against this background programme evaluators need address the two questions: (1) What are 
the mechanisms for change triggered by a program and how do they counteract the existing social processes?” 
and (2) “What are the social and cultural conditions necessary for change mechanisms to operate and how are 
they distributed within and between program contexts?” (Pawson & Tilley, 1997; p. 75, 77). 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) assume that social programmes emerge from the identification of 
behavioural patterns (T), creating certain regularities (R1), which are perceived as problematic. 
This underlying assumption is perfectly applicable to the introduction of energy efficiency 
programmes, which depart from the social regularity “consumers saying no to efficiency 
improvements” (or saying nothing at all, which has the same outcome as a no). This regularity 
might be regarded as a problem and lead to the introduction of programmes that foster the 
up-take of energy efficiency measures, even though underlying motivations for introducing 
these programmes can differ significantly, ranging from climate policy goals, over energy 
security to building up a new business area for private companies. Pawson and Tilley elaborate 
that undesired regularities evolve from underlying, explanatory mechanisms (M1). By 
introducing new social programmes, policy-makers or programme designers try to trigger a 
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shift in the pattern of behaviour in question into the direction of a desired pattern (R2). 
Pawson and Tilley assume that programmes are effective when new or several new 
mechanisms (M2 – Mx) break with the old mechanism (M1) and the desired behavioural pattern 
(R2) replaces the old one (R1). The shift from R1 to R2 is the outcome (O) of the intervention. 
C1 stands for context. This Realistic Evaluation framework is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 - “Basic ingredients of successful programmed social change” 
Source: Pawson & Tilley (1997; p. 74) 
With regards to the cases under analysis, these programmes have in common that they want to 
depart from the social regularity “consumers saying no to efficiency improvements” and aim 
for “consumers saying yes to efficiency improvements”. In the terminology of Tilley and 
Pawson (1997) this is the shift from the regularity of inaction (R1) to action (R2).  As outlined 
before, there are barriers to consumers’ up-take of energy efficiency improvements, which can 
be described as mechanisms (Mx) that enforce the regularity of inaction (R1). In chapter 3, it 
will be analysed on a theoretical level how the original PAYS® system aims to overcome eight 
inhibiting mechanisms, or barriers (B1-8), by introducing new enabling mechanisms (M1-8).  
These barriers under analysis are: B1: inertia, B2: lack of available capital and/or liquidity 
preferences, B3: disincentives due to long pay-back periods, B4: risk aversion, B5: split 
incentives, B6: high transaction costs on the consumer’s side, B7: high transaction costs on the 
provider’s side, B8: high financing costs. The eight barriers have been identified as relevant 
inhibiting mechanisms in a review of energy efficiency literature (Guertler & Royston, 2013; 
Howarth & Sanstad, 1995; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994; Mundaca et al., 2013; Stieß & Dunkelberg, 
2013; Tuominen et al., 2012). They have already been briefly presented in chapter 1. The 
barriers as well as the PAYS® mechanisms to overcome these barriers will be laid down in 
more detail in chapter 3. In chapter 4, after introducing the reader to the context of the 
How$mart® programme and the UK Green Deal, the eight barriers will build the structure of 
the comparative ex-post evaluation of the on-bill programmes. It will be assessed which 
“mechanisms for change” were triggered by the programmes to address these barriers and 
how effective these mechanisms were in inducing social change. It will also be assessed in 
which aspects the programmes deviate from the PAYS® intervention theory and if these 
deviations provide explanatory value for understanding the programmes’ performance.  
2.1.2 Conceptual choices for analysing transaction costs 
A transaction cost (TC) analysis under the ex-post evaluation of How$mart® and the Green 
Deal, needed to be based on several conceptual choices. These are presented in the following 
section, which introduces the reader to the theoretical foundation of the TC analysis. 
The concept and analysis of transaction costs is one of the fundamental components of the 
school of New Institutional Economics (Ménard, 2004). In New Institutional Economics in 
general and in academic literature on the diffusion of energy efficiency technologies in 
particular, there is an on-going debate which cost components exactly constitute transaction 
costs (TCs). This applies in particular to the boundary between administrative and transaction 
costs. While Joskow & Marron (1992a), McCann et al. (2005), Stiglitz (1986) include 
administrative costs in their definition of TCs, other authors narrow the definition of TCs to 
ex-ante and ex-post activities, not directly related to drawing up the contract as such 
Sarah Kloke, IIIEE, Lund University 
10 
(Furubotn & Richter, 2010; Matthews, 1986; Mundaca et al., 2013). This thesis follows the 
definition provided by Matthews (1986, p. 906): ‘‘[TCs are] the costs of arranging a contract ex 
ante and monitoring and enforcing it ex post, as opposed to production costs.’’ Under this 
definition, common sources of TCs for investments in energy efficiency are related to time 
devoted to gathering, assessing and applying information, making decisions on technologies 
and usage, due diligence, contract negotiations and contract enforcement as well as monitoring 
and verification costs (Mundaca et al., 2013; Sanstad & Howarth, 1994). 
Figure 2 illustrates how TCs determine the price level for certain quantities of energy savings. 
A supply curve can be surrogated based on the marginal costs of providing one more unit of 
energy savings. The demand curve represents the private marginal benefits for one extra unit 
of energy savings. The y-axis is depicted in monetary terms and the x-axis represents the 
quantity of leveraged energy savings. Taking the first supply curve (S), a good amount of 
energy savings can be yielded at negative costs, which means that the efficiency improvement 
yields monetary savings from a lifecycle perspective (Joskow & Marron, 1992). The 
equilibrium level at QE illustrates the level of energy savings that would be yielded in the 
absence of TCs. Adding TCs faced by providers to the marginal costs, shifts the supply curve 
upwards and to the left (S´) with the effect of decreasing energy savings, falling from QE to 
Q´(TCs), and a higher price per saved energy unit, moving from PE to P´(TCs). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Impacts of administrative and transaction costs on price and quantity of energy savings 
Source: Own illustration based on Mundaca et al. (2013) 
The focus of the transaction costs analysis of the How$mart® and Green Deal lies on TCs 
borne by the utility Midwest Energy and Green Deal Providers. The author acknowledges that 
there is a very fine line between ACs and TCs. To provide greater clarity in the data analysis, 
administrative and marketing costs have been assessed separately from TCs in the survey sent 
to on-bill financing providers. 
While energy consumer and public authorities who oversee energy efficiency programmes also 
face TCs, these costs will not be part of the TC analysis. Assessing opportunity costs of 
exchanging appliances and equipment before the end of their lifetime would be highly 
interesting from a life-cycle perspective (Joskow & Marron, 1992), but are also not assessed.  
2.1.3 A multi-criteria framework for the ex-ante evaluation 
The ex-ante evaluation of policy instruments for encouraging a potential introduction of on-
bill financing in the German context draws from all findings of the ex-post evaluation of the 
How$mart® programme and the Green Deal. A multi-criteria framework is applied as  
“evaluation is by nature normative and thus […] criteria on which to base the normative 
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judgements must be utilized” (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 425). For this purpose, Mickwitz’ (2003) 
general criteria for the evaluation of environmental policies were chosen. Mickwitz’ multi-
criteria framework was regarded as particularly suitable for a first ex-ante evaluation that seeks 
to clarify if introducing a policy instrument for encouraging on-bill programmes might be an 
interesting option in the German context. Based on this general ex-ante evaluation an 
economic evaluation, such as a cost-benefit analysis (also called efficiency analysis by Vedung 
(2009)) could be carried out in a second step. However, the application of economic or 
democracy-related criteria, e.g. legitimacy, was out of scope for this thesis. The six criteria 
from Mickwitz (2003) and their application for the ex-ante evaluation are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Criteria for the ex-ante evaluation of policy instruments that encourage on-bill finance models in the 
German context based on Mickwitz (2003) 
Criteria 
Related questions from  
Mickwitz (2003, p. 426) 
Case-specific questions 
Relevance 
Do the goals of the instruments cover key 
environmental problems?  
Does on-bill financing address key energy 
efficiency related problems in the 
German context?  
Impact 
Is it possible to identify impacts that are 
clearly due to the policy instruments and 
their implementation? 
Is it possible to identify impacts that 
would be due to a policy instrument that 
encourages on-bill models and their 
implementation? 
Predictability 
Is it possible to foresee the 
administration, outputs and outcomes of 
the policy instrument? Is it thus possible 
for those regulated, as well as others, to 
prepare and take into account the policy 
instrument and its implications? 
Can administration, outputs and 
outcomes of design options for a policy 
instrument that encourages on-bill 
models be foreseen? 
Effectiveness 
To what degree do the achieved 
outcomes correspond to the intended 
goals of the policy instrument?  
 
To what degree can on-bill programmes 
deliver outcomes in light of overall 
energy efficiency goals and specific goals 
of the policy instrument? 
Persistence 
Are the effects persistent in such a way 
that they have a lasting effect on 
the state of the environment? 
Are yielded energy savings persistent in 
such a way that they have a lasting effect 
on absolute energy use? 
Flexibility Can the policy instrument cope with 
changing conditions? 
Can the policy instrument for on-bill 
programmes adapt to changing 
conditions?  
 
To evaluate the relevance of a policy instrument that encourages on-bill programmes, the reader 
will be introduced to the current policy mix for energy efficiency. Existing literature is 
reviewed (Becker et al., 2014; Blazejczak, Edler, & Schill, 2014; Löschel et al., 2014; Martin 
Pehnt et al., 2011; Stieß & Dunkelberg, 2013) to identify if there is a gap in the efficiency 
instruments mix, which might (partly) be filled by on-bill models.  
For assessing the potential impact, in a first step the results of a literature review will be 
presented regarding unexploited energy efficiency potentials in the German residential sector 
and the commercial sector, comprising firms that are not engaged in farming, manufacturing, 
or transportation (Blazejczak et al., 2014; Martin Pehnt et al., 2011). It should be noted that 
on-bill programmes might also be a suitable instrument to encourage efficiency improvements 
in industry. An analysis of the needs and saving potentials industry was out of scope of this 
thesis for two reasons. First, how to successfully tap energy saving potentials in industry is 
highly sector specific. Due to time constraints no analysis could have been carried out of the 
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specific industrial sectors represented in Germany. Second, larger energy consumers already 
have access to energy-saving-contracting models, in contrast to households (Berger & Schäfer, 
2009).4 Therefore, preference has been given to the residential sector as the added value of on-
bill programmes might be higher than in industry. The transport sector has also been excluded 
from this analysis as the focus lies on energy use in buildings, even though pilots with a similar 
logic are under development (Leber, 2014). In a second step, existing data on costs and 
benefits of specific energy efficiency technologies (Becker et al., 2014; BMVBS, 2012a, 2012b; 
Burr, 2013) is used to identify measures that could be suitable for on-bill financing.  
Several policy design options are evaluated, which vary in their degree of coerciveness and 
predictability of administration, outputs, in terms of on-bill programmes on the market, and 
outcome, in terms of energy efficiency measures installed and financed under these 
programmes. A policy instrument that obliges all energy providers to offer on-bill 
programmes to their customers (without mandated energy saving targets) is chosen for a 
bottom-up calculation of potential energy savings. The results of this calculation are used to 
evaluate the instrument’s effectiveness in terms of induced energy savings related to this specific 
policy instrument in light of Germany’s wider energy efficiency targets. Other policy design 
options will also be discussed, but are not underpinned by an assessment of induced energy 
savings. Furthermore, it will be discussed how persistent these savings might be in light of the 
existing literature on the so-called “rebound effect” which (partly) offsets yielded energy 
savings.5 Regarding the criterion flexibility, it will be evaluated how a policy to encourage on-
bill financing could interact with policy instruments that are currently discussed in the German 
energy efficiency policy arena.  
2.2 Methods for data collection  
To increase reliability, methods for data collection followed the principle of triangulation, 
described as “the attempt to get a fix on a phenomenon or measurement (and, derivatively, an 
interpretation) by approaching it via several independent routes” (Scriven, 1991, pp. 364–354). 
Secondary data as well as primary data was gathered from a variety of sources, which will be 
presented in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
The research for this thesis started with a screening of on-bill programmes all over the world. 
Academic literature as well as grey literature, such as government websites, reports or 
publications from non-governmental organisations was covered to provide a comprehensive 
overview over a variety of perspectives. As no on-bill programmes were identified outside the 
U.S. and the UK this resulted in an in-depth literature review with a narrowed geographical 
scope. Based on this review, the How$mart® programme in Kansas, US and the UK Green 
Deal were chosen as the cases for the ex-post analysis. All relevant secondary sources on these 
two programmes were consulted. For the ex-ante analysis, literature was consulted on the 
                                                 
4 A small number of utilities introduced mini-contracting programmes for energy efficiency improvements in households. 
Examples are the the programme for replacing inefficient refrigerators in low-income households, which is run by 
Wuppertaler Stadtwerke (WSW, 2013) or the programme for exchanging heating pumps and hydraulic balancing, run by 
Stadtwerke Tübingen (Berlo et al., 2011). Overall, these programmes are only available to a small share of households. 
5 In the academic literature different types of “rebound effect” are classified. For on-bill financing it is relevant to educate 
consumers about the micro-economic, direct rebound effect as it might partly or fully offset the estimated energy cost 
savings.  This type of “rebound effect” describes the phenomenon where “Improved energy efficiency for a particular 
energy service will decrease the effective price of that service and should therefore lead to an increase in consumption of 
that service. This [increase in consumption] will tend to offset the reduction in energy consumption provided by the 
efficiency improvement” (Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 2008, p. 637). The magnitude of direct “rebound effects” remains 
heavily debated and ranges from 1-3% to a complete offset of energy savings. However, most estimates are between 15 
and 30% (Berkhout et al., 2000; Greening et al., 2000; Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 2008). 
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German energy efficiency policy landscape, remaining energy saving potentials as well as data 
on costs and benefits of specific energy efficiency measures.  Along the case specific research, 
academic literature and evaluations of transaction costs related to energy efficiency 
programmes in other contexts were scrutinised. The literature review on the field of study was 
accompanied by a review of analytical frameworks for energy (efficiency) policy evaluation.  
Based on insights from existing literature, relevant stakeholders were identified, contacted and 
interviewed for the purpose of the ex-post evaluation. The applied guidelines for the semi-
structured interviews are attached in Annex I. All interviewees had the opportunity to review 
the statements attributed to their name. Furthermore, interviewees could choose to remain 
anonymous. To gain a better understanding of the original PAYS® system a telephone 
interview was carried out with Harlan Lachman from the EEI followed by frequent e-mail 
communications. For the evaluation of How$mart®, Michael Volker, the former Director of 
Regulatory and Energy Services at Midwest Energy, was interviewed, also followed up by e-
mail communications. With regards to the evaluation of the Green Deal, various face-to-face 
interviews with three Green Deal Providers, a representative of the Department for Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC) as well as a representative from the Green Deal Finance 
Company (GDFC) were highly relevant sources of information for getting a clear 
understanding of the design and functioning of the Green Deal. Further, questions on the 
history and design choices were clarified and discussed via two telephone interviews with Jan 
Rosenow (Researcher and Senior Consultant at Ricardo-AEA Group) and Kirsty Neale 
(former DECC employee who was involved in the development of the Green Deal). The 
representative from DECC, Zoe Leader (Energy Efficiency Policy Officer, WWF-UK) and 
Steven Heath (Director for Public Affairs at Knauf Insulation Northern Europe) were already 
interviewed in March 2014 for a previous (unpublished) paper on the Green Deal. The 
insights gained are also presented and discussed in this thesis.  
These sources of qualitative data were complemented by a survey sent out to 45 Green Deal 
providers in the UK and Midwest Energy in the U.S. The major purpose of designing the 
survey was to get quantitative data on transaction, administrative and marketing costs related 
to the provision of on-bill products. The questionnaire for Green Deal providers also 
comprised questions on obstacles and barriers faced by the companies as well as open 
questions regarding suggestions for improvements of the Green Deal policy framework. Six 
providers participated in the survey. Four providers used the online survey, one responded in 
a face-to-face interview and one provider responded on the phone. The questionnaire and 
participants’ responses are available in Annex II & III and inserted in the relevant sections of 
the ex-post evaluation, presented in chapter 3. Another interviewed provider was still in the 
preparatory phase of selling the first Green Deal Plans. As most questions of the survey were 
targeted at providers that have already gained experiences with selling Green Deal Plans, the 
provider did not participate in the survey, but delivered highly valuable insights on the design 
and functioning of the accreditation process and the Green Deal in general.  
For the ex-ante analysis, interviews with various stakeholders from the German energy 
efficiency context were carried out to get a preliminary feedback on a potential application of 
on-bill financing and related policy-instruments. First, interviewees from the energy efficiency 
policy arena as well as market actors were presented with the concept of the PAYS® system in 
its original form and were asked on potential obstacles that might need to be addressed in the 
German context. Second, experiences from the U.S. and the UK were presented and 
discussed with the interviewees. Interview partners were Michael Blohm (Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Economy, BMWi), Reinhard Loch (Head of the Energy Efficiency Unit 
at the Consumer Association, VZ NRW), Frank Schillig (Managing Director at KWA Eviva 
GmbH), Andreas Mucke (representative of local electricity provider, Wuppertaler Stadtwerke). 
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3. Analysis of the Pay as You Save
®
 intervention theory 
The following chapter provides the reader with a theoretical analysis of the Pay as You Save 
(PAYS®) intervention or programme theory. The EEI developed the PAYS® system as a 
template for designing OBF programmes in 1999 (Burr, 2013). To protect the intellectual 
property rights of the model, the EEI trademarked the name and the acronym within the U.S. 
The developers have provided the design and consulting services to five utilities that 
introduced OBF programmes based on the PAYS® system (Lachman, 2013). For an overview 
see Annex IV. The term “Pay as You Save” is often used for other types of on-bill models or 
even contracting solutions that bear little resembles with the EEI design (UK-GBC, 2009). In 
this thesis, the term is only used for the PAYS® system developed by the EEI. On-bill 
programmes without the trademark will be categorised as OBF (energy efficiency service) and 
OBR (loan) programmes. 
In the following analysis, each section elaborates on how a new mechanism for change (Mx) 
aims to overcome a certain barrier (Bx) to investments in energy efficiency. This analysis is 
based on Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) “Realistic Evaluation” framework, as it was outlined in 
chapter 2.1.1.  
M1 → B1 – Inertia: Inertia can be defined as “a tendency to do nothing or remain unchanged” 
(Inertia, n.d.). Even where large subsidies are offered for energy efficiency measures, 
consumers tend to not respond with a high take-up (CCC, 2009; Krarup & Russell, 2005). 
This can be partially explained with information deficits, but also with limited capabilities to 
translate information into calculations comparing the costs and benefits of the efficiency 
measure (Sanstad & Howarth, 1994; Zundel & Stieß, 2011). The PAYS® strategy for 
overcoming high levels of inertia is to actively approach the consumer and to do the maths on 
costs and benefits for him or her. It is usually the utility or a contractor who contacts 
consumers with high levels of energy use and offers to install efficiency measure(s) at no up-
front costs. Under PAYS®, all measures are eligible where the costs can be repaid through 
monthly chargers over 75% over the measure’s life time and where monthly charges are not 
higher than 75% of expected yielded energy cost savings. The following exemplary calculation 
is intended to clarify how the PAYS® system could be applied for the exchange of an old 
standard gas boiler to a new condensing gas boiler (with a lifetime of 19 years) in a single-
family home (see Figure 3). Data was taken from the German context (BMVBS, 2012a). 
 
Figure 3 - Exemplary calculation for on-bill financing applied for a boiler exchange in a single-family home 
Source: Own illustration; Data on costs and savings is based on BMVBS (BMVBS, 2012a) 
 €-    
 €1,000.00  
 €2,000.00  
 €3,000.00  
 €4,000.00  
 €5,000.00   €4,155  €3,922  €3,381 
Charge on gas bill (p.a.) Gas bill (p.a.) 
Cost components: 
Technology/installation costs : 5,500€ 
Programme costs: 700€ 
Financing costs: 1,486€ 
Total costs: 8,224€ 
Costs over 14 years (75% lifetime): 
On-bill charge:  541€/a 
Savings before repayment:  233€/a 
Savings after repayment: 774€/a 
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For making the PAYS® system work, it is therefore a prerequisite that the measure’s savings 
allow to pay-off the total costs, including costs for technology, the installation, administration, 
marketing, financing and further transaction costs. Limiting repayments to 75% of savings 
should ensure that the consumer benefits from immediate net savings after the installation of 
the measure(s). The customer enjoys the full savings after repayments have been settled. As 
the product is not designed as a loan, but as a utility service, consumers do not need to 
undergo a credit check. This reduces the hassle factor. If these conditions are fulfilled, the 
consumer has a strong incentive to say yes to the efficiency improvement (H. Lachman, 
personal communication, various occasions) 
M2 → B2 – Lack of available capital and/ or liquidity preference: Households tend to face difficulties 
or are reluctant to provide the capital for efficiency measures from their own pocket (Berlo et 
al., 2011; Guertler & Royston, 2013; Sanstad & Howarth, 1994). Under PAYS® this barrier is 
addressed, as consumers do not face the upfront costs related to energy efficient renovations. 
Investment costs are borne by the utility or third-party lender. The provider might finance the 
renovation from its own budget or seek external funding. From a consumer perspective, the 
OBF design has the advantage that outstanding service charges are not considered as debt. 
Therefore, OBF has no impact on the ability to access credit for other purposes or mortgage 
financing. This is also highly relevant for businesses that are often reluctant to take on debt on 
their balance sheets (H. Lachman, personal communication, July 8, 2014). 
M3 → B3 – Split incentives: The “split incentive dilemma”, also called the “investor-user 
dilemma”, describes the situation where the landlord (the investor) bears the costs, but the 
tenant (the user) enjoys a lower energy bill. As costs and benefits are split between the two 
parties, the landlord has no incentive to invest in energy efficiency measures, except the 
increasing value of the property. As most owners fear that property markets tend to 
undervalue the efficiency improvement, this incentive is usually not sufficient to trigger energy 
efficiency investments (Guertler & Royston, 2013; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994; Tuominen et al., 
2012). This barrier is addressed by the PAYS® system, as the up-front costs are not borne by 
the landlord, but the utility or a third-party. It is one of the basic rules that repayments are 
borne by the beneficiary of reduced energy costs. Through the introduction of a charge on the 
energy bill the financial responsibility is shifted from the landlord to the tenant, given that the 
tenant is the bill payer and enjoys the benefits of the installed measure(s). In well-functioning 
property markets the landlord should benefit from an increased property value (Burr, 2013). 
M4 → B4 – Uncertainty regarding long pay-back periods: Investments in energy efficiency measures 
are by nature highly illiquid and mostly irreversible (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). Combined with 
pay-back periods for deeper building retrofits of more than thirty years many consumers are 
reluctant to invest in efficiency improvements (Guertler & Royston, 2013). Under PAYS®, 
parts of the benefits are shifted from long-term future savings to the present. Due to the 75% 
rule, consumers should see an immediate benefit from a reduced energy bill even before 
investments are amortised. Furthermore, the payment obligation is connected to the gas or 
electricity meter, not to a legal person. This ensures that the actual beneficiary of the savings 
pays back the measure’s costs. If the first programme participant moves out, the following 
resident is responsible for paying the outstanding charges. This overcomes uncertainties with 
regards to long pay-back periods (H. Lachman, personal communication, July 8, 2014). 
M5 → B5 – Risk aversion: As many efficiency measures are characterised by high-up front costs 
and long amortisation periods, consumers might face a significant loss if the measure breaks 
or does not yield the expected energy savings (Gates, 1983). The perception of high risks is 
translated into high discount rates for future savings that inhibit the introduction of efficiency 
improvements (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). To overcome consumers’ risk aversion, the PAYS® 
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system provides programme participants with a high level of consumer protection. The system 
mandates that if a measure breaks or fails the consumer’s payment obligation has to stop. 
Only when the measure has been repaired repayments may continue. Limiting payback 
periods to 75% of the expected lifetime of the installed measure is another safety provision. 
Furthermore, the utility acts as a mediator between contractors, e.g. craftsmen, and consumers 
and thereby gives consumer complaints a stronger voice (H. Lachman, personal 
communication, July 8, 2014).  
M6 → B6 – High transaction costs:  Transaction costs related to the installation of energy 
efficiency measures from a consumer’s perspective are mostly related to the search of 
information about energy saving potentials, technologies and market conditions as well as the 
decision-making and contract negotiations with the energy efficiency service provider 
(Björkqvist & Wene, 1993; Gates, 1983; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). Under PAYS®, the costs for 
searching information should be reduced, as the utility or certified contractors provide the 
consumer with the know-how about energy savings and technologies’ characteristics. Based 
on an assessment of energy saving potentials in the customer’s property, the consumer is 
approached with a tailor-made offer for installing and financing the recommended measure(s). 
Even though transaction costs on the customer side cannot be eliminated, they should be 
lower compared to most self-organised efficiency improvements.  
Furthermore, it is not only the consumers’ uptake of energy efficiency measures that is 
hindered by a number of barriers. The basic prerequisite for the PAYS® intervention theory to 
translate into practice is that energy service providers are able to yield energy efficiency 
potentials cost-effectively. Providers also face two major barriers, which are addressed by the 
PAYS® model: 
M7 → B6 – High administrative and transaction costs:  Searching for information, marketing, due 
diligence, contract negotiations, programme administration, monitoring of energy use and cost 
savings are all sources of transaction costs on the provider’s side that can move apparently 
cost-effective energy savings into the non-economic zone (Kiss, 2013; Mundaca, Mansoz, 
Neij, & Timilsina, 2013). Due to the small size of energy efficiency projects in households, 
transaction costs are regarded as relatively high compared to the overall investment (Guertler 
& Royston, 2013). The scale of these costs should be reduced by the simple and streamlined 
design of PAYS® programmes. As the finance provided is not designed as a loan, but as a 
service the time spent by the utility on credit assessments and contract negotiation should be 
reduced. 
M8 → B8 – High finance costs: Providing energy efficiency services at no up-front costs and 
spreading the repayments over a long period is still a novel concept for many banks. The 
(perceived) risk attached to this finance model is a crucial factor for banks when determining 
the appropriate interest level (K. Neale, personal communication, August 5, 2014). Therefore, 
utilities or third parties might struggle to access low cost finance (Guertler & Royston, 2013). 
Under the PAYS® system, the risk for the lender is reduced as the utility guarantees to repay 
the loan independent from customers’ repayments. Therefore, it is the utility that is 
responsible for collecting repayments and outstanding debt from customers, not the bank. In 
case of non-payment the utility has the right to react with a disconnection of utility services 
(EEI, 2014). This creates a strong incentive for the customer to repay the costs, resulting in a 
low rate of defaulting customers. Tying the payment obligation to the building’s electricity or 
gas meter is further a strategy of “de-risking” the investment from the side of the utility, as 
new residents can be held liable for outstanding charges (Bell et al., 2011; Cillo & Lachman, 
2013). 
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4. Ex-post evaluation of on-bill programmes 
4.1 The How$mart® programme in Kansas, U.S.  
In the following sections the reader will be provided with background information regarding 
the introduction, the design and the performance of the How$mart® programme. 
Furthermore, it will be analysed how effective How$mart® is in overcoming the eight barriers, 
that should be addressed by the PAYS® intervention theory. 
4.1.1 Context 
Midwest Energy is a local electric and gas cooperative that serves 48,000 electric and 42,000 
gas customers in central and western Kansas.6 The introduction of How$mart® is based on 
long-term experiences with energy efficiency services, which have been promoted by the 
utility since the early 1980s as an effective tool to manage high bill complaints and to improve 
customer satisfaction (Volker & Johnson, 2008). Between 2005 and 2007, the City of Hays 
allocated higher than expected franchise tax revenues from Midwest Energy due to high gas 
prices. These revenues had the downside of increasing energy bills for Hays’ residents. City 
administrators decided to use tax revenues for promoting the up-take of energy efficiency 
measures in low-income households. Midwest Energy got in charge of the energy audit 
programme. The utility realised that particularly lower-income households in rental properties 
were not able to implement the energy auditor’s advice due to several market barriers, such as 
a lack of capital. Midwest Energy’s aim was to provide a financing programme for efficiency 
improvements suitable for overcoming the identified barriers in rental and low-income 
markets. Midwest Energy learned about PAYS® and regarded it as an effective tool to address 
high up-front costs, capital constraints, long payback periods, conflicting incentives between 
landlords and tenants, and consumer education (Volker & Johnson, 2008). The PAYS® 
system, as it was designed by the EEI, built the foundation for the development of 
How$mart®. However, in certain aspects How$mart® deviates from the original design to 
better adapt to local circumstances. Therefore, Midwest Energy is not allowed to use the 
PAYS® trademark (Cillo & Lachman, 2013). The differences will be highlighted below. 
Worldwide, Midwest was the first utility to voluntarily adopt the PAYS® system (Johnson et 
al., 2012). How$mart® was introduced as a pilot programme in 2007 in four counties. Initially, 
it was designed as an OBR programme. Midwest Energy lobbied at the state level for a change 
in legislation to allow the utility to restructure the financing from a loan to a tariff-based 
service. In August 2008, the desired legislative changes were in place and How$mart® was fully 
implemented in all 41 counties as an OBF model (Burr, 2013; Johnson et al., 2012).  
4.1.2 Consumer uptake and installed energy efficiency measures 
Until the end of 2012, Midwest Energy invested US$4.8 million in energy efficiency measures 
in 858 locations. By August 2014, 1,184 projects have been completed. Measures that are 
eligible under How$mart® must be permanently attached to the building. Portable measures, 
such as refrigerators, are thus not eligible under the programme (Johnson et al., 2012). 
Installed measures in the residential sector mostly comprise new heating systems. Other 
measures are the exchange of air conditioners, air sealing, insulation of the building shell and 
geothermal loop projects. The programme component How$mart Light® offers efficient 
                                                 
6 Midwest Energy owns the electric transmission system. Electricity is generated from company-owned sources or procured 
contractually. The gas system is not vertically integrated. This means that Midwest Energy is not operating upstream 
transmission “pipes” or gas production facilities (Johnson et al., 2012; Volker & Johnson, 2008).  
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lighting solutions to the commercial and industrial sector. The average project size across all 
customer segments has been $7,489, based on data from 2012 (Cillo & Lachman, 2013). 
Since inception, the energy efficiency measures installed under the How$mart programme 
saved 9,756 GJ of electricity and 33,072 GJ of gas. This resulted in 4,370 reduced tons of 
carbon emissions (Midwest Energy, personal communication, September 11, 2014). Midwest 
Energy closely monitored a small sample of households in the first year after the introduction 
of How$mart®. These households showed a 28% decrease in natural gas consumption in the 
winter months and a 15% decrease in summer electricity usage (Volker & Johnson, 2008). 
4.1.3 The customer’s journey under How$mart® 
In the following section, the reader will be introduced to the How$mart® customers’ journey, 
which comprises the key activities, transactions and contractual sequences that programme 
participants have to go through. It usually takes the following route: Some customers with 
energy bill concerns or complaints become familiar with the programme through contacting 
the utility. Others are actively approached by Midwest’s contractors or informed about the 
programme by social service agencies when financing efficiency improvements from 
consumers’ own means is not an option. When an initial contact has been established 
customers receive more detailed information about the functioning of How$mart® and a high-
level screening of energy usage. This may then lead into a comprehensive on-site audit 
performed by one of Midwest’s auditors. The audit may include the following services: an air 
infiltration test, an infrared scan, a duct leakage test and a furnace combustion test. Midwest 
Energy charges a fee of $200 if the customer decides to stop the process at this stage. In case 
the auditor cannot find improvements that result in a lower energy bill, Midwest Energy 
covers the costs and the process stops as well. If the audit reveals cost-effective energy 
efficiency potentials and the customer is still on-board, a preliminary Conservation Plan is 
developed which consists of recommended efficiency measures, the estimated costs of those 
measures and expected energy savings, translated into cost savings.  
All measures are eligible where monthly charges for repaying the costs of the efficiency 
improvement do not exceed 90% of the yielded energy cost savings. Furthermore, the 
payback period is not allowed to exceed 15 years or 75% of the expected life of the measure. 
Particularly, costs of efficiency improvements in the building shell, e.g. a new façade, can be 
hard to unbundle from modernisation costs, which would have been borne by the property 
owner anyway. Under How$mart, there is no complicated procedure in place to differentiate 
between incremental and full costs of a measure. If savings allow for it, Midwest Energy bears 
the full costs of the measure (M. Volker, personal communication, July 2, 2014). 
If the customer is interested in signing up for the programme, he or she solicits binding bids 
from a list of Midwest’s approved contractors. When the most attractive bid has been chosen, 
the Conservation Plan is finalised (Johnson et al., 2012; Volker & Johnson, 2008).  
In rental properties the landlord and the tenant must give their consent to participating in the 
How$mart® programme by signing a form. This form also requires the current property 
owner to inform new tenants or owners that a How$mart® payment obligation is tied to the 
building’s gas or electricity meter (Johnson et al., 2012).  
The customer informs Midwest Energy when the instalment of the chosen measure or 
package of measures has been satisfactorily completed. Midwest Energy carries out a post-
retrofit audit to check if all measures have been implemented as prescribed in the conservation 
plan (M. Volker, personal communication, August 29, 2014). As a last step, Midwest Energy 
pays the contractor and starts to issue the monthly tariff on the customer’s utility bill (Johnson 
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et al., 2012). The tariff is either allocated on the electricity or gas bill, depending on the 
customer’s location in Midwest Energy’s service area. While some customers only receive 
electricity, others are provided with gas or both, electricity and gas. However, in all service 
areas customers are eligible for measures that save electricity and gas. The payment streams 
under How$mart® are based on net utility bill savings, which are not necessarily Midwest 
Energy’s utility bill savings (M. Volker, personal communication, May 27, 2014). 
The steps of a customer’s journey under How$mart® are illustrated in Figure 4. The blue 
arrows depict all kind of transactions. The yellow lines represent monetary flows. 
 
Figure 4 - Key activities and contractual sequences under the How$mart® customer's journey  
Source: Own illustration based on (Burr, 2013; Johnson et al., 2012; Volker & Johnson, 2008) 
As Midwest Energy does not operate in a liberalised market, there is no regulation in place for 
how to proceed with customers who wish to switch to another electricity or gas supplier (M. 
Volker personal communication, June 13, 2014). 
4.1.4 Effectiveness in overcoming barriers on the consumer’s side  
As outlined before, the design of the How$mart® programme was inspired by the PAYS® 
system. In the following section it will be analysed how effective the How$mart® programme 
has been in translating the introduced PAYS® intervention theory into practice. Under each 
subsection a short summary will be provided if the programme was successful in introducing a 
mechanism for change (Mx) that is able to overcome the barrier under discussion. 
4.1.4.1 Tackling inertia 
As introduced above, consumers tend to respond to energy efficiency programmes with high 
levels of inertia (Krarup & Russell, 2005). Therefore, it is remarkable that, even though 
Midwest Energy does not provide additional incentives in form grants or rebates, about 55% 
of customers making decisions on projects agree to sign up for How$mart® (Cillo & Lachman, 
2013). This means that the majority of customers being engaged with the programme regard it 
as a good deal.  For those customers the hurdle of solving “complex optimization problems in 
order to obtain the least cost provision of energy services” (Sanstad & Howarth, 1994, p. 815) 
seems to be cleared. A major limitation is that the prerequisite of getting engaged with the 
programme is not fulfilled by the large majority of customers, as they are not actively 
approached by Midwest Energy, contractors or social service agencies. Customers with an 
above average energy use or unsatisfied customers are more likely to be informed about 
How$mart®. Out of the all customers 1.3% had participated within the first three years (Hayes 
et al., 2011), which means 0.43% of the total customer base have participated per year. 
Effectiveness M1: As the majority of customers who are actively approached under How$mart
® say “yes” to 
efficiency improvements, high levels of inertia can be regarded as overcome without providing subsidies to trigger 
higher participation rates. A drawback is that only a small share of customers is actively targeted.  
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4.1.4.2 Tackling a lack of capital and/ or liquidity preference 
Neither the building owner nor the tenant has to bear the up-front costs for installing the 
recommended measure(s), if savings allow for it. Here, the full costs are borne by Midwest 
Energy. The eligibility for participating in How$mart® is based on the identified energy saving 
potential. The utility checks the customer’s utility billing history, but does not carry out a 
conventional credit assessment (Bell & Nadel, 2012). Therefore, How$mart® does not directly 
discriminate based on income. There might be an indirect discrimination as low-income 
households can be assumed to be likely in energy debt. However, for most households, 
How$mart® is overcoming the barrier “lack of capital” given that energy efficiency measures 
can be re-financed via the energy cost savings.  
By limiting the monthly repayments to 90% of estimated energy cost savings, Midwest Energy 
provides customers with a 10% safety margin, in case savings realised are below expected 
savings. The margin is lower than the recommended 25% under PAYS®, but was chosen to 
allow for larger aggressive investments in efficiency measures (Volker & Johnson, 2008). This 
should not be misinterpreted that the 90% are always exploited to the fullest extent. 
The question arises how to account for a potential rebound effect that partly or fully offsets 
the yielded energy savings. M. Volker (personal communication, June 13, 2014) reported a 
typical rebound effect of 25% after the installation of the energy efficiency measure, which is 
consistent with most estimates ranging from 15% to 30% in academic literature (Berkhout, 
Muskens, & Velthuijsen, 2000; Greening, Greene, & Di, 2000; Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 
2008). This means that households where the 90% have been fully exploited might pay higher 
energy bills over the payback period than before the measure’s installation. The Citizens’ 
Utility Ratepayer Board raised concerns that How$mart® might pose a risk to low-income 
households, as the utility has the right to disconnect the customer in case of non-payment 
(Burr, 2013). In contrast, Midwest Energy argues that How$mart® is decreasing the risk of 
disconnection as customers should enjoy lower utility bills even before the repayments are 
settled. The effect of “comfort taking” should not be accounted as “less savings” (M. Volker, 
personal communication, June 13, 2014). In summary, it is under debate how to account for a 
rebound effect and consequently if How$mart® programme participants risk to face higher 
utility bills. If customers pay higher bills than before the efficiency improvement, this has a 
negative effect on customer’s liquidity, even if customers do not face any up-front costs. 
The situation is different when customers wish to install measures where monthly repayments 
are expected to exceed 90% of the energy cost savings. Midwest Energy still bears the 
investment costs that can be recovered through 90% of the estimated cost savings, but 
customers provide additional funding from their own capital to bear the incremental costs. In 
these cases, investments in efficiency measures reduce the customer’s liquidity in terms of net 
disposable income. M. Volker (personal communication, August 29, 2014) estimated that in 
about two thirds of all projects property owners or landlords have contributed to the 
financing of the measure. A capital injection from the customer is usually needed for replacing 
equipment related to heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), unless previously 
installed equipment has been very old and inefficient and great energy savings can be yielded 
after the exchange. Combining the exchange of HVAC equipment with highly cost-effective 
thermal insulations of the building shell is a common strategy to reduce the amount of capital 
required from programme participants. By the end of 2012, customers had invested US$1.4 
million in addition to the US$4.8 million provided by Midwest Energy (Cillo & Lachman, 
2013). Out of the total investments mobilised, customers’ capital injection amounts to 22%.  
Effectiveness M2: How$mart® is overcoming the barrier “lack of finance” for households that are not in energy 
debt and that show saving potentials, where 90% of the savings over 75% of the measures’ lifetime allow to 
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finance the total costs of the efficiency improvement. However, programme participants’ liquidity might still be 
reduced when a rebound effect more than offsets energy savings and increases energy bills. 
4.1.4.3 Tackling disincentives due to long pay-back periods 
The risk of bearing the energy efficiency improvement’s costs without seeing any benefits due 
to moving into another property before the end of the payback period is reduced significantly 
as the payment obligation ends with the end of the residence. Tying the payment obligation to 
the building’s electricity of gas meter and not to the individual is a crucial element of 
How$mart®. It is fully in line with the design of PAYS®. However, this risk is only fully 
overcome for one third of the projects, where customers have not contributed any capital 
from their own pocket. Even before the end of the payback period, the energy user should 
enjoy lower energy costs due to the 90% rule. Seeing an immediate benefit can be regarded as 
a relevant incentive for customers with expected short residence durations. 
The transfer of the payment obligation is ensured by different procedures. First, the property 
owner is obligated to inform a new owner or tenant about the How$mart charges. By signing 
a form, the owner agrees to pay the remaining balance of the How$mart® obligation within 30 
days if the buyer was not notified before the sale of the property. Second, when moving 
customers call to close their billing accounts Midwest Energy reminds the owner of the agreed 
disclosure procedure. Midwest Energy also informs the new owner or tenant when the first 
contact is established for the payment of utility bills. However, this is usually taking place after 
the property has already been sold. Third, as Midwest Energy faced problems with owners, 
who did not notify the payment obligation correctly, the company adopted the policy of filing 
a commercial lien in form of a Uniform Commercial Codes (UCC) with the local County 
Register of Deeds. The property is then used as collateral to protect Midwest’s interests. When 
a property title is searched, the How$mart® payment obligation will be recognized before the 
completion of the sale (Volker & Johnson, 2008). In this aspect, How$mart® deviates from 
PAYS®, where the property is not encumbered and the disclosure of the payment obligation is 
solely based on the contracts signed by programme participants (H. Lachman, personal 
communication, July 1, 2014). Midwest has also cooperated with local state realtors to depict 
How$mart® charges in “Seller Disclosure Forms” (Volker & Johnson, 2008). 
Effectiveness M3: As the payment obligation is tied to the energy meter, the risk to pay for improvements 
without seeing the benefit due to “long pay-back periods” is eliminated for those customers where measures are 
fully financed by Midwest Energy.  
4.1.4.4 Tackling risk aversion 
Unlike in the original PAYS® system, the utility does not take the risk for a failing measure. 
This risk is assigned to the property owner (Cillo & Lachman, 2013). Midwest Energy explains 
this deviation in the design of the How$mart® programme with interests expressed by local 
stakeholders. Customers as well as contractors preferred to have a close customer-contractor 
relationship without having Midwest Energy as an intermediary actor in case of problems with 
equipment maintenance (Burr, 2013). Nevertheless, Midwest Energy requires certain quality 
standards from contractors. For example, with regards to insulation materials blown in 
cellulose or foam are allowed, while fibreglass bats or blown in fibreglass is not (M. Volker, 
personal communication, June 13, 2014). Instead of using a formal accreditation system, 
Midwest Energy has been highly active in developing a strong relationship with contractors, 
e.g. by offering training opportunities on efficiency technologies (Volker & Johnson, 2008). 
Effectiveness M4: As the risk for a failing measure is borne by the customer and not by the utility, the barrier 
“risk aversion” cannot be regarded as overcome. 
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4.1.4.5 Tackling ‘split incentives’ between landlords and tenants 
By shifting the payment obligation to the beneficiary of the energy cost savings, the “split 
incentives problem” between landlords and tenants has been overcome (Burr, 2013). Out of 
the total number of completed jobs, 14% were carried out in rental homes, which is consistent 
with the demographic characteristics of Midwest Energy’s service area where 14.6% rent their 
homes (Johnson et al., 2012). For those measures where the costs cannot be fully recovered 
via the charge on the energy bill it, the landlord is required to provide capital in addition to the 
capital injected by Midwest Energy. In practice, tenants never bear any costs except the 
surcharge on the energy bill (M. Volker, personal communication, August 29, 2014). 
As explained above, to create an incentive structure that appeals to both, the landlord and the 
tenant, it is essential that the payments and benefits are borne by the same actor. In the rental 
market under Midwest Energy’s service area, there are different billing procedures in place: 
(1) The tenant pays the utility bill.  The landlord needs to give her consent, but is not involved 
in financing the energy efficiency measure, given that the measure can be fully financed via the 
energy cost savings. Here, the landlord only sees an indirect benefit in form of a quality 
improvement of the property. A service charge is attached to the rental unit’s meter. The 
tenant bears the payment obligation and enjoys a lower energy bill after the installation of the 
efficiency measure. If the rental property is vacant it is the landlord’s responsibility to pay the 
utility bill with the attached tariff. (M. Volker, personal communication, June 24, 2014). 
(2) Energy costs are included in the rent. Based on consumption data from Midwest Energy 
the property manager calculates a utility cap, which is a flat utility fee, for the rental units.  If 
the tenant consumes more energy than covered by the cap, he is responsible to pay additional 
charges. Here, the landlord is the main beneficiary of How$mart®, as the landlord does not 
pass on the energy cost savings to the tenant. The landlord pays the charge on the utility bill, 
but also enjoys the monetary savings and indirect benefits from an upgraded property. As 
costs and savings are borne by the landlord, there is no split incentives dilemma (Burr, 2013).  
(3) Electricity is metered individually and paid by the tenant. Gas is not metered individually, 
but for the whole building, and is paid by the landlord. Here, the savings of the two energy 
carriers will be unbundled. The benefits as well as the charge for repaying measures that save 
electricity are located on the tenant’s bill. The landlord is responsible for paying a charge on 
the gas bill, but also enjoys the cost savings related to the reduced gas consumption (M. 
Volker, personal communication, June 24, 2014).  
As mentioned before, landlords should benefit from an increased property value due to 
efficiency improvements, even before the repayments have been settled. However, in practice 
owners were worried that a payment obligation tied to their property might be an obstacle for 
a property transfer. Midwest Energy learned that particularly landlords tend to frequently 
invest and divest in rental properties. As it was one of Midwest Energy’s priorities to tear 
down barriers for the rental market, the utility dropped the policy of demanding an interest 
penalty for early payoff. This decision was already taken within the first year after the 
introduction of How$mart®. The new, more flexible design allows customers to pay off the 
outstanding balance at any time without facing penalties (Volker & Johnson, 2008). 
Effectiveness M5: As cost and benefits are always allocated with either the tenant or the landlord, the barrier 
“split-incentives” has been overcome in Midwest Energy’s service area.  
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4.1.4.6 Tackling high transaction costs 
There is no data available on TCs faced by How$mart® participants. Overall, the design of the 
programme has been kept relatively simple. As illustrated in section 4.1.3, customers have to 
go through five steps to receive an efficiency improvement financed by Midwest Energy. If 
the measure is fully financed by the utility, the customer only has to deal with two actors, 
Midwest Energy and the chosen contractor. If the customer chooses a measure where 
additional funding is needed and the customer is not able or willing to inject capital from her 
own pocket, a private bank might be involved in financing the improvement. As the utility 
takes over the work related to identifying energy saving potentials, calculating costs and 
benefits as well as seeking access to third-party finance, TCs are partly shifted to the utility, 
which would normally be faced by energy consumers when carrying out efficiency 
improvements on their own. From the literature review and interviews, no significant 
obstacles were found in the customer’s journey. Therefore, it can be assumed that How$mart® 
participants face lower TCs than most non-participants who organise and implement the 
installation and financing of efficiency improvements in their properties themselves. 
Effectiveness M6: Due to the simple and streamlined design of How$mart®, resulting in a low number of 
contractual sequences and actors involved, it can be assumed that consumers face relatively low transaction costs. 
4.1.5 Effectiveness in overcoming barriers on the provider’s side  
4.1.5.1 Analysis of administrative and transaction costs 
As the programme operator, Midwest Energy faces several cost drivers that determine the 
overall level of programme costs. Major cost components are marketing costs, carrying out 
energy audits, administrative costs, such as the entry of How$mart charges into the billing 
system, and transaction costs that accrue from in-house capacity building, time spent on 
developing a contractor network, due diligence, or contract negotiations. Midwest Energy has 
no accounting system in place that allows for a breakdown of programme costs into specific 
cost components. By the end of 2012, programme fees amounted for US$ 207,000 (Cillo & 
Lachman, 2013). In relation to total investments made in energy efficiency technologies 
installed under the How$mart programme (US$4.8 million from Midwest Energy and US$ 1.4 
million from programme participants), programme fees account for 3% of total capital costs. 
Spreading programme fees over the 858 sold energy efficiency service packages, programme 
fees amount to US$241 per project. Reported data from other PAYS programmes are located 
in a similar range (H. Lachman, personal communication, various occasions). Unfortunately, 
no quantitative data could be accessed to assess in more detail which costs are covered by 
programme fees. It is also unclear how well programme fees reflect rather “hidden” 
transaction costs, such as time spent on negotiating with the local state realtor organisation or 
preparing a workshop with contractors. 
4.1.5.2 Financing costs  
The utility succeeded in accessing low cost capital from different sources, such as the Kansas 
Housing Resources Corporation, stimulus funds through the “Efficiency Kansas” programme7 
and the Rural Economic Development Loan (REDL) from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (Cillo & Lachman, 2013). By mixing these sources of funding, the blended cost of 
capital is currently 2% (M. Volker, personal communication, May 27, 2014). This allows the 
company to pass on low interest rates to their customers. 
                                                 
7 In 2010 and 2011 Midwest Energy received funding from the state’s programme “Efficiency Kansas” that is fed by a 
revolving loan fund based on $37 million accessed through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). 
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 Interest rates8 have ranged from 0 to 8% over the lifetime of the programme (Bell & Nadel, 
2012). Over the last years, the interest rate for residential customers has been 3%. Commercial 
customers have paid a slightly higher interest rate of 4.5%. According to Michael Volker, the 
access to capital with low interest rates in the range of 2% is one of the key facilitating factors 
for a relatively high consumer up-take under How$mart®. Furthermore, the interest rate has 
an impact on the portfolio of measures that can be fully financed under How$mart. Lowering 
the interest by one percentage point allows an additional investment of $450 to pay-off over 
75% of a standard measure. Therefore, financing costs have a direct impact on the eligibility 
of measures under How$mart (M. Volker, personal communication, various occasions). 
It should be noted that Midwest Energy decided to lower the interest rate embedded in the 
programme costs to a rate below the allowed rate of return for the utility. The incoming 
money flow from programme participants does not fully recover the embedded costs of the 
programme. However, How$mart® is still regarded as a good sell for the company due to very 
high levels of customer satisfaction. As the preceding audit programme it is “seen as a 
customer service expense, not really a profit center” (M. Volker, personal communication, July 
2, 2014). A survey customer satisfaction showed that customers who are aware of EES and 
who used the provided services show a higher level of satisfaction (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 - Impact of energy efficiency services on Midwest Energy's customer satisfaction 
Source: Own illustration based on Volker & Johnson, (2008) 
Effectiveness M8: Providing customers with a low-cost financing solution has a positive impact on the eligibility 
of energy efficiency measures under How$mart®. It can be regarded as a crucial facilitating factor.  
4.2 Lessons learned and recommended policy design criteria 
The How$mart® programme’s design and performance raised a lot of interest. In Kentucky 
and South Carolina energy efficiency programmes were introduced that are based on the 
design of How$mart® (Burr, 2013). Which lessons can be learned from this case study and 
which policy design criteria can be identified for future on-bill programmes? 
(1) Provide the installation and financing of energy efficiency measures as a service, not as a loan. 
Providing the efficiency improvement as a utility service, not as a loan, is one of the essential 
design features of How$mart for increasing customers’ willingness to participate in the 
programme. Paying a tariff based service on the energy bill, which is technically not taking out 
debt, is particularly attractive for consumers that are already in debt or simply risk averse.  
                                                 
8 Note that there is a difference between the interest rate and the APR. The interest rate is “the proportion of a loan that is 
charged as interest to the borrower, typically expressed as an annual percentage of the loan outstanding” (Interest rate, 
n.d.). The "APR is made up of two components: [the] interest rate and any additional charges.” (Zamarripa, 2014).  
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(2) By ensuring that the measure’s beneficiary pays, OBF is able to overcome barriers in rental markets. 
Midwest Energy’s effort to create a programme design that overcomes barriers in the rental 
market has been successful (Burr, 2013). Providing the whole service, from the audit to the 
financing, at no upfront costs as well as allocating the payment of the tariff with the 
beneficiary of the energy cost savings, are two crucial elements for accessing the rental market. 
(3) Require a margin between repayments and expected savings, to ensure customers see an immediate benefit. 
Due to the 90% rule, How$mart® participants should see an immediate effect on their energy 
bill. Depending on the energy saving potential and saturation of energy demand, a rebound 
effect might reduce monetary savings in the range of 25%. However, increased comfort can 
also be regarded as an immediate indirect benefit to the customer. 
(4) Seek sources of low cost capital that allow passing on low interest rates to programme participants. 
Having access to low cost finance from the state enabled Midwest Energy to offer attractive 
financial conditions to their customers. As outlined before, low finance costs in the range of 
3% p.a. increase the portfolio of measures that can be fully financed via energy cost savings. 
(5) Place the utility at the centre of the programme to reduce administrative and transaction costs. 
First, the utility has a direct relationship with its customers, which reduces transaction costs in 
several ways. Based on customer data, Midwest Energy can identify energy users who might 
be interested in participating in the programme due to high energy use levels or bill 
complaints. Furthermore, the new contractual relationship can be built on existing trust. The 
customer would not participate if the utility is known for its bad service and the utility would 
not provide financing for a customer who has an unreliable billing history (Bell et al., 2011). 
This reduces the need for additional checks, such as the customer’s financial credit worthiness.  
Second, tying the repayments to the energy bill reduces the risk of non-payment on the side of 
the financier. As the utility is able to react with a disconnection in case of non-payment, 
default rates across on-bill programmes in the U.S. are below 1% (Cillo & Lachman, 2013). 
Third, the motivation of a utility is different from an independent ESCO. Creating a 
programme that recovers its costs is of course in the utility’s interest. However, creating a 
programme that generates profit is not necessarily the first priority. In the case of Midwest 
Energy, the main motivation has been to raise the level of customer satisfaction. This is 
particularly interesting as Midwest Energy is not operating in a competitive market. In an open 
market, it can be assumed that utilities have an even higher interest in building a long-term 
relationship, even longer than an energy efficiency measure’s payback period and in providing 
high quality services. As Johnson et al. (2012) explain: “From the utility’s perspective, this is 
what makes How$mart® concept unique: it is not just an expense aimed at lessening the 
utility’s sales volumes, but rather an investment that yields a rate of return like traditional 
utility investment while satisfying the same end-use need for the customer at lower cost. ” 
(6) Encourage utilities to establish a strong contractor network to avoid costly accreditation procedures. 
Establishing a good contractor network through educational activities helped Midwest Energy 
to ensure that the implementation of efficiency improvements meets the desired quality 
standards. Contractors have an incentive to provide high quality products and services at 
relatively low costs to access the programme, as it can be regarded as a vibrant market place. 
Committed contractors also play an important role in promoting the programme. 
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4.3 The UK Green Deal  
The following sections present background information on the introduction, the design and 
the performance of the Green Deal. To provide the reader with a good understanding of how 
the Green Deal’s performance is influenced by the UK policy mix, two other sources of 
finance for energy efficiency measures that are closely intertwined with the Green Deal will be 
introduced. Based on this portray, it will be analysed how effective the Green Deal is in 
overcoming the eight barriers to efficiency improvements, as laid down in the intervention 
theory of PAYS®.  
4.3.1 Context 
The Green Deal was introduced as an energy efficiency financing programme against the 
background of three challenges: First, UK households “waste” £2 to 3 billion per year on 
energy costs due to poorly insulated homes and inefficient appliances (DECC, 2011b). 
Second, CO2 emissions from the residential building sector are in conflict with national carbon 
budgets.  For reaching a building sector wide 34% CO2 emission reduction by 2022, emissions 
from residential buildings will need to be cut by 29% (DECC, 2010).9 Third, the government 
needs to take action to reach its target to eradicate fuel poverty by 2016 in England and 
Scotland and by 2018 in Wales.10 Energy efficiency improvements have been at levels far too 
low to overcome the identified social problems in the desired period of time (DECC, 2012). 
Policy-makers realised that by 2020 there would be saturation for low cost measures delivered 
by energy companies under the flagship instrument: the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target 
(CERT). Socialising costs of more costly measures on consumers’ energy bills was regarded as 
politically unfeasible (Rosenow & Eyre, 2014). In times of short public budgets, it was 
therefore of key importance to draw in private capital into the energy efficiency market. The 
UK government assumed that high upfront costs paired with long payback periods and split 
incentives between landlords and tenants build two major barriers to privately financed energy 
efficiency improvements in the building sector. Against this background, the government 
intended to design an innovative, market-based instrument suitable for overcoming these 
barriers (DECC, 2010). According to a representative from DECC (personal communication, 
March 6, 2014) the development of the Green Deal was in part triggered by the UK Green 
Buildings Council report “Pay as You Save: financing low energy refurbishment in housing” 
(UK-GBC, 2009). The previous government under the Labour Party tested the concept in a 
pilot programme from November 2009 to July 2011 (Rosenow, Eyre, Rohde, & Bürger, 2013). 
It should be noted that the design of the PAYS pilots is not consistent with the original 
PAYS® system developed by the EEI. For example, there was no provision that estimated 
energy cost savings have to exceed repayments. Under the pilot programme households were 
provided with up to £20,000 per property at a 0% interest rate (Rosenow et al., 2013).  
                                                 
9 The UK Climate Change Act introduced an overall carbon budget of 3018 Mt CO2e for 2008 to 2012, 2782 Mt CO2e for 
2013-2017 and 2544 Mt CO2e for 2018-2022. This translates into a 21% CO2 emissions reduction by 2008 and a 34% 
reduction by 2022, compared to 1990 levels (DECC, 2010). High CO2 emissions in buildings are largely related to the 
combustion of fossil fuels for space heating. Heating rooms and water with gas-fired boilers is responsible for three 
fourths of British households’ energy consumption (DECC, 2010). In 2011, 59% of homes with cavity walls, but only 1% 
with solid walls had an insulation measure installed (DECC, 2011a). 
10 Households are considered to be in fuel poverty when they face fuel costs that are above the national median level and 
when they are left with a residual income below the official poverty line after paying these fuel costs. According to official 
statistics, 2.39 million households live in fuel poverty in England (DECC, 2013). The World Health Organisation (WHO 
Europe, 2011) estimates that cold housing caused 9,532 deaths per year between 1991 and 2005. Particularly, older people 
face a higher risk of fuel poverty. According to data from the National Health Service (NHS, 2013), two thirds  of people 
with diagnosed hypothermia are older than 60 years .  
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The preparation of a primary legislative proposal for introducing the Green Deal, the Energy 
Act, already dates back to the previous government. After national elections in 2010, the new 
coalition government continued to work on the legal framework, but enacted several changes. 
According to Zoe Leader from the WWF-UK (personal communication, March 6, 2014), large 
parts of the “regulatory sticks”, which would have acted as demand drivers for efficiency 
measures, were removed from the early version of the legislative framework. For example, 
originally homeowners who expand their property would have been obliged to upgrade the 
rest of their property to the energy performance standards of the Buildings Regulation.  
The government carried out preliminary research on consumer attitudes, which suggested that 
a lack of capital is households’ main reason for not implementing efficiency measures. More 
than 50% of the respondents indicated that the innovative element of payments being 
attached to their energy bills would make them more likely to take up a Green Deal. Policy-
makers concluded that the on-bill design could be a motivating factor for a significant share of 
households to install energy efficiency measures in their homes (DECC, 2011c). Furthermore, 
in 2011, a formal stakeholder consultation was carried out on the proposals for the 
introduction of the Green Deal and a new Energy Company Obligation (ECO), which 
received more than 600 written responses (DECC, 2011d, 2012d).  
This preparatory phase was accompanied by great expectations. Chris Huhne, Secretary of 
State, declared that 100,000 jobs would be created in the Green Deal supply chain within five 
years (DECC, 2010). Greg Barker, the Minister for energy and climate change, announced the 
objective of 14 million refurbished homes under the Green Deal by 2020 and another 12 
million by 2030 (DECC, 2011b). This would equal a refurbishment of 97% out of 26.7 million 
homes11 within less than two decades (DECC, 2011a). Estimates for the required investment 
to reach this scale of ambition range from £7 to £11 billion per year (Holmes, 2011). The 
Impact Assessment for the Green Deal and the Energy Company Obligation, published in 
2012, already lowered these high expectations. It predicted that the Green Deal would draw 
private finance into the energy efficiency market amounting to £300 million in the first year 
and exceeding £400 in the following five years, a small fraction of the original announcement 
(DECC, 2012a). While the initial idea underlying the Green Deal was to leverage large energy 
efficiency potentials without additional subsidies, the financial calculations carried out in the 
Impact Assessment showed that many energy efficiency measures cannot be financed under 
the Green Deal alone. Savings often do not suffice to pay back technology, installation, 
finance costs and additional programme fees within the measure’s lifetime or max. 25 years. 
For example, only one third of the costs for £9,950 of a solid wall insulation could be 
provided by Green Deal finance over a payback period of 20 years (DECC, 2012a). Against 
this background it became clear that the Green Deal as new policy instrument is insufficient to 
deliver the scale of energy efficiency improvements desired by the UK government. Two 
additional sources of capital were introduced that should be blended with Green Deal finance. 
The first one is the Energy Company Obligation (ECO)12, which will be presented in more 
detail in chapter 3.2.1. The second one is a subsidy programme, the Cashback Scheme, 
recently replaced by the Home Improvement Fund (HIF), which is illustrated in chapter 2.3.4.  
Based on the Energy Act, which was passed in 2011, five Implementing Regulations were 
introduced that build the legislative framework of the Green Deal. Further details are laid 
                                                 
11 There are 26.7 million homes in total, out of which 23.3 million dwellings have lofts, 18.8 million have cavity walls and 7.9 
million have solid walls (DECC, 2011a). 
12 The legislative framework is the Electricity and Gas (Energy Companies Obligation) Order 2012, which was passed by Parliament 
on December 4, 2012 and will run until March 2015 (gov.uk, 2014c).  
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down in the Codes of Practice for Green Deal assessors, providers and installers as well as the 
Green Deal Arrangements Agreement between electricity suppliers, Green Deal providers and 
finance parties.13 After a delay due to IT and other problems, the Green Deal was launched on 
28 January 2013 in England and Wales and on 25 February 2013 in Scotland, as the 
Government’s “flagship piece of legislation, which will deliver energy efficiency to homes and 
buildings” (Hough & White, 2014).14  
At the of the process, the Green Deal was designed as an OBR model offered by accredited 
providers at commercial interest rates (Mallaburn & Eyre, 2014; Interviewee from DECC, 
personal communication, June 18, 2014). A core feature is the Golden Rule: the expected 
energy cost savings must be equal to or greater than the Green Deal repayments attached to 
the energy bill. This principle naturally sets the upper limit for Green Deal finance available 
for the installation of energy efficiency measures (DECC, 2012d, pp. 16–17). As under PAYS® 
energy savings are not guaranteed, but are estimated based on average energy use. Repayments 
are allowed to equal 100% of the savings and to increase by 2% per year (DECC, 2012d). 
Even though the policy allows for a 2% escalator, it has not been applied yet (Interviewee 
from GDFC, personal communication, September 3, 2014). The underlying idea of allowing 
repayments to offset 100% of the savings  has been to increase the available amount of Green 
Deal finance and therefore to increase the eligibility of measures with relatively higher costs 
and lower savings (DECC, 2010, 2012a). In contrast, under PAYS® available finance is limited 
to 75% of the savings and under How$mart® to 90% (Cillo & Lachman, 2013; Johnson et al., 
2012). As under How$mart®, the Green Deal policy does not require that installed measures 
can be financed entirely through energy savings. The Golden Rule only sets the limit for 
available Green Deal finance. The customer can choose to seek additional sources of finance 
for less cost-effective measures (DECC, 2012d). In accordance with PAYS®, the financial 
responsibility is tied to the building’s electricity meter, not to an individual.15  
4.3.2 The Green Deal’s interplay with the Energy Company Obligation 
The UK has a long tradition of energy company obligation schemes to encourage the 
implementation of energy efficiency measures at the customer end. With the Supplier 
Obligation in 1994, the UK was the first European country that implemented such an 
instrument. Since then, numerous changes have been introduced. However, over the years the 
Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) and later on the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target 
(CERT) remained the most important policies to encourage energy savings and to reduce 
carbon emissions in the UK housing stock. The implicit annual energy savings target increased 
from 1.5 TWh in 1994-1998 to 104 TWh in 2008-2012. For an overview of the UK’s history 
of energy company obligations see Rosenow & Eyre (2012) and Mallaburn & Eyre (2014). 
The new ECO is covering all gas and electricity suppliers with more than 250,000 customers. 
Suppliers are not only obligated to yield energy savings at their customer end, but have to 
meet certain requirements regarding the type of measures installed and household segments. 
The rationale has been to provide funding for economically less attractive measures, as 
                                                 
13 See The Green Deal Framework (Disclosure, Acknowledgement, Redress etc.) Regulations 2012. 
14 The five Implementing Regulations are: The Green Deal Framework (Disclosure, Acknowledgment, Redress etc.) 
Regulations 2012 SI 2012 No. 2079, The Green Deal (Energy Efficiency Improvements) Order 2012 SI 2012 No. 2106, 
The Green Deal (Qualifying Energy Improvements) Order 2012 SI 2012 No. 2105, The Green Deal (Acknowledgement) 
Regulations 2012   2012 No. 1660, The Green Deal (Disclosure) Regulations 2012 SI 2012 No. 1660. 
15 Establishing a legal foundation to tie the loan to the meter and automatically transferring it to new residents was a major 
challenge in the development of the Green Deal (Interviewee from DECC, personal communication, June 18, 2014). 
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insulating solid and hard-to-treat cavity walls (component 1), as well as to support vulnerable 
households (component 2 & 3). An overview over the specific requirements and targets for 
the three components can be found in Annex V. The costs borne by energy suppliers are 
spread over all energy bills regardless if customers have benefited from efficiency 
improvements or not (DECC, 2012a; Rosenow & Eyre, 2013; Rosenow & Galvin, 2013).  
The introduction of the Green Deal and ECO turned the traditional aim of supplier 
obligations on its head. Now, the Green Deal is designed to draw in private finance for low-
cost measures, while ECO is designed to provide additional funding for high-cost measures 
(Rosenow & Eyre, 2013). As companies try to maximise utility and therefore to minimise 
costs, suppliers used to focus on the most cost-effective measures under previous obligation 
schemes. As allowing the installation of cost-effective measures under ECO would undermine 
the delivery of Green Deal Plans, all measures that meet the Golden Rule are excluded from 
the first ECO component, the Carbon Saving Obligation (CERO). Green Deal providers, 
who act as the financiers to the final customer in the Green Deal supply chain, are able to 
access ECO funding either through bilateral contracts with obligated suppliers or through a 
brokerage platform.16 Having access to ECO funding enables Green Deal providers to pass on 
subsidies to their customers for more costly measures (DECC, 2012a, 2014k). As stated 
above, the rationale behind this linkage was to achieve a blending of financing sources. 
However, in practice, providers reported that a blending of Green Deal finance with ECO 
subsidies has been relatively rare (DECC, 2014k). For accessing the ECO brokerage platform 
it is a prerequisite to be an accredited Green Deal provider. This policy design had the 
unwanted side effect that most companies went through the accreditation process without 
being interested in providing Green Deal finance plans. Many Green Deal providers used to 
deliver energy savings to energy suppliers under the EEC or CERT and regarded the ECO as 
a continuation of this market .17 Other Green Deal providers who would be interested in a 
blending of ECO funding with Green Deal finance, but who entered the market over the last 
months, have not been able to access ECO funding (Green Deal provider, personal 
communication, June 16, 2014). 
Even though the overall investments in energy efficiency improvements under ECO are 
comparable to the previous obligation schemes CERT and CESP with £1.3 billion per year 
(Mallaburn & Eyre, 2014), Rosenow and Eyre (2013) warned that yielded energy savings will 
decrease due to two effects: (1) the Green Deal is not expected to compensate a reduced 
installation rate of low-cost measures under ECO, (2) within ECO, the foregone energy 
savings from low-cost measures are not compensated by rising rates of high cost measures, 
such as solid wall insulations. This also affects carbon reduction levels. While the obligation 
schemes CERT and CESP resulted in CO2 reductions of more than 60 million tonnes (Mt) 
per year, their successors Green Deal and ECO combined are expected to achieve roughly 
one fifth of this mitigation level, with 12.8 Mt of CO2  per year (Rosenow & Eyre, 2013). 
                                                 
16 On the brokerage platform, Green Deal providers can submit bids for selling energy savings to suppliers. Research on 
behalf of DECC showed that energy companies prefer bilateral contracts as a delivery mechanism for energy savings. The 
brokerage platform was regarded as a tool to fill shortfalls at attractive prices. Bilateral contracts were also regarded as 
more secure than buying savings from an anonymous party (DECC, 2014k). While prices for CSCO lots sold remained 
constant throughout 2013 at £50-£60 per tCO2, prices under CERO showed a decreasing price trend from £110-£120 to 
£80-£100 per tCO2. The buying price for lots sold fell from £0.22–£0.24 per £1 of lifetime cost savings in the first half of 
2013 to £0.12-£0.14 per £1 of lifetime cost savings in the second half of the year. Both, providers and energy companies 
were sceptical that under current price levels energy savings could be delivered at an adequate quality (DECC, 2014k). 
17. Other Green Deal providers are young start-ups, often with an engineering/ installation or financial services background. 
Other companies, such as installers of renewable energy systems, property maintenance and construction companies, as 
well as retailers and wholesalers and energy companies themselves, decided to extend their business area by becoming 
authorised Green Deal providers (DECC, 2014k). 
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DECC (2012) acknowledged the trade-off between achieving high levels of CO2 reductions in 
the short-term and encouraging deeper refurbishments. Projections showed that including all 
kind of measures under CERO would yield 19% higher CO2 reductions by March 2015.18  
4.3.3 The Green Deal’s interplay with the Cashback Scheme and the 
Home Improvement Fund 
To increase the early up-take of energy efficiency measures, the government introduced the 
Cashback scheme for domestic customers in England and Wales. The scheme was provided 
with a capital injection of £40 million. From January 2013 to June 2014 grants of up to £4,000 
have been distributed to households on a first come, first served basis. The prerequisite to be 
eligible for a Cashback voucher was to carry out a Green Deal assessment and to agree to a 
quote submitted by a provider. However, customers were not required to take out Green Deal 
finance to qualify for the grant (DECC, 2014g). In total, 16,438 Cashback vouchers were 
issued. The majority was used for boiler replacements (DECC, 2014e). 
In June 2014, the Home Improvement Fund (HIF) replaced the Cashback scheme. The 
provided £50 million have been passed on to consumers in form of grants for energy 
efficiency measures. By combining a solid wall insulation with other efficiency measures 
households in England and Wales received up to £7,600. Due to an unexpected demand, the 
HIF was already closed for applications, two months after its introduction (DECC, 2014c). 
Additional funding up to £120 million should be made available soon (DECC, 2014a). 
4.3.4 Consumer uptake and installed energy efficiency measures 
The Green Deal is a young market-based instrument and it is too early to jump to conclusions 
about its performance. However, initial targets were clearly missed. By December 2013, only 
1,612 households had signed up for a Green Deal financing plan (DECC, 2014d). Initially, 
Climate Change Minister Greg Barker had announced the target of 10,000 households taking 
out a Green Deal loan by the end of the year 2013 (Vern, 2014). For the first year, the Impact 
Assessment’s central scenario projected the installation of 41,800 solid wall insulations and 
398,000 cavity wall insulations under ECO and the Green Deal (DECC, 2012a). Installation 
numbers fell short of this projection with only 22,720 solid wall and 151,232 cavity wall 
insulations, representing a share of 54% and 38% of the desired outcome (DECC, 2014d). 
According to Steven Heath, Director for Public Affairs at Knauf Insulation Northern Europe 
(personal communication, March, 6, 2014), there is no significant market activity for insulation 
outside of these three schemes. Compared to previous years the total market activity has 
decreased from 1.6 million insulation measures installed in 2011 (loft, cavity and solid wall) to 
300,000 in 2013 (DECC, 2011a, 2014d). Many market participants raised concerns about the 
negative impacts on the insulation industry (Harvey, 2013; Knauf Insulation, 2011).  
By the end of June 2014, 263,068 Green Deal assessments had been carried out. Research 
carried out on behalf of DECC found that 44% of households who received a Green Deal 
assessment had installed at least one efficiency measure two to three months after the date of 
the assessment. However, the measures were not necessarily financed through a Green Deal. 
For 29% of the households, the up-front costs for the efficiency improvement have been 
covered completely by third parties, such as local authorities, housing associations, landlords 
or Green Deal Providers with access to ECO funding. Unfortunately, there is no data 
                                                 
18 Easy-to-treat cavity wall insulations are the most cost-effective insulation measure with an installation cost of £500 and 
annual savings of £133. In theory, the installation pays off in less than four years. In comparison, solid wall insulation pays 
off after 36 years, without considering financing costs. 
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available on how many households installed measures with Green Deal finance as the only 
source of capital. Combined with Cashback vouchers, Green Deal finance was used by 5% of 
all households and combined with other sources by another 4%. About 7% fully financed the 
recommended measure(s) from their own pocket (DECC, 2014f).19 Figure 6 illustrates how 
measures were paid for.  
 
Figure 6 - Households’ post assessment activity and sources of finance 
Own illustration based on DECC (2014e) 
By the end of June 2014, out of all assessed households, 1.2% (3,234) decided to sign up for a 
Green Deal financing plan. In 1,587 unique properties Green Deal plans have gone “live”, 
which means that all measures are installed and payments are issued.  
In total, 3,685 measures were installed using Green Deal finance. This shows that households 
tend to install one measure, instead of the envisaged packages of measures. The most popular 
measures have been photovoltaic systems, condensing gas boilers and solid wall insulations 
(DECC, 2014e). An overview over the type of measures installed is presented in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 - Type of measures installed under the Green Deal 
Source: Own illustration based on DECC (2014d) 
                                                 
19 These shares are based on surveys sent out in three waves on behalf of DECC between April and December 2013 (DECC, 
2014f). More recent waves of research do not provide data on the blending of different sources of finance (DECC, 2014i). 
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4.3.5 The customer’s journey under the Green Deal  
A normal customer’s journey, in terms of key activities and contractual sequences, under the 
Green Deal comprises the following steps: The marketing of a Green Deal provider, assessor 
or installer, or any other type of information provokes a customer’s interest in the Green 
Deal. Based on the acquired information, the customer chooses one of the certified Green 
Deal assessors who carries out an in-house energy audit and advises the customer on 
measure(s) that could be installed cost-effectively. The assessor is only allowed to recommend 
products from the Green Deal Measures List. 20  Eligible measures range from insulating the 
building shell, over hot water controls, to replacing fossil fuel based heating systems with 
renewable energy systems (DECC, 2014j). The list is regularly updated by the government.21  
The assessor is required to state the results of the audit in a Green Deal advice report, which 
contains a Green Deal occupancy assessment, providing information on the householders’ 
specific energy use, and an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC),22 providing information on 
the physical dimensions of the building, the type of construction, the nature of the heating and 
ventilation systems, lighting and existing energy efficiency measures in place (DECC, 2012a). 
With the Green Deal Advice Report the household approaches one or more Green Deal 
providers, who submit a quote, laying down the costs (investment costs, interest and further 
fees) as well as how these costs will be charged on the energy bill over a certain period of time. 
A common approach is that providers add their costs to the quotes provided by installers. 
These are then bundled together and offered to the potential customer (DECC, 2014k). To 
increase customer protection, for Green Deal Plans exceeding £10,000 customers are required 
to obtain at least three quotes from different providers (DECC, 2011c). When the customer 
decides on which company to work with, the provider starts to develop a detailed Green Deal 
finance plan, which is the contract between the Green Deal provider and the bill payer 
(DECC, 2012a). On behalf of the provider, the Green Deal Finance Company (GDFC), 
which acts as the lender to the provider, checks on the customer's credit worthiness. It 
comprises 1) a confirmation of the customer's credit rating; 2) checking the energy debt level 
of the customer (e.g. debt arrears); and 3) a check if the customer is a “politically exposed 
person” (PEP) as well as a sanctions check. In addition, the provider reviews the affordability 
for the customer (Interviewee from GDFC, personal communication, June 19, 2014). The 
amount of accessible Green Deal finance is limited by the Golden Rule. The repayments on 
the bill should not exceed the typical annual savings calculated for the measures. 
When the homeowner, or in the rental sector the landlord and the tenant sign up to the Green 
Deal plan, the measure or package is implemented by an accredited installer. The installer is 
often the same company as the provider. Following the completion of the installation, the 
GDFC purchases the remittances of the Green Deal plan, meaning that the provider and 
                                                 
20 For domestic properties, accredited assessors are required to use the “Reduced Data Standard Assessment Procedure” 
(RdSAP), which was developed by the Building Research Establishment (BRE) and is currently also used for generating 
Energy Performance Certificates (EPC). The methodology is based on the National Calculation Method as we all as 
standards set by the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) (Booth & Choudhary, 2013). For non-domestic properties, the software tool “Simplified Building 
Energy Model” is applied, which has also been developed by the BRE Group (BRE, 2014; DECC, 2012d) 
21 The existing so-called “Appendix Q process” enables market participants to suggest new measures to be included in the 
list. DECC assists companies by covering parts of the costs related to the accreditation process (DECC, 2012d). 
22 The design of EPCs may differ from country to country according to regulatory requirements. In the UK, an EPC gives a 
property a rating from A, for the most efficient class, to G, for the least efficient class. The EPC is valid for ten years. In 
addition to information about a property’s energy use and typical energy costs, it provides recommendations about how to 
reduce energy use and save money (gov.uk, 2014a) 
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installer are remunerated. The GDFC notifies the new Green Deal to the Green Deal Central 
Charges database run by Gemserv (Gemserv, 2014).23 The GDFC also notifies the energy 
supplier, who receives 1p/plan/day or 2p/plan/day if it is a small provider as a compensation 
for the administrative burden (DECC, 2012a).24 After the completed installation, the Green 
Deal Plan switches from ‘pending’ to ‘live’ and the energy supplier starts collecting repayments 
alongside the customer's usual electricity payment streams, which can be prepayment, daily, 
monthly or quarterly (DECC, 2010, 2012a). The energy provider forwards the payments to the 
Green Deal provider or directly to the GDFC, depending on the provider’s preferences. As 
long as there are outstanding instalments, the energy supplier acts as a trustee for the relevant 
Green Deal provider and is responsible for collecting potential debt from the Green Deal 
participant. The energy supplier is obligated to use the same processes and efforts to recover 
Green Deal arrears as for electricity arrears, which means that non-payment may be responded 
with a disconnection of the customer from the supplier’s services (DECC, 2012b). Default 
rates are expected to be low for this reason (Holmes, 2011). After the end of the payback 
period the GDFC settles the loan. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8 - Key activities and contractual sequences under the Green Deal customer's journey  
Source: Own illustration based on DECC (2010, 2012a) and personal communications 
                                                 
23 The government’s decision to award Gemserv to become the “Green Deal Oversight and Registration Body” (GD ORB) 
and to run the Green Deal Central Charge database has been criticized. As the big six energy companies, British Gas, 
Scottish & Southern, ScottishPower, nPower, E.ON and EDF, are Gemserv’s largest shareholders, the GD ORB might be 
biased against small companies, critics argued. The government defended its choice for being based on a competitive 
tendering process under EU procurement rules (ClickGreen, 2012). 
24 There is a levelisation mechanism in place to ensure that Green Deal providers do not pay more than 1p/day/plan. 
Therefore, larger suppliers receive slightly less to free up higher payments for smaller suppliers. These fees are invoiced 
every three months to reduce the administrative burden (DECC, 2012a) 
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The customer is still free to switch to a new energy supplier, even if the first supplier happens 
to be the Green Deal provider. The obligation to collect the outstanding Green Deal 
instalments on the customer’s electricity bill is passed on to the new supplier (DECC, 2012a).  
It should be noted that the actors and process steps included in Figure 8, only apply to 
successfully delivered Green Deal finance plans that are solely based on Green Deal finance. 
As already presented under chapter 2.3.4, many households decided to carry out a Green Deal 
assessment without signing up for a Green Deal finance plan, as the assessment is a 
prerequisite for being eligible for other sources of finance, such as ECO funding and 
Cashback/ HIF grants. As only a very limited number of measures can be financed with 
Green Deal finance alone, there will be very few cases where Green Deal finance has not been 
blended with funding from ECO, the HIF, the customer’s own capital or third party 
financing, which might be provided by a private bank. It can be assumed that in the majority 
of cases more actors and steps are part of the customer’s journey (DECC, 2014k).  
In other cases, the customer might not be satisfied with the provided service and file a 
complaint. If the Green Deal provider, assessor or installer has not been able to resolve the 
complaint within eight weeks, the customer can access a dedicated Green Deal Ombudsman 
service (DECC, 2012a; gov.uk, 2014b). 
4.3.6 Effectiveness in overcoming barriers on the consumer’s side  
In the following sections, it will be analysed how effective the Green Deal is in overcoming 
barriers that are addressed by the PAYS® intervention theory. Throughout the analysis, the 
differences between the Green Deal and the PAYS® system will be highlighted. 
4.3.6.1 Tackling inertia  
The UK government assumed that a lack of capital was the major barrier to energy efficiency 
improvements in the residential sector. As Gregor Barker explained: “We thought that unless 
we gave customers the payment method no one would touch these things” (Vern, 2014). As 
only 1.2% of households who received a Green Deal assessment, said yes to install a measure 
with Green Deal finance, it cannot be concluded that providing an OBR model has been 
effective an effective policy instrument for overcoming consumers’ inertia. In relation to the 
total number of households, the Green Deal achieved a participation rate of only 0.006% in 
the first year.25 Three out of four providers, who participated in the survey, reported that they 
regarded the “lack of interest or apathy of end-users” as a barrier for delivering Green Deals 
(Annex III). This disinterest in energy efficiency improvements is remarkable as households’ 
annual electricity bills in England and Wales have increased by 170% and gas bills by 218% 
since reaching relatively low levels in 2004 (DECC, 2014b). 
Research commissioned by DECC (2014k) found that providers mostly relied on their website 
and the database of the Green Deal Oversight and Registration Body and did not pursue 
direct-to-consumer marketing strategies. This means, the effort to establish a first contact 
between customers and Green Deal providers usually lies on the side of the consumer.  None 
of the participating providers had carried out targeted marketing to approach customers that 
are more likely to proceed with a Green Deal plan, e.g. based on data on income or house 
types and energy usage. This finding was supported by interviews with Green Deal providers. 
As four out of five persons had not heard about at the Green Deal at its launch (Adam & 
Collinson, 2014), it is not surprising that relatively few customers have actively approached 
                                                 
25 This is based on dividing 1,612 participating households over the total population of 26.7 million homes (DECC, 2011a). 
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assessors and providers. There seems to be a general miscommunication regarding who 
should be responsible for promoting the Green Deal. While the government intended to 
develop “a programme, which is owned by the industry” (G. Barker in webinar, Great British 
Refurb Campaign (2011)), market participants expected the government to promote the 
Green Deal more actively (Green Deal provider, personal communication, June 17, 2014).   
Furthermore, against the background of a long history of energy company obligations, where  
many households received energy efficiency measures at reduced costs or no up-front costs  
(Rosenow, 2012), households might not have much appetite for bearing the full cost of 
efficiency measures (even though stretched over time). According to Zoe Leader (personal 
communication, March 6, 2014), the historical situation has lead to an underestimation of the 
real value of efficiency measures. Against this background it is unclear how the Green Deal is 
supposed to create demand. The interviewee concluded that for making the Green Deal work, 
a change in people’s mindset would be needed combined with regulatory sticks. 
The impact of the interest rate on consumer up-take is analysed in section 4.3.7.2. 
Effectiveness M1: The Green Deal has not been successful in overcoming consumers’ inertia.  
4.3.6.2 Tackling a lack of capital and/ or liquidity preference 
As the Green Deal is designed as a loan, customers take out debt. This affects their credit 
record and might limit customers’ ability to seek finance for other purposes (DECC, 2014k). 
What has been achieved is that Green Deal finance is accessible to 83% of the population, 
while conventional finance is only available to roughly 50% (UK-GBC, 2014). The barrier 
“lack of available finance” has been eliminated for one third of all customers, but cannot be 
regarded as overcome. Even though the amount of available Green Deal finance is linked to 
energy savings, customers still need to undergo a check of credit worthiness and energy debt 
to be eligible for the Green Deal (DECC, 2014k). Therefore, there is still a discrimination 
based on income in place. This builds up a significant barrier for households that are already 
in fuel poverty and who are in the biggest need of efficiency improvements. According to 
Guertler (2012, p. 92), the Green Deal “on its own is not intended for alleviating fuel poverty, 
but rather focuses on ‘able-to-pay’ households.” The government  acknowledged this problem 
and introduced the Affordable Warmth (component 3 of the ECO), which has been designed 
as a complementary source of funding to target households in fuel poverty, who are neither 
able to finance efficiency improvements by own means, nor to access Green Deal finance 
(DECC, 2012a). However, Affordable Warmth replaced the previous government fuel poverty 
programme in England, the so-called Warm Front. In fact, the Association for the 
Conservation of Energy (ACE) calculated that the introduction of the Green Deal and ECO 
caused a reduction of available funding for households in fuel poverty by 29% (ACE, 2012).  
Customers who have access to Green Deal finance still face the problem that there is often a 
funding shortfall for more costly measures and larger packages of energy efficiency 
improvements. Providers reported that Green Deal finance usually covers about one third of 
the total costs. Even where providers had access to ECO subsidies, these were often not 
sufficient to fill the financing gap. In this case, third-party financing from a bank or the 
customer’s pocket is needed, which means that customers cover a share of the up-front costs 
with negative impacts on their liquidity in terms of disposable income (DECC, 2014k).  
As in the U.S., critics in the UK expressed concerns that the Green Deal’s major promise to 
enable households to yield energy savings at no costs, might not be fulfilled as estimated 
energy savings might not materialise due to false assumptions regarding the baseline energy 
demand, unexpected rebound effects or underperforming efficiency measures (Booth & 
Choudhary, 2013; Harvey, 2011). If the Green Deal assessor has demonstrably carried an 
Sarah Kloke, IIIEE, Lund University 
36 
improper audit, he is required to pay an indemnity (Green Deal provider, personal 
communication, June 19, 2014). However, DECC acknowledged that there might be a 
significant disparity between theoretical and actual savings due to a number of other reasons, 
such as defective installations, obstruction to insulating parts of walls, natural variations in the 
thermal performance of structural and fabric elements as well as households failing to operate 
the measure correctly (DECC, 2012d). Detailed guidelines were published on the application 
of “in-use factors” to ensure more accurate estimates of savings related to measures available 
under the Green Deal. These factors limit the amount of Green Deal finance by a specified 
percentage, which ranges from 0% for solar water heating to 35% for cavity wall insulations 
(DECC, 2012c).  
A potential overestimation of energy savings has been regarded as particularly problematic for 
households with a lower than average energy usage, which tend to be lower income 
households (Booth & Choudhary, 2013; Harvey, 2012). These households might not see the 
expected savings, as the Golden Rule is calculated based on data for average energy users. As 
repayments are allowed to amount for 100% of the savings (depending on the in-use factor 
for the specific measure) there is no general safety margin as under PAYS® where payments 
should not exceed 75% of cost savings. This risk is even higher in households that paid their 
reduced energy use with a loss of comfort and that are likely to adjust their indoor 
temperature to normal comfort levels after the efficiency improvement(s). For a measure with 
a high “in-use factor”, such as 35% for cavity wall insulation, energy cost savings are likely to 
fully offset the Green Deal instalments with the effect of a lower energy bill. For other 
measures, such as solar water heating with a 0% in-use factor, repayments might easily exceed 
estimated energy cost savings. Here, customers might pay higher energy bills than before the 
installation. For customers that face difficulties in paying their utility bills, the risk might 
increase to be cut-off from utility service due to non-payment. The government responded to 
this concern related to “comfort taking” by requiring Green Deal providers to obtain a written 
acknowledgement from lower than average energy users, which states that the customer is 
aware of the Green Deal instalment potentially exceeding energy cost savings (DECC, 2012d). 
Effectiveness M2: As only a very small number of measures can be fully financed under the Green Deal, the 
barrier “access to finance and liquidity preference” has only been overcome for the most cost-effective measures. 
Furthermore, programme participation is based on income. The barrier prevails for low-income households.  
4.3.6.3 Tackling long pay-back periods 
As under PAYS®, payments are tied to the property, not to an individual person. To increase 
legal certainty, the Green Deal instalment is disclosed in the property’s Energy Performance 
Certificate (EPC). Property owners need to order an EPC before marketing a property to sell 
or rent. Estate agents are also legally obliged to either disclose the EPC in full or the EPC 
property asset writing for a domestic property that is for sale (DECC, 2012a; gov.uk, 2014a).26 
Furthermore, the owner or landlord needs to obtain a written acknowledgement from the new 
resident stating that they are aware of the Green Deal instalment attached to the property and 
understand that they can be held liable, as the payment obligation is transferred to them. This 
acknowledgement may be included in contracts for sale, written leases and license agreements, 
or in standalone documents, where there is no written lease or licence agreement (DECC, 
2011c).  
                                                 
26 There are exceptions for buildings such as stand-alone buildings with total useful floor space of less than 50m², industrial 
sites, workshops and non-residential agricultural buildings with a low energy consumption or holiday accomodations. For a 
full list see gov.uk (2014a). 
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On the one hand, property owners as well as tenants do not face the risk to be liable for 
Green Deal instalments if they move out of the improved property. Unbundling the financial 
responsibility from the first Green Deal participant therefore reduces the uncertainty with 
regards to long pay-back periods. On the other hand, this barrier is only fully overcome for 
measures that are fully financed under the Green Deal and ECO, which is relatively rare. In 
most cases, where customer’s used their own capital or loans from other banks, there is a risk 
investments might reveal themselves as a sunk cost. The customer might move out before 
seeing any monetary benefits. Theoretically, already before cost savings can be realised, 
property owners should see an indirect benefit through an increase of the property value. 
However, as there are no experiences made with selling properties with a Green Deal attached 
to it, many property owners fear that it might lower the property value in, as future buyers 
might be unwilling to buy a property with an unknown financial product attached to it 
(Interviewee from DECC, March 6, 2014). Originally, there has been an early repayment 
charge in place. As this was regarded as a barrier to the up-take of Green Deals, it was decided 
to allow for an early-payback without penalties (GDFC, 2014).  
Due to the 100% repayment rule, households might only see a financial benefit from the 
Green Deal after the loan has been settled. Depending on the measure installed this may take 
up to 25 years. Therefore, even though the uncertainty regarding long pay-back periods is 
reduced, customers may not necessarily see immediate net savings on their energy bill. In this 
case, the incentive to participate is to see benefits in the long-term, which is not highly 
attractive if high implicit discount rates for future energy cost savings are applied by 
consumers (Gately, 1980; Hausman, 1979; Howarth & Sanstad, 1995). 
Effectiveness M3: The risk to pay for improvements without seeing the benefit due to “long pay-back periods” is 
only overcome for those measures that are fully financed under the Green Deal. This is very rare. The Green 
Deal does not require that customers see any immediate benefits. Savings may only materialise after the end of 
the payback period, providing little incentives to sign-up for an efficiency improvement under the Green Deal. 
4.3.6.4 Tackling risk aversion 
To ensure high levels of consumer protection, the government proposed that Green Deal 
products should be warranted for the entire repayment period.27 This proposal was met with 
concerns from private companies. While such a guarantee could be provided for inert 
measures, such as insulations, costs would be prohibitively high for mechanical and electrical 
measures, for example it would almost double the cost of a boiler (DECC, 2012a). This 
motivated the government to limit the required guarantees to “five years and an extended 10 
year guarantee to cover any consequential building damage sustained as a result of the 
measures being installed” (DECC, 2012d, p. 21).28 As cost-effective guarantees for solid wall 
and cavity wall insulations have been already on the market, the required guarantee for 
improvements and consequential building damage is extended to 25 years for these measures. 
Allowing payback periods for the whole lifetime of a measure as well as guarantees shorter 
than payback periods is not in line with the PAYS® system, as customers face the risk of 
paying for measures that are no longer working.  
                                                 
27 The warranty would have been required to be backed by an insurance and to be underwritten by an “A” rate company.   
28 Overall, the 10 year guarantee for the potential building damage was expected to increase the overall cost of a Green Deal 
package by 1% to 2.5%. It was hoped that Green Deal providers are able to reduce costs by negotiating extended 
warranties from manufacturers and installers. (DECC, 2012a). 
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Effectiveness M4: By unbundling payback periods from product warranties, customers face the risk to pay for 
measures that do not deliver energy savings. The barrier “risk aversion” cannot be regarded as overcome. 
4.3.6.5 Tackling ‘split incentives’ between landlords and tenants 
As under PAYS® it is one of the key premises of the Green Deal that “those benefitting from 
the installation of a Green Deal measure should be the one paying the charge” (DECC, 2012d, 
p. 19). If energy costs are not included in the rent, it is the tenant who pays the Green Deal 
instalment and who also benefits from yielded savings. In theory, this should overcome the 
‘split incentives’ barrier in the rental sector. Still, if usually only one third of the measures’ 
costs can be covered by Green Deal finance it remains the question who pays for the 
remaining two thirds. According to the English Housing Survey, about half of private renters’ 
length of residence is less than two years (DCLG, 2010). Under these circumstances, it is not 
attractive to invest in energy efficiency measures with long payback periods from a tenant’s 
perspective. It is also unlikely that landlords are more willing to cover two thirds of the 
investment costs than before the introduction of the Green Deal, as they personally do not 
benefit from lower energy costs. Except for very few highly cost-effective measures where 
Green Deal finance can cover the total costs, such as the insulation of easy-to-treat cavity 
walls or the exchange of cylinder thermostats (DECC, 2012a), the old investor-user dilemma 
arises.  
So far, there is no reliable data available on the performance of the Green Deal in the rental 
sector. Considering that less than 30% of households live in rented homes or apartments 
(Dieckhöner, 2012), the results from the survey suggest that the rental sector is not 
underrepresented. Three out of five providers reported that rental apartments accounted for a 
share higher than 25% out of all customers (see Annex III). However, these results are not 
statistically representative. 
Effectiveness M5: The barrier “split-incentives” is overcome where measure can be fully financed under the 
Green Deal. In practice, this is very rare and only feasible for the most cost-effective measures. 
4.3.6.6 Tackling high transaction costs 
Even though no quantitative analysis could be carried out of transaction costs faced by Green 
Deal participants, it can be assumed that these tend to be very high due to the large number of 
transactions and actors involved in the customer’s journey. Consumers have to undergo a 
minimum of five steps to receive an active Green Deal Plan. As outlined above there is plenty 
of evidence that in practice further steps might be needed due to a shortfall of Green Deal 
finance and other obstacles, such as misinformation, need to be overcome (DECC, 2014k). 
Furthermore, the effort to establish the first contact is usually located on the consumer’s side. 
Due to many Green Deal providers not being market ready and others working only with 
ECO funding, consumers reported that they had to call up to 20 providers until they found a 
company that was able and willing to work on their request (DECC, 2014k). This observation 
is supported by official figures from the GDFC (GDFC, 2014), stating that 38 Green Deal 
providers are actively selling plans, out of a 151 registered providers (DECC, 2014e).  
Furthermore, when customers had chosen an independent Green Deal assessor, they often 
faced the problem that Green Deal providers were unwilling to use the produced advice 
report. Even though this is not in line with the Green Deal Code of Practice, many providers 
would not proceed with the development of a Green Deal plan. While some providers simply 
do not respond to enquiries from customers with advice reports from external assessors, other 
providers require the assessor to re-do elements of the report. The costs are usually covered 
by the provider, but consumers still face the hassle of another in-house visit (DECC, 2014k). 
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It can be observed, that instead of providing a streamlined procedure, a highly complex 
system has been created. The aim of developing a “one-stop-shop” model with “smooth 
transition between stages” (DECC, 2012d, p. 36) has not been successfully implemented into 
practice. Furthermore, by interlinking the Green Deal with ECO and Cashback, respectively 
the Home Improvement Fund, the customer is not interacting with one finance provider and 
one installer, as for example under How$mart®, but with up to five actors (the assessor, 
provider, installer, HIF and potentially a private bank). If a customer wishes or needs to blend 
Green Deal funding with Cashback and a private loan, he or she needs to undergo three 
different application procedures, which are related to significant levels of paper work. This 
complexity often provokes irritation on the customer’s side, as many entered the Green Deal 
process with expectations raised by government advertising that energy efficiency measures 
would be fully financed under the Green Deal (DECC, 2014k). 
Effectiveness M6: Due to the complexity of the scheme, which is likely to result in a lot of time and effort 
invested in information seeking and application procedures, the barrier “high transaction costs” is not overcome 
from a customer’s perspective. 
4.3.7  Effectiveness in overcoming barriers on the provider’s side  
To overcome the barriers for the up-take of energy efficiency measures on the consumer’s 
side, discussed under 2.3.6, it is a prerequisite that all actors in the Green Deal supply chain 
are able to fulfil their role in delivering the Green Deal as a final product. In practice, 
particularly Green Deal providers struggle to make a business case out of the Green Deal 
(Personal communication with various Green Deal providers, June 2014). Besides the general 
lack of demand, this is due to high administrative costs (ACs) and transaction costs (TCs) 
related to the provision of Green Deals. Furthermore, high financing costs have been 
identified as a major hindering factor. Current levels of APRs strictly limit the number of 
measures, where the total costs of a Green Deal Plan can be refinanced through the energy 
cost savings. Therefore, in the following two sections a closer analysis will be taken at the 
nature, scale and burden of transaction and administrative costs faced by Green Deal 
providers, as well as financing costs under the Green Deal framework. 
4.3.7.1 Analysis of administrative and transaction costs 
According to the conceptual choices, presented in chapter 2.2.1., transaction costs were 
defined as costs that are occurring ex-ante and ex-post of producing of Green Deal plans, the 
actual contract between Green Deal providers and their customers.  
The survey results revealed that providers face several sources of TCs, such as in-house 
capacity building, accreditation costs, searching for information, interacting with the GDFC, 
customers, customers’ energy suppliers and business partners. The finding that Green Deal 
providers regarded the interaction with customer’s energy suppliers as a source of TCs is in 
conflict with the information provided by the GDFC that it is the GDFC who handles the 
notification procedure on behalf of Green Deal providers. 
Interestingly project documentation and internal management, which can be regarded as an 
AC, was ranked as the top cost driver. The responses are illustrated in Figure 9. The 
differentiation of the scale of TCs and ACs (from very high to very low) is expressed in the 
colour coding and the order of cost drivers with the most significant cost drivers at the top. 
Other reported cost drivers that were not included in the questionnaire are IT development, 
lawyer’s fees and travel costs.  
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Figure 9 - Major cost drivers faced by Green Deal providers when selling Green Deal Plans 
Source: Own illustration based survey results (see Annex II & III) 
For the sake of clarity, it needs to be differentiated between the scale of TCs and ACs the 
burden of these costs for the individual provider. The scale may be a fixed or constant 
component, whereas the burden may decrease with the size of the project (Mundaca, 2007). 
Overall, the reported burden of running TCs in relation to total capital costs of all installed 
measure(s) ranges between 3% and 28%. ACs account for 17% to 75% and marketing costs 
for 0% to 36%. In all cases ACs exceed reported TCs. In three out of five cases aggregated 
ACs and TCs equal or exceed the investments made in technology and installation costs (see 
Figure 9). No reliable data could be gathered on the specific type of installed measures, such 
as cavity wall insulation. Most respondents indicated that investments in energy efficiency 
technologies exceeded investments in renewable energy installations (see Annex III). In the 
semi-structured interviews, providers were asked for the administrative costs related to the 
production of one Green Deal plan. Responses ranged between £300 and £450 (Green Deal 
providers, personal communication, various occasions).  
It should be noted that the given responses revealed that providers applied different 
interpretations of the term total capital cost. Some providers reported only the capital invested 
via Green Deal finance, while others reported the capital invested from all sources of finance. 
All respondents were contacted and asked to review the provided data based on a clearer 
definition of total capital costs as the total amount of money that was invested into the 
measures under the Green Deal plans. This comprises total capital injected by the Green Deal 
provider through Green Deal finance or ECO, the consumer or grants from the Cashback 
scheme or the Home Improvement Fund. As providers write the Green Deal financing plan 
they should have a good overview over the sources of finance used for installing the chosen 
measure(s). 
Face-to-face interviews with Green Deal providers revealed that the process of becoming a 
provider is a highly relevant cost driver. The accreditation process was often regarded as 
lengthy and complicated.29 One provider reported that it was a highly time consuming process 
                                                 
29 The official requirements are: “In order to operate as GD Providers, applicants are also required to: [1] Hold a Category A 
CCA licence, which enables them to lend money to consumers (the terms of GD Finance mean that the GD Provider is 
technically the lender). [2] Sign up to the Green Deal Arrangements Agreement (GDAA), which sets out the terms and 
conditions associated with the Green Deal Central Charge Database. [3] Obtain access to the Green Deal Central Charge 
Database (GDCC), which facilitates the collection (and remittance) of GD payments via the electricity meter. [4] Obtain 
access to the Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) Register, since GD Providers must update EPCs following the 
installation of measures under the GD. [5] Join the Green Deal Ombudsman and Investigation Service, which provides a 
redress scheme for consumers under the GD.” (DECC, 2014k, p. 11) 
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with different forms going back and forth between his company and the accreditation body 
until they found that they mostly had to copy the Code of Practice into the application form 
(Green Deal provider, personal communication, June 17, 2014). With regards to the cost of 
working time spent on the accreditation process a second Green Deal provider estimated that 
a full-time employee was working on the accreditation for 5-6 months, costing the company 
between £15,000 and £20,000. On top, all providers need to pay between £15,000 and £20,000 
in form of accreditation fees for the official accreditation process and the on-boarding with 
the GDFC. One provider indicated that additional £10,000 had to be spent on IT Software. 
Another provider estimated that, including opportunity costs30, the process of becoming an 
active Green Deal provider cost the company £100,000 (Green Deal providers, personal 
communication, various occasions). Opportunity costs in this case can be defined as foregone 
income that could have been generated by choosing other business activities than engaging in 
the Green Deal market.  
While some of the respondents had just started to sell the first Green Deal plans, others have 
been fully operational since 2013. This causes a bias in comparing TCs, including accreditation 
costs in relation to total capital costs. Younger Green Deal providers will automatically show 
higher TCs as accreditation costs are spread over a lower amount of invested capital due to a 
smaller number of Green Deal plans sold.  Therefore, respondents were contacted again 
(same occasion as clarification on the definition of capital costs) and asked for a 
differentiation between accreditation costs and operational costs, comprised of ACs, TCs and 
marketing costs. Unfortunately, no clarification was received from provider 2 and 3. Overall, 
most providers had no accounting procedures in place for providing a quick overview over 
running TCs, ACs, and marketing costs in relation to total capital costs. Therefore, the 
illustrated data in Figure 10 and comparisons between the reported data should be treated 
with care.  
        
Figure 10 - Estimate of running marketing, administrative and transaction costs in relation to capital costs of 
all measures installed under Green Deal Plans provided by responding Green Deal providers 
Source: Own illustration based survey results (see Annex II & III) and personal communications 
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When adding accreditation costs of £45,000 (excluding opportunity costs) on top of running 
costs faced by two providers (those who reported absolute total capital costs, others only 
reported shares or highly aggregated data), ACs, TCs, marketing and accreditation costs 
account for 137% and 245% of total capital costs.  Figure 11 illustrates how accreditation 
costs by far outweigh all other sources of costs that providers accounted for in their estimates. 
 
Figure 11 - Estimate of operational marketing, administrative and transaction costs as well as accreditation 
costs in relation to capital costs of all measures installed under Green Deal Plans sold by responding Green 
Deal providers 
Source: Own illustration based survey results (see Annex II & III) and personal communications 
Overall, most interviewed providers regarded the burden of ACs and TCs combined with a 
low demand from customers as too high to make an attractive business case out of selling 
Green Deal financing plans. One interviewee stated that if sales of Green Deal plans would 
not increase in the near future, the company would need to revise its business strategy. 
Another provider who recently got officially accredited feared that bearing another fee of 
£10,000 for on-boarding with the GDFC might not pay off, due to low consumer demand. 
However, as the provider had no access to alternative sources of finance, the completed 
accreditation would reveal itself as a major sunk cost. Accessing ECO funding at this point of 
time was also not regarded as unattractive as prices on the brokerage platform have decreased 
(Green Deal providers, personal communication, various occasions).  
Effectiveness M7: Aggregated administrative and transaction costs often equal or even exceed the technology and 
installation costs of the efficiency measures provided under the Green Deal. Many Green Deal Providers 
struggle to make a business case. The barrier high transaction costs can therefore be regarded as persistent. 
4.3.7.2 Financing costs  
One of the core assumptions underlying the design of the Green Deal was to provide access 
to capital to a wide spectrum of households through low-cost private finance (DECC, 2010). 
During the preparatory phase, the government actively engaged with banks to draw private 
finance into the Green Deal framework. This attempt was not successful. According to a 
former DECC employee, one of the major issues was where to locate the liability if the 
customer or the Green Deal provider defaults. In the end, banks regarded the Green Deal as 
an “untried scheme” with too many variables and therefore a hard to quantify risk attached to 
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it. The perceived high risk, as loans are likely to be passed on to new residents without 
requiring a credit assessment from these customers, would have resulted in very high interest 
rates attached to Green Deal loans (K. Neale, personal communication, June 24, 2014). 
As banks were reluctant to engage with the Green Deal, two other options were considered. 
First, the government could have provided guaranteed loans to bring down the financing 
costs. However, this approach has not been politically feasible in times where reducing the 
state deficit had a high priority. Another option would have been to oblige energy suppliers to 
provide Green Deals to their customers and locating the liability on the supplier’s side. While 
some energy suppliers saw the introduction of the Green Deal as an opportunity for opening 
new markets, other suppliers were reluctant to take on debt with negative impacts on their 
balance sheets (K. Neale, personal communication, June 24, 2014). 
Against this background, a fourth approach was chosen. The GDFC was established as a not-
for-profit mutual to finance and administer Green Deal Plans. It was provided with a capital 
injection of £244 million by the Green Investment Bank, DECC and 54 members from the 
public and private sector (DECC, 2014d; GDFC, 2014). In May 2013, the GDFC started to 
finance Green Deal Plans. It is not directly lending money to final consumers, but to Green 
Deal providers. As illustrated in the customer’s journey, the GDFC buys the remittances for 
the financing plan from the Green Deal provider. The GDFC offers unsecured loans at a 
fixed interest rate of 6.96% for a lifetime of up to 25 years (GDFC, 2014).31 Adding fees, e.g. 
for paying the provider, the APR is derived, which depends on the size of the loan. For 
smaller loans, in the region of £5,000 and below, providers reported APRs of 14-15%. The 
APR for larger loans, being worth more than £8,000, range between 8-10% (DECC, 2014k). 
An analysis carried out by Capital Economics came to the conclusion that the interest rate is 
competitive when compared to other unsecured personal loans on the finance market (UK-
GBC, 2014). Nevertheless, in a survey carried out on behalf of DECC, Green Deal providers 
regarded Green Deal finance for smaller loans as poor value for money (DECC, 2014k). This 
view has been supported by a representative from the insulation industry, as high-income 
households have access to finance at similar interest rates, but with higher flexibility on the 
High Street. Furthermore, many homeowners have the option to extend their mortgages and 
receive capital at an interest rate of 3-4% (S. Heath, personal communication, March 7, 2014). 
For this segment of households the economics of energy efficiency have not been improved. 
The question remains how closely variations in the interest rate translate into consumer 
demand. A survey of 2,300 UK adults, conducted by the Great British Refurb Campaign 
(2011), found that 56% of respondents regarded the Green Deal as attractive. One third said 
to be “very” or “fairly” likely to take up a Green Deal with an interest rate of 2%. This share 
fell to 11% at a 4% interest rate and to only 7% at a 6% interest rate. It should be noted that 
research on consumer behaviour found a significant gap between statements and actions 
(Power & Mont, 2010). The up-take might be even lower than indicated by consumers. 
What is puzzling is that the DECC Green Deal Assessment consumer research (2014) 
produced very different results. When participants were asked for reasons not to use Green 
Deal finance only 2-3% answered that it was not attractive. At least a partial explanation might 
be that 40% responded that they did not seek Green Deal finance, because the costs were 
covered by someone else. Again, this suggests that households sign up for Green Deal 
                                                 
31 The Green Deal Finance Company has just launched a finance product for tenants. The impact has not been assessed yet. 
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assessments without being interested in a Green Deal plan, as assessments are a prerequisite to 
apply for the Cashback scheme. Overall, the government did not succeed in providing a 
financial product attractive enough to increase consumers’ uptake of energy efficiency 
measures.  
Independent from the level of the GDFC’s interest rate in comparison to other financial 
products and with regards to consumers’ attitudes, it has a clear impact on the number of 
measures that are able to meet the Golden Rule. For example, a hard-to-treat cavity wall 
insulation with installation costs of £1,875 and further costs for the Green Deal Plan of £400 
would just be able to meet the Golden Rule at an interest rate of 3%, while it clearly doesn’t at 
a rate of 6.96%. The insulation is yielding bill savings amounting to £133 in the first year. At 
an interest rate of 3% yearly instalments amount for £131 over 25 years, but at a rate of 6.96% 
instalments increase to £194.32 In other words, an increase of the interest rate by one 
percentage point requires energy savings to increase by 10% for meeting the Golden Rule. 
This is roughly in line with the rule of thumb that a rise in the interest rate by one percentage 
point, requires energy demand to decrease by 7% to get the same amount of return reported 
by Steven Heath (in webinar of the Great British Refurb Campaign (2011)). While finance 
costs over the lifetime account for £991 in the 3% scenario, they rise to £2,588 under an 
interest rate of 7%, equaling 138% of the measure’s initial installation costs. 
This illustrates that the current interest rate has a significant impact on the range of measures 
which meet the Golden Rule and the overall attractiveness of the Green Deal. For many 
providers who do not have access to other means of funding, such as ECO or third party 
finance from private banks, this poses a major problem, as they are not able to deliver Green 
Deal plans without requiring their customers to cover a certain share of the up-front costs. 
Effectiveness M7: The current level of the interest rate limits the portfolio of efficiency measures that meet the 
Golden Rule. It therefore inhibits the delivery of Green Deal Plans. The barrier high financing costs is still 
persistent. The effect of the current interest rate on consumers’ willingness to take-up Green Deals is debated.  
4.4 Lessons learned and recommended policy design criteria 
The Green Deal has been introduced with great expectations and a high level of interest in 
other European countries. One and a half years after its introduction, it is still early to evaluate 
the Green Deal. However, what can be observed is that households’ uptake and numbers of 
installed measures are far from achieving initial targets (see section 4.3.4.). The barrier analysis 
showed that even though the terminology “Pay as You Save” is often used when referring to 
the Green Deal, the two systems differ in many crucial aspects. Overall, the Green Deal’s 
design has not been able to fully overcome any of the barriers that should be addressed by the 
PAYS® intervention theory. So, which lessons can be learned for future improvements to the 
Green Deal and the introduction of similar programmes in other countries? 
(1) Keep it simple – reduce transactions costs by limiting the number of actors and sources of funding. 
Overall, interlinking the Green Deal with the ECO created a highly complex system with a 
number of undesired side effects. Seeing many Green Deal providers on the market that do 
                                                 
32 This calculation is based on data taken from the Green Deal’s Impact Assessment (DECC, 2012a, p. 138). It should be 
noted that there is a caveat to this calculation. It is not clear if in-use factors have been applied in the Impact Assessment. 
If in-use factors have not been applied, instalments certainly exceed the savings in both cases. It is also questionable if 
consumers are willing to take up a loan for such a long time period without seeing hardly any immediate savings. This 
calculation should therefore only be regarded as an illustration of finance costs’ impact on total costs of a Green Deal plan. 
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not sell Green Deals is one of these effects. The complexity of the Green Deal due to the high 
number of actors and multiple sources of finance involved, translates into high administrative 
and transaction costs on the customer’s as well as on the provider’s side. By opening the 
Green Deal to many different actors, a robust accreditation system needed to be introduced. 
Here, the unwanted side effect was that the costs accruing during the accreditation process are 
so high that many small Green Deal providers risk going out of business. For future on-bill 
policies, it is essential to reflect the following trade-off: On the one hand, it is desirable to 
open the Green Deal market for small assessors and installers. On the other hand, placing 
energy suppliers at the heart of the Green Deal (and taking over the role of many small 
providers) could produce economies of scale and simplify the customer’s journey, as fewer 
actors need to be involved. 
(2) Seek sources of low cost capital that allow passing on low interest rates to programme participants. 
The current level of the interest rate excludes measures from being financed under the Green 
Deal. There are different options to reduce the current level of the interest rate (UK-GBC, 
2014). The government could provide the GDFC with access to low-cost capital. This allows 
providers to base Green Deal plans for highly cost-effective measures on one source of 
finance, the GDFC. Limiting the number of financing sources and therefore the number of 
actors and application procedures reduces overall ACs and TCs for providers and customers. 
For less cost-effective measures, ECO funding or grants from the HIF would still need to be 
accessed. However, to fully overcome the “high up-front” costs barrier, customers should not 
be required to provide additional capital on top of Green Deal and ECO or HIF finance. 
(3) Require a margin between repayments and expected savings, to ensure customers see an immediate benefit  
Allowing repayments on the energy bill to account for 100% of estimated savings, means that 
customers might not see any immediate net benefit (even without considering the rebound 
effect). Instead of applying “in-use” factors for specific measures, a general rule should be 
introduced that limits payments to a certain share of expected savings. Again, this would 
reduce the complexity of the scheme. Energy consumers could easily see that there is a safety 
margin that protects them from paying more than before the measure’s installation.  
(4) Establish a policy-framework that provides market actors with long-term certainty. 
All respondents from the survey agreed that “uncertainty about the future development of the 
Green Deal” poses a barrier to their business models (see Annex III). During the first year of 
the Green Deal and ECO many conflicting signals were sent to market actors. How the 
government undermined the essential policy design criteria “long-term certainty” will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6.   
(5) Ensure that all links in the supply chain are market-ready when introducing the programme 
Already during the consultation phase, many market participants expressed the concern that 
the schedule for introducing the Green Deal is too ambitious. It was claimed that there was no 
transition period for the energy efficiency industry to change business models from delivering 
cavity wall insulations to delivering the high rate of solid wall insulations envisaged under 
ECO. Furthermore, only a small number of Green Deal providers were fully operational when 
the Green Deal was launched (DECC, 2012d; Great British Refurb Campaign, 2011). This led 
to a significant hassle for early-adopters trying to find a Green Deal provider that would 
deliver the energy efficiency service they requested. Providers reported that by the time they 
were able to deliver Green Deal Plans, the initial interest had dropped (DECC, 2014k). 
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4.5 Comparative Analysis of How$mart
®
 and the Green Deal 
How$mart® and the Green Deal were introduced with the similar underlying theory of making 
energy efficiency improvements available at no up-front costs and recovering the costs on the 
energy bill. Nevertheless, the analysis demonstrated that the programmes differ in many 
aspects, such as the nature of the financial product and repayment terms. 
Overall, both programmes deviate from the original PAYS® system and the mechanisms 
introduced do not overcome all barriers as suggested by the PAYS® intervention theory laid 
down in chapter 3. One of the core assumptions underlying the development of PAYS® was 
to develop a system where customers are assured that they will only pay for the service if they 
personally benefit from the savings. As neither How$mart® nor the Green Deal provide 
warranties for the whole life time of installed measures, customers face the risk of paying for 
measures which are no longer working. This is a critical infringement of the PAYS® 
intervention theory where providing high level of consumer assurance is one of the key 
mechanisms to overcome risk aversion on the customer side (H. Lachman, personal 
communication, August 7, 2014). Core design features are summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2 - Comparative analysis of How$mart® and the Green Deal  
 How$mart® (Kansas, U.S.) Green Deal (UK) 
Nature Utility initiative  Governmental initiative 
Financing terms   
Financing costs 2%  (0-8% APR) 6.95%  (8-10% APR) 
Access to subsidised 
loans from government 
Yes (indirect) No 
Nature of product Tariffed service Loan 
Repayment terms Level: Max. 90% of savings 
Duration: max. over 75% of life 
time of measure 
Level: Max. 100% of savings 
Duration: up to 100%% of life 
time of measure 
Risk of non-payment Utility (not lenders to Midwest 
Energy) 
Green Deal Finance Company 
(lender to GD Providers) 
Flexibility early pay-off Without penalty Without penalty 
Transaction costs   
Programme  US$ 241 per service package £350-400 per Green Deal plan 
Economies of scale One utility selling financing 
packages for many customers 
(Ideally)  high number of 
providers selling financing 
packages for many customers 
Customer’s journey   
Number of actors  2 3-5 
Marketing  Targeted marketing,  customers 
with complaints/ high bills 
No targeted marketing 
Audit For free if customer signs up  Depending on provider, 
sometimes for  free if consumer 
signs up for Green Deal Plan 
Credit assessment Billing history Billing history, credit rating, PEP 
and sanctions check 
Hassle factor for 
customer 
Deals with utility and contractor Deals with many actors, goes 
through significant paper work 
Warranties No warranties provided by utility Warranties between 10-25 years 
depending on product 
Provider’s motivation  Customer satisfaction Profit 
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Comparing the two programmes from a customer’s perspective, it can be observed that the 
Green Deal is significantly more complex and requires much more commitment to go through 
the required process steps and to overcome the identified obstacles in the customer’s journey. 
While Midwest Energy succeeded in developing a product where more than 55% of 
approached customers say yes to an efficiency improvement, only 1.2% of households who 
carried out a Green Deal assessment have decided to sign up for a Green Deal Plan. 
Interestingly, around 80% report that they have implemented at least one measure or are 
intending to install a measure, but seek other sources funding (DECC, 2014f, 2014h). This 
finding either suggests that a lack of access to capital is not a major barrier or that those 
customers who face this barrier do not even sign up for a Green Deal assessment.  
From a provider’s perspective, a similar observation can be made. Selling a Green Deal is 
much more complex due to its design as a loan, the number of actors involved and the 
detailed requirements set up by the government, above all regarding the accreditation process.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in theory both programmes perform better in 
establishing mechanisms that overcome the identified barriers than they do in practice. A 
major a hindering factor is that many efficiency measures cannot be financed with OBF or 
OBR models alone, as energy cost savings do not allow to recover technology, installation, 
administrative, transaction and financing costs. The blending of capital with funding from the 
customer’s own pocket or another bank lets the old barriers arise, as (B2) customers might not 
be able to seek additional funding or have strong liquidity preferences, (B3) face the risk of not 
seeing the benefits when moving out and (B4) split incentives between landlords and tenants 
prevent investments in efficiency improvements. The analysis of new mechanisms introduced 
by How$mart® and the Green Deal and their effectiveness in overcoming identified barriers to 
the up-take of energy efficiency measures is summarised in Table 3. The green shading 
illustrates that a barrier can be regarded as “overcome”, while yellow stands for “partially 
overcome” and red for “not overcome”.  
Table 3 - New mechanisms versus old barriers under How$mart® and the Green Deal 
 How$mart® Green Deal 
B1:  Inertia Once potential customer is 
reached, high participation rate 
Even when potential customer is 
reached, low participation rate 
B2: Lack of available finance and/ 
or liquidity preferences 
Overcome for customers that are 
not in energy debt with sufficient 
saving potential 
Overcome for 83% of the 
population, but only for very few 
measures 
B3: Disincentives due to long pay-
back periods 
Overcome for highly cost-
effective measures; limited where 
How$mart® finance is blended 
with customer’s own capital 
Overcome for highly cost-
effective measures; limited in 
practice due to small number of 
measures that meet Golden Rule 
B4: Risk aversion Not overcome Not overcome 
B5: Split incentives Overcome Theoretically not overcome, 
empirically unclear 
B6: Transaction costs, customers Relatively low Relatively high to very high 
B7: Transaction costs, providers Relatively low Relatively high to very high 
B8: Financing costs Low High; competitive to other 
unsecured loans, but too high for 
many measures to meet Golden 
Rule 
If three overarching lessons learned from the comparative analysis between How$mart® and 
the Green Deal had to be summarised for utilities and policy-makers that are interested in 
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introducing on-bill programmes, they would be the following key points. They will also lay the 
foundation for the ex-ante analysis of on-bill models for the German context (chapter 3). 
(1) On-bill financing can be a suitable instrument to leverage investments in highly cost-
effective energy efficiency measures. The economics of energy efficiency investments 
usually do not allow for deep retrofits to be financed under an on-bill programme. If 
savings allow to pay for technology, installation, financing, programme and other 
transaction costs, barriers on the consumer’s side can be overcome, such as “lack of 
finance”, “disincentives regarding long pay-back periods” and “split incentives” between 
investors and users. Attaching the payments to the property’s electricity or gas meter is a 
unique feature of this innovative financing model which sets it apart from other financing 
offers such as conventional contracting. 
(2) Within the different sub-categories of on-bill models, preference should be given to 
designing the product as a service (OBF) and not as a loan (OBR). Waiving credit 
assessments related to taking out a loan should reduce transaction costs on the customer’s 
and the provider’s side. It also tears down psychological barriers, as many consumers are 
reluctant to take on debt for investing in energy efficiency, even if their financial situation 
would allow for it (Stieß & Dunkelberg, 2013). Furthermore, basing the eligibility of 
programme participants on an assessment of energy saving potentials rather than a check 
of customers’ economic status, improves the access to finance for energy efficiency 
improvements for lower income groups as well as small and middle enterprise who often 
struggle to access conventional capital markets. 
(3) Placing the utility at the heart of the programme should reduce overall transaction costs 
for a number of reasons: (a) Existing data on energy use levels as well as communicating 
with unsatisfied customers allows for targeted marketing to customers where the largest 
energy savings can be yielded. (b) No new payment streams have to be established and no 
third actor has to be reimbursed for the administrative effort (as energy companies under 
the Green Deal). Charges on the energy bill can be incorporated in existing billing systems. 
(c) From the customer’s perspective it reduces the complexity of the scheme as fewer 
actors are involved in the customer’s journey. Furthermore, the utility acts as a strong 
intermediary in case of conflicts with the installer of an energy efficiency measure. In 
contrast, under the Green Deal the finance provider and installer is often the same 
company. (d) Last but not least, it should reduce transaction costs from the state’s 
perspective, as quality assurance is largely left to the utility, which has an interest in 
achieving high levels of customer satisfaction through cooperating with highly-skilled 
contractors at the lowest possible price.  
Pay as You Save or Save as you Pay? 
49 
5. Ex-ante policy evaluation of promoting on-bill 
programmes in the German context  
In this chapter, the lessons learned from the analysis of the How$mart® programme and the 
Green Deal, will be transferred to the German context. As laid down in chapter 2.3 the ex-
ante evaluation of (a) policy instrument(s) that encourages on-bill financing is based on 
Mickwitz’ (2003) six criteria: relevance, impact, effectiveness, persistence, flexibility and predictability.  
5.1 Context - The German policy landscape for energy efficiency  
The Energy Concept lays down the basic policy framework for the “Energy Transition” 
towards a largely carbon neutral energy system by 2050. It seeks to reduce Germany’s total 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80% to 95% by mid-century.  The “Energy Transition” is based 
on a large-scale shift to renewable energies as well as reduction in primary energy demand by 
50%. The building sector plays a crucial role in reaching the overall energy efficiency and 
climate targets, as it currently accounts for 40% of Germany’s final energy use and one third 
of total CO2 emissions due to the combustion of fossil fuels for providing space heating, warm 
water, cooling and lighting (Becker et al., 2014). In the short term, by 2020, buildings’ final 
energy demand for heating, cooling and warm water is aimed to be reduced by 20%. By 2050, 
primary energy demand should be lowered by 80%. The remaining energy demand should to 
be largely covered by renewable energies (BMWi & BMU, 2010). All energy efficiency targets 
(excluding transport) from the Energy Concept are summarised in Table 4. 
Table 4 - Germany's national energy efficiency targets based on BMWi & BMU (2010) 
 2020 2050 
Primary energy demand (against 2008) -20% -50% 
Increase in final energy productivity 2.1.% per year 
Electricity demand (against 2008)  -10% -25% 
Final energy demand in buildings for space 
heating, cooling, warm water 
-20%  
Primary demand in buildings  -80% 
Refurbishment of building stock 2% of total building stock per year 
While the Energy Concept builds the overarching framework for the German Energy 
Transition, the National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) lay down more specific 
policy measures to reach the target of reducing the final energy demand by 9% by 2016 
compared to the average final energy demand over the period 2001 to 2005. This target was 
defined by the EU Energy Service Directive (2006/32/EC, ESD). Two NEEAPs have been 
submitted in 2007 and 2011. The third one is currently under development (Bigalke et al., 
2012; BMWi, 2007, 2011). The successor of the ESD, the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(2012/12/EU, EED) was adapted in May 2013 with the aim of reaching an indicative EU 
wide energy efficiency target of 20% by 2020. It requires all member states to reduce the 
national final energy use by 1.5%, measured in terms of sales of energy suppliers to final 
customers compared to the average sales from 2010 to 2012. For Germany, after accounting 
for all exemption clauses, this equals a reduction of final energy use of 1.125% per year or 73 
PJ in 2014, accumulating to 512 PJ in 2020. Over the total time period, the cumulated final 
energy use needs to be reduced by 2.047 PJ (Dinges et al., 2014) . 
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Germany is expected to the reach the 9% target for 2016 (Bigalke et al., 2012). However, 
Germany will not fulfil the requirements of the EED without further action. There has been a 
methodological debate on how to accurately calculate the „implementation gap“. Dinges et al. 
(2014) estimated that 502 PJ have to be reduced with additional actions. Furthermore, recent 
analyses show that Germany is not on track to meet its national energy efficiency targets. 
Current levels of an increase of 1.1% in final energy productivity per year need to be doubled, 
as well as current levels of the renovation rate of the building stock (Becker et al., 2014; 
BMWi, 2014; Löschel et al., 2014; Stieß & Dunkelberg, 2013; Weiss, Dunkelberg, & 
Vogelpohl, 2012). How the German government tries to encourage energy efficiency 
improvements will be illustrated in the following sections by introducing the reader to the 
existing policy mix comprised of regulatory, informational and economic instruments (see 
chapter 2 for a conceptual categorisation of policy instruments). 
5.1.1 Regulatory instruments  
Germany’s major regulatory instrument for energy efficiency is the definition of minimum 
energy performance standards for buildings and energy consuming products. In light of the oil 
crisis and rising energy prices the first Energy Saving Act (EnEG) targeting the energy 
demand from buildings was introduced in 1977. The EnEG provides a legal foundation for 
several ordinances which lay down detailed performance standards. Compared to other EU 
member countries, Germany’s energy savings regulations, dating back to the Thermal 
Insulation Ordinance (WSchVO), have been regarded as fairly progressive (IEA, 2013a; Weiss 
et al., 2012). Today, the Energy Conservation Ordinance (EnEV) builds the main regulatory 
law for energy efficiency in buildings. It defines minimum energy performance standards for 
the building shell as well as the heating system, ventilation, air conditioning and water boilers. 
Standards are split into classes for new and existing refurbished buildings.33 However, only 
those efficiency improvements are mandated which are suitable for cost recovery (Weiss et al., 
2012). In 2013, the EnEV was revised with the effect of an increase of efficiency requirements 
by 25% for new buildings from 2016 onwards (BMWi, 2014).  
Another important regulatory instrument for the decarbonisation of the building stock is the 
Renewable Energies Heating Act (EEWärmeG), which was introduced in 2009. For new 
buildings, it requires a certain share of heating and cooling demand to be satisfied with 
renewable energy deployment (Weiss et al., 2012) 
Moving away from the building sector to appliances, Germany has translated the EU Eco-
Design Directive (2005/32/EC, respectively 2009/125/EC) into the Energy-related Products 
Act (EBPG, respectively EVPG). The Act defines environmental and efficiency standards for 
energy consuming products, such as cooling and freezing devices or office equipment.  
5.1.2 Information instruments 
There are numerous campaigns to educate energy consumers about energy saving potentials in 
their homes (see for example Co2online, 2014a, 2014b; GUSB21, 2014). Since the 1970s, 
consumer associations have played an important role in providing impartial consultations on 
energy efficiency improvements (IEA, 2013a).   
In addition to campaigns for consumer education, the above presented regulations also 
mandate the provision of informational services. Since 1995, new buildings need to be 
                                                 
33 EnEV performance standards for existing buildings need to be fulfilled ”when 10% or more of the existing building 
component surface is changed or where more than 15m2 of floor space is added“ (IEA, 2013a, p. 42). 
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equipped with an EPC.34 Since 2009, the EnEV also requires sellers, landlords or lessor to 
provide interested parties with an EPC to inform consumers about the energy demand of 
residential buildings (IEA, 2013a). Recently, energy efficiency classes on EPCs were 
introduced to increase transparency in the real estate market  (BMWi, 2014; Weiss et al., 2012). 
A similar labelling approach is in place for energy consuming products. To better visualise the 
product’s performance, efficiency classes from “A+++” to “G” have been introduced by the 
EU regulation 2010/30/EU.    
5.1.3 Economic instruments 
Economic instruments can be split into two categories. The first one is comprised of 
instruments that introduce economic disincentives for the usage of energy in general and the 
combustion of fossil fuels in more particular. The second category contains instruments that 
provide economic incentives with the aim of encouraging the up-take of efficiency measures.  
Increased tax rates on petroleum, natural gas, heavy fuel oil and electricity, fall under the first 
category. These taxes were introduced in a step-wise approach under the Ecological Tax 
Reform dating back to 1999. Since then, several amendments have been enacted to the Energy 
Tax Act (EnergieStG) and the Electricity Tax Act (StromStG). To avoid negative effects on 
energy-producing and energy-consuming industries’ international competitiveness, tax reliefs 
have been granted. Since 2013, these tax reliefs are linked to the implementation of energy 
management systems and an industry wide energy saving target (IEA, 2013a). 
The major economic instrument falling under the second category is a large-scale soft loan 
programme for energy efficient refurbishments of existing homes and energy efficient new 
buildings. This instrument will be presented in more detail in the following section. 
5.1.3.1.1 The KfW Programmes for Energy Efficient Refurbishments 
The flagship instrument for energy efficient refurbishments in the German household sector 
is a preferential loan programme run by the state-owned development bank, Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW). The KfW CO2-Building Rehabilitation Programme (CO2 
Gebäudesanierungsprogramm) was introduced in 2001. In 2009, it was replaced by the KfW 
Programmes for Energy Efficient Refurbishment and for Energy Efficiency Construction. 
To be eligible for KfW funding it is mandatory to consult an accredited energy advisor from  a 
database operated by the Germany Energy Agency (see: Dena, 2014).35 Under the Efficient 
Refurbishment programme loans are granted to homeowners at a guaranteed interest of 1% 
for a term of ten years. The loan can be extended up to 30 years. There is a grace period 
between two and five years, where only interests have to be repaid, but not the loan itself 
(KfW, 2014c). The loan terms for refurbishments differ between two classes of loans. The 
first type of up to €50,000 per housing unit is available for single measures such as thermal 
insulation of walls, roofs, basements and floors, replacement of windows and exterior doors, 
renewal or optimization of the heating system and the renovation or installation of a 
ventilation system. In addition, indirect costs which are related to energy efficient 
refurbishments are covered, such as additional building costs (e.g. for an architect or building 
                                                 
34 The EPC is must contain information on „the  year  of construction, use of the building, usable surface area, and type of 
heating, water heating, and  type  and  percentage  of  renewable  energies” (IEA, 2013a, p. 42). It also provides 
recommendations for efficiency improvements if cost-effective saving potentials have been identified. 
35 The most comprehensive standardized assessment is the so-called “BaFA-Vor-Ort-Beratung”, where assessors are required 
to use certified computer software to develop tailor-made energy efficient refurbishment recommendations. The 
government subsidises the service with €300. Homeowners pay the remaining €300-400 (Stieß & Dunkelberg, 2013). 
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permits), building recovery costs (e.g. plastering walls after insulating) and costs for consulting, 
planning and other services during construction (KfW, 2014b). The second type of loan, of up 
to €75,000, can be combined with grants for more ambitious refurbishments which meet the 
KfW’s “Efficient house” standards. The terms follow a basic rule: the more ambitious the 
refurbishment is the more attractive is the KfW financial package, comprising a low-interest 
loan and a grant. The reference point for the “Efficient House” classification is the German 
building code, specified in the EnEV. The “Efficient house” class 100 equals the energy 
efficiency requirements for new buildings. The EnEV allows refurbished existing buildings to 
exceed the minimum performance standards for new buildings by 40%. The KfW loans 
reward refurbishments that go below the mandated max. level of energy use. For example, a 
refurbished building that exceeds the energy use of new buildings by only 15% meets the KfW 
“Efficient house” 115 standard. There are four standards from 115 to 85 (KfW, 2014d).  
For the constructing or purchasing buildings, the KfW offers loans of up to €50,000 to 
homeowners and contracting agents at an interest rate of 1.51% for a term of ten years. Again, 
the terms vary depending on the “Effcient House” standard reached after the efficiency 
improvement. The classes range from 70, 55, 40 to the passive house standard. For the most 
ambitious ones 55, 40 and passive houses, grants of up to €5,000 are issued (KfW, 2014a). 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2013a, p. 41), the KfW Energy 
Efficiency Programmes can be regarded as “one of the most significant programmes 
worldwide in terms of ambition and amounts of finance available”. Interestingly, the 
programmes saw a low demand during the first years. This changed when the KfW started to 
cooperate with local customer banks, who sell KfW loans to their final customers (D. Becker, 
personal communication, September 8, 2014).36 Despite high levels of demand, the 
programmes have seen turbulent times due to an unsecure funding situation. Funding for the 
cross-subsidized interest rate and grants used to be provided by the national budget. In 2011, 
the programme started to be funded partly through the German Energy and Climate Fund 
(EKF) and in 2012 it has been solely based on the later one (IEA, 2013b). The EKF is largely 
dependent on the auctioning revenues from the EU Emission Trading System (ETS), which 
caused the EKF to run into financing problems when prices in the EU ETS dropped 
sharply.37 The result were severe budget cuts for several climate and energy initiatives, 
including the KfW Programmes (Doelling, 2012). The programme’s budget decreased from 
€2.25 billion in 2009 to €900 million in 2011 (DENEFF, 2011). Against this background, in 
March 2012, the parliament’s budget committee decided to provide additional funding from 
the national budget, going back to the mixed public-private-financing model. Since then, the 
annual programme budget has been stabilised at €1.5 billion per year (KfW, 2013). 
It should be noted that finance provided by the KfW is not the same as total investments 
made in energy efficiency improvements in buildings. The consultancy Prognos AG estimates 
that annual energy related investments in the building stock account for €4 billion per year 
under the current refurbishment activity level of 1% per year (Thamling & Kemmler, 2012). 
                                                 
36 Most conventional banks, such as Deutsche Bank, Sparkasse, Volks- und Raiffeisenbank, or Commerzbank offer the KfW 
financial products for energy efficient refurbishments. The loans are refinanced by the KfW while the customer banks 
receive a margin for credit risk handling (Dorendorf, 2013). 
37  The government had calculated with a price of EUR 17 per European Emission Allowances (EUAs), generating sufficient 
income to finance several subsidy-driven climate and energy initiatives, such as the KFW energy efficiency programmes or 
the International Climate Initiative (ICI). However, due to the oversupply of EUAs on the European ETS spot market, 
the price per certificate dropped to only EUR 7 in 2011, creating substantial financing shortages (DENEFF, 2011). 
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5.2 Evaluating the relevance of on-bill models  
Which conclusions can be drawn regarding a potential introduction of on-bill programmes?  
First, even if funding for the KfW programmes will be stabilised over the next years, 
additional sources of finance need to be tapped to reach the ambitious energy efficiency 
targets in the German Energy Concept. The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW 
Berlin) calculated that for doubling current refurbishment rates in residential buildings, 
additional energy related investments of €7.4 billion per year will be needed in 2020, increasing 
to €9 billion in 2030 and €14 billion in 2050.38 In other areas additional €4.2 billion by 2020 
and €4.7 billion will be needed, for example for the refurbishment of non-domestic buildings, 
the replacement of inefficient electric households appliances and efficiency measures in the 
commercial sector and industry (Blazejczak et al., 2014). These estimates involve a significant 
degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, they illustrate that there is a need for accessing new and 
also private sources of finance. The German government acknowledged the challenge and 
decided to examine new market-based instruments (Becker et al., 2014). Against this 
background, the introduction of on-bill programmes can be regarded as relevant, if those 
programmes have access to private sources of finance or to public sources that are budget 
neutral, for example once a revolving loan fund has been established. 
Second, while the EnEV defines minimum performance standards, the KfW programmes 
provide financial incentives for ambitious single measures and deep refurbishments that are 
not necessarily cost-effective from a household perspective (Rosenow et al., 2013). Currently, 
there is a significant gap in the policy mix to encourage the up-take of less ambitious, but 
highly cost-effective energy efficiency measures. While some energy providers and consumer 
associations handed out grants for yielding “low-hanging fruits” particularly in low-income 
households, no long-term policy instruments were identified that target energy efficiency 
measures in buildings which go beyond the minimum requirements laid down by the EnEV, 
but that do not qualify for the higher KfW standards. As on-bill programmes tend to focus on 
highly cost-effective measures which require relatively small investment volumes, they could 
be a highly interesting option to close this gap. Regarding the installed type of measures there 
might be a certain overlap as the KfW also provides finance for the exchange of heating 
systems. However, with regards to targeted consumer segments, research on consumer 
behaviour suggests that OBF programmes, which are designed as an energy efficiency service 
and not as a loan, could be appealing to consumers that do not engage with a loan 
programme. More than two-thirds out of a sample of 1,008 homeowners are unwilling to 
borrow money for financing (further) energy efficiency measures. This cannot be explained 
with the burden of already existing debt, as only slightly more than one third reported that the 
credit line for the property is exhausted. The authors conclude “that a negative attitude 
towards loans is a major barrier against a comprehensive refurbishment” (Zundel & Stieß, 
2011, p. 98). Basing eligibility criteria on energy saving potentials, might also trigger 
modernisations in small and middle enterprises that are often not rated as credit worthy.  
Furthermore, no national energy efficiency programmes that provide incentives for the 
replacement of old inefficient electronic devices were identified. This could also be an 
interesting area where on-bill models might have a significant impact. When applying on-bill 
models to portable measures the payment obligation should be tied to the programme 
participant, not to the building’s electricity or gas meter (M. Volker, personal communication, 
                                                 
38 Due to diminishing rates of return (yielded energy savings per €), energy related annual investments increase significantly 
over time. Blazejczak et al (2014) assumed energy related investments to account for 30% of the refurbishment’s full costs. 
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September 2, 2014). If the person moves, repayments could be continued in a new location, 
given that the energy supplier is still active in this area. If the energy supplier is switched, the 
outstanding charges could be paid back early. As payback periods are usually much shorter 
and investments are much more liquid than investments in the building shell, the market 
barrier “uncertainty with regards to long pay-back periods” can be regarded as relatively low. 
In summary, OBF programmes should have an impact in form of an increased energy 
efficiency activity, alongside the improvements triggered by the existing instruments mix. 
5.3 Evaluating the impact of on-bill programmes 
Based on the premise that on-bill models might be an interesting complement to the existing 
energy efficiency policy mix, it is analysed what kind of energy saving potential in the 
residential and commercial sector could be addressed. Furthermore, it will be assessed which 
measures could be eligible under on-bill programmes to identify if these programmes might 
have a measurable impact alongside the existing policy mix. 
5.3.1 Identification of unexploited energy saving potential 
Several studies have been published on cost-effective energy saving potentials in the German 
residential and commercial sector (see: Dena, 2012; Pehnt et al., 2011; Schlomann, Becker, & 
Bürger, 2012; Seefeld et al., 2007). As applied methodological approaches differ significantly, 
the results cannot be directly compared. Projections from Pehnt et al. (2011) were used for 
further analyses as provided data allows for a relatively detailed breakdown of energy saving 
potentials in the residential and the commercial sector.39 The authors established three 
scenarios: (1) a “frozen efficiency” scenario, assuming no further efficiency developments and 
a constant final energy use of 9000 PJ per year (2009 levels), (2) a reference scenario, 
extrapolating current trends, (3) an “ambitious efficiency” scenario, where the implementation 
of cost-effective efficiency measures is accelerated due to an optimal policy framework. When 
comparing the frozen efficiency scenario with the ambitious scenario for the time period 2009 
to 2030, Pehnt et al. (2011) derive an energy saving potential of 183 TWh in the residential 
sector and 113 TWh in the commercial sector.  
Breaking down this aggregate estimate shows the largest energy saving potential can be 
leveraged by better insulating the existing residential building stock, exchanging heating 
systems and requiring strict efficiency standards for new residential buildings, followed by the 
same areas of improvement in the commercial building stock (Martin Pehnt et al., 2011). 
Currently, 65% of all buildings’ facades and 30% of all roofs are not insulated and another 
20% of facades and 35% of roofs do not meet today’s technical standards (Kohler, 2012).40 
Another area where significant electricity saving potentials could be exploited is the exchange 
of inefficient electric appliances such as refrigerators, washing machines or dryers in 
households, as well as cooling and freezing or office equipment in the commercial sector. A 
slightly smaller saving potential can be leveraged through intelligent lighting solutions, where 
the saving potential in the commercial is higher than in the residential sector (Martin Pehnt et 
al., 2011). The “landscape” of energy saving potentials in both sectors is illustrated in Figure 
12. 
                                                 
39 The German Energy Agency (Dena, 2012) estimates that the residential sector’s final energy consumption could be reduced 
cost-effectively by 121 TWh by 2020 compared to 2008 (heating: 112 TWh, electricity: 9 TWh). This would equal a reduction 
of 17% compared to 2008 levels. The commercial sector shows a cost-effective saving potential of 67 TWh (heating: 52 TWh, 
electricity: 15 TWh), while industry accounts for a saving potential of 75 TWh (fuels: 48 TWh, electricity: 27 TWh). As there 
is no information available on how these potentials were calculated, they were not used for further analysis. 
40 ”Not meeting today’s technical standards” means that insulation thickness is below 9 cm for facades and below 13 cm for 
roofs (Kohler, 2012).  
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Figure 12 - Landscape of energy saving potential in the residential and commercial sector 
Source: Own illustration adapted from Pehnt et al. (2011) 
5.3.2 Identification of eligible measures for on-bill models 
Based on the identified energy saving potentials in the residential and commercial sector, it 
was assessed if specific energy saving measures from these areas would be attractive under on-
bill programmes. Existing publications were scrutinised for data on technology and installation 
costs and energy savings (Becker et al., 2014; BMVBS, 2012a, 2012b, 2013).41 It should be 
noted that there are significant deviations regarding costs and savings in the available literature 
and that consulted energy efficiency experts raised concerns that the applied estimates for 
energy saving potentials might be too optimistic. The following economic assessment should 
therefore be treated with caution.  
Only those measures were chosen for further analysis where annual energy cost savings 
exceeded annual payments. Annual payments were derived from three components. First, 
technology and installation costs were drawn from existing literature. A conservative approach 
was chosen by working with full costs instead of energy related incremental costs. This 
distinction is particularly relevant for insulating the building shell where full costs are often 
two to four times higher than energy related incremental costs (Becker et al., 2014; Weiß & 
Dunkelberg, 2010). For measures installed in residential buildings the costs resemble literature 
values for relatively large, modernised detached family houses.42 Providing estimates for other 
types of buildings was out of scope for this thesis. Choosing this type of reference building 
can be justified as detached and semi-detached houses account for 83% of the residential 
                                                 
41 For this review only those studies were chosen that provide specific data on costs and savings for the German context. 
Material costs, labour costs, business profit and professional fees differ significantly between countries (Boneta, 2013). 
42 The data was derived from two studies with slightly different reference buildings. The reference building in Becker et al. 
(2014, p. 126) has the following characteristics: Detached, modernised family house built 1958-1968, floor area 242m², 
Energy performance: roof: 0.25 W/m².K, walls, 0.34 W/m².K, windows 1.3 W/m².K, floor 0.52 W/m².K, heating system: 
low-temperature boiler from 1987-1994. The BMVBS (2012a) reference building’s characteristics are: Detached family 
house, floor area 296 m², heating demand: 110 kWh/m²a, heating system: condensing gas or oil boiler which was installed 
before 1994. It was not assumed that replacing heating system will be accompanied by switching the energy carrier.  
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building stock (Bigalke et al., 2012). Furthermore, these two building types are particularly 
relevant for reducing the overall energy demand from the residential building stock, as the 
specific heating requirements per square metre of living space is higher than in multi-family 
buildings (Weiss et al., 2012).  Due to a lack of data only one measure targeting the 
commercial sector was included in this economic assessment. 
After identifying adequate data for technology and installation costs, programme costs 
amounting for 700€ per measure were added based on data provided by Green Deal 
providers, except for the refrigerator replacement where 180€ were assumed to be more 
suitable based on data from an existing mini-contracting model (A. Mucke, personal 
communication, July 16, 2014). While the 700€ estimate is significantly higher than reported 
data for most OBF programmes in the U.S. (H. Lachman personal communication, July 8, 
2014), it is below typical costs of providing one Green Deal financing plan (Green Deal 
providers, personal communication, various occasions). Compared to data provided by Berlo 
et al. (2011) on costs faced by municipal utilities for designing an energy efficiency 
programme, administration, marketing, client consultation and programme evaluation, the 
estimate is located in the medium range. In a last step, financing costs were added, assuming 
that providers are able to pass on an interest rate of 3% to their customers. All costs were 
added up and spread over 85% of the measures’ lifetime.43 
Energy cost savings were calculated based on energy prices for households and commercial 
customers from 2012.44 If future energy prices rise, annual savings will increase over time 
compared to the reference case where no efficiency measures would have been installed. If 
energy prices decrease, savings will be lower than illustrated. Measures were excluded where 
annual repayments exceeded 85% of estimated energy cost savings, as it was regarded as 
crucial to provide a 15% buffer to programme participants for two reasons. First, as already 
discussed, under on-bill programmes savings are not guaranteed and estimates provided by 
energy assessors might be inaccurate. Second, customers should see an immediate benefit in 
participating in the programme. This would not be given if payments would be allowed to 
account 100% of the savings. Third, due to rebound effects of different scales, many 
participants are likely to face higher energy bills than before the installation. This risk will be 
reduced by limiting annual repayments to 85% of annual energy cost savings. 
It should be noted that no discount rate was applied for future energy savings, as no research 
has been carried out on consumer behaviour and their implicit discount rates under on-bill 
programmes. Assuming that on-bill financing would offer consumers a largely risk free energy 
efficiency service (due to long-term warranties for installed technologies and an attachment of 
the payment obligation to the meter) which comes at no up-front costs, applied discount rates 
should be relatively low. The following calculation has the simple purpose to illustrate which 
measures would be eligible for on-bill models under the assumed programme requirements. 
All measures which have been identified as eligible are presented in Table 5. The majority of 
assessed measures would not pay for themselves under the assumed conditions. These 
measures are efficient windows, roof isolation, solar-thermal systems, replacing old gas and oil 
boilers by pellet boilers and hydraulic balancing for existing boiler driven heating systems. 
Particularly, those measures which are on the border to being eligible for on-bill financing, 
                                                 
43 Again, an exception was made for the refrigerator as it is the only portable measure. The low investment volume and 
relatively high savings allow for a shorter payment period of five years. 
44 Energy prices 2012 for households: electricity: 0,2873 €/kWh, gas: 0,0648 €/kWh, oil: 0,0896 €/kWh, pellets: 0,0550 
€/kWh; Commercial sector: electricity 0,2414 €/kWh. Based on Becker et al. (2014, p. 133). 
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such as hydraulic balancing, might be attractive when bundled with highly cost-effective 
efficiency measures, provided that total payments do not exceed 85% of the savings.  
Table 5 - Non-exclusive list of eligible measures for on-bill financing based on *Becker et al. (2014), 
**BMVBS (2012a), ***(WSW, 2013) 
Measure 
 Electricity 
(kWh) 
 Gas 
(kWh) 
 Oil 
(kWh) 
Full costs 
(€) 
Payback  
(years) 
Saving 
(€/a) 
Payment 
(€/a) 
Single-family 
home facade 
renovation BAT 
0.12 W / (m² K)* 
 300 - 17400 
21,400  
- 
24,900 
 25  1,645  1,334 
Replacement 
night storage 
heaters by gas 
central heating* 
 15,800  -17,400 - 10,850  13  3,412  1,086 
Replacing old gas 
standard boiler 
to condensing 
gas boiler** 
- 11,941 -  5500  16  774  494 
Replacing old oil 
standard boiler 
to condensing oil 
boiler** 
- -  9,460  8,800  16  848  701 
Replacing old 
fridge by A+++ 
model*** 
682 - - 450 5 196 138 
Replacing 
lighting in 
commercial 
buildings** 
 3,500 - -  3,000  13  845 282 
The assessment of specific measures shows that on-bill financing is not a suitable instrument 
for deep refurbishments, but could be an attractive option for highly cost-effective measures, 
such as exchanging single-family houses’ heating systems or replacing inefficient electronic 
devices. Compared to experiences reported from the How$mart programme it is remarkable 
that in Kansas the exchange of boilers usually requires an additional capital injection from the 
consumer, while insulations have been proven to be highly cost-effective. The data for the 
German context turns this observation on its head. It suggests that the full costs of a boiler 
exchange could be financed in an on-bill model, while most insulation measures cannot.   
Overall, the economic assessment illustrates that a significant amount of measures could be 
eligible and that on-bill programmes could have an impact alongside the existing energy 
efficiency instruments. However, it should be emphasised again that the results of this 
assessment underlie a certain degree of uncertainty, as technology and installation costs as well 
as energy savings are not static, but highly context specific and the reliability of values from 
the existing literature has been questioned by interviewed experts. 
5.3.3 Overcoming context specific barriers that reduce the impact of 
on-bill models 
The following section will analyse context specific barriers that might reduce the impact of on-
bill models in Germany. The barriers were mostly identified in semi-structured interviews with 
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experts from the German energy efficiency policy arena. To transfer existing experiences 
regarding potential solutions on how these barriers could (partly) be overcome, the identified 
issues were also discussed with on-bill experts from the U.S. and the UK. 
5.3.3.1 Need for adequate metering and billing systems 
In contrast to the UK and in Kansas, most German households and small businesses do not 
get a feedback on their actual electricity use through a monthly bill. Monthly payments for 
grid-bound energy carriers, such as electricity and gas, are usually based on an estimate of 
actual energy use. Residential customers start paying a billing amount, which reflects the 
average use for the corresponding household size. After a year the actual energy use is 
checked. The consumer either pays money to the utility if energy use was higher than 
estimated or the consumer gets money back if it was lower. Afterwards, monthly payments are 
adjusted to better reflect actual consumption levels. For on-bill programmes this billing system 
creates several challenges. First, most consumers are poorly educated about their actual energy 
use. Second, if monthly payments are not lowered by the estimated energy cost savings, 
consumers do not see an immediate benefit in participating in the programme. However, if 
monthly payments are reduced after the efficiency improvement has been implemented, but 
the estimate of energy cost savings proved to be wrong, consumers face the risk of paying 
back a significant amount of energy debt, which accumulated over the first year. For the same 
reason programme participants’ electricity bills remain constant for the first year despite 
yielded savings under the existing mini-contracting programme for efficient fridges, operated 
by the local energy supplier Wuppertaler Stadtwerke (A. Mucke, personal communication, July 
14, 2014). This risk related to accumulating energy debt could be reduced by using a certain 
safety margin, even though a timely feedback on actual consumption would be more desirable. 
When the building is not connected to a grid-bound energy source the consumer does not 
receive any direct feedback on energy use for space heating and warm water.  This is the case 
for one fourth of all German apartment’s where heating systems are based on boilers 
connected to oil tanks (Diefenbach, Cischinsky, Rodenfels, & Clausnitzer, 2010). In similar 
cases in the U.S., the electricity supplier acted as the energy efficiency provider. A charge is 
attached to the electricity bill, even though savings accrued from a reduced use of locally 
stored propane or natural gas (H. Lachman, personal communication, July, 1, 2014). 
Furthermore, in the German rental sector it is very common that heating expenses are 
included in the rent. Interviewed experts from the U.S. argued an OBF model could still work 
if the prerequisite is fulfilled that benefits and OBF charges are borne by the same person, 
here the tenant. The landlord could collect the surcharge from the tenant and pass it on to the 
heating supplier. The incentive for the landlord is to receive an improvement of the property 
without bearing any costs (H. Lachman & M. Volker, personal communication, various 
occasions). The situation gets more complex in multi-apartment buildings with no metering 
system is in place that allows measuring the tenant’s actual energy use. In Germany, the 
landlord is obliged to provide for individual metering. However, there are some exceptions to 
this rule, for example, in old multi-apartment buildings where the installation of individual 
meters would not be cost-effective after ten years (§ 10 HeizkostenV, BGBl. I S. 3250). In this 
type of buildings there is often only one meter in place. The total buildings’ energy use is then 
spread over the number of square meters and allocated to the apartments. As improvements 
are shared by all residents of the building the energy cost savings could also be distributed by 
square meters. If energy efficiency improvements are only carried out in a certain share of 
apartments, the rent of the beneficiaries would need to be adjusted.  
Aligning incentives by introducing a fixed price for energy in the rent and locating all benefits 
on the landlord’s side, as it has been observed in Kansas (Burr, 2013), would be illegal in 
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Germany. Landlords are required to pass on energy savings to their tenants, as heating 
expenses in the rent need to reflect tenants’ actual consumption (HeizkostenV, BGB).45 
Overall, the challenges seem to be solvable. However, an individual and timely metering of 
consumers’ actual energy use would improve the situation significantly. The EED encourages 
the introduction of “individual meters that accurately reflect the final customer’s actual energy 
consumption and that provide information on actual time of use” for all relevant energy 
carriers (Art 9. Directive 2012/27/EU, OJ L 315/1).46 However, the EED also contains a 
clause which states that new meters only need to be introduced if their installation is 
technically possible and cost-effective. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
(BMWi) has commissioned a cost-benefit analysis of the roll-out of smart meters and metering 
systems. The results suggest that a roll-out of smart metering systems47 for energy consumers 
with an annual electricity consumption above 6,000 kWh and a roll-out of smart meters for 
smaller consumers is cost-effective from a micro and macro-economic perspective. The roll-
out of smart meters for gas was not recommended, as the installation was found to be too 
costly (Ernst & Young, 2013). However, the study did not account for the potential benefits 
related to new services, such as OBF, that could be facilitated by a roll-out of smart meters.  
5.3.3.2 Need for capacity-building along the supply chain 
According to the developer of PAYS® a good contractor network is one of the crucial factors 
for making OBF programmes work (H. Lachman, personal communication, August 4, 2014). 
Several interviewed energy efficiency experts from the German energy efficiency arena were 
sceptical that current educational programmes and accreditation systems are adequate to 
ensure a high quality of energy assessors and installers. It was also questioned if energy 
suppliers are well prepared to act as an energy efficiency service provider and run on-bill 
programmes. This problem cannot be solved by an intelligent policy design for on-bill 
financing alone, but needs to be embedded in a larger initiative for an improved capacity-
building along the whole energy efficiency supply chain. Based on the lessons learned from 
the UK, an elaborate accreditation system for on-bill finance providers can be expected to 
come at significant costs. If instead energy suppliers act as financiers and cooperate with 
energy efficiency service providers in a contracting network, economies of scale could be 
realised and parts of the quality assurance can be expected to be exercised by the supplier that 
aims to establish a long-term relationship with its customers and business partners. 
5.3.3.3  Need to persuade relevant stakeholders 
The German energy system is currently undergoing a radical transition that naturally creates 
winners and losers. Many large electricity and gas supplier struggle to make profit under 
current market conditions. Therefore, suppliers are looking for new business models. In a 
recent survey, 54% of responding energy suppliers reported that extending customer services 
is part of their business strategy (Pressetext, 2014). This could be a facilitating factor for OBF 
                                                 
45 If landlords modernise their rental property, they are allowed to increase the annual rent (exclusive of heating) by 11% of 
the modernisation’s costs. Only incremental costs over maintenance work can be allocated to the tenant (§ 559, BGB). 
Under current market conditions the 11% modernisation allocation is often insufficient to recover the costs of an energy 
efficient retrofit (Henger & Voigtländer, 2011). From the tenant’s perspective the rent increase due to the modernisation 
allocation might be (partly) offset by energy cost savings, which are reflected in the total rent (inclusive of heating). 
46 By 2020, 80% of all consumers in the EU should be provided with smart metering systems for electricity. No schedules are 
provided for the roll-out of metering systems for other energy carriers (Art 9. Directive 2012/27/EU, OJ L 315/1). 
47 The EED defines smart or intelligent metering systems as “an electronic system that can measure energy consumption, 
[…], and can transmit and receive data using a form of electronic communication” (Art 9. Directive 2012/27/EU, OJ L 
315/1). In contrast, smart meters are not connected to a communication network (Ernst & Young, 2013). 
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programmes. However, under these conditions of high uncertainty, it will be crucial to 
carefully consider all actors’ interests. An in-depth stakeholder analysis was out of this scope 
for this thesis, but several insights have been gained in expert interviews (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13 - Stakeholders' interests with regards to on-bill financing 
Source: Own illustration based on expert interviews on various occasions 
As highlighted in red colour, conflicts can be expected when deciding who is going to be 
allowed to act as an on-bill finance provider. Policy-makers face a trade-off between keeping 
the design simple from a customer’s perspective by placing the energy supplier at the heart of 
the scheme (How$mart®) or opening it up to a wide array of market actors, accompanied by 
potentially costly accreditation processes and a higher degree of complexity (Green Deal). 
5.3.3.4 Need to account for differing legal traditions 
A legal assessment with regards to OBF in the German context was also out of scope of this 
thesis. It is therefore unclear if the legal practice in the U.S. and the UK, such as tying the 
payment obligation to the building’s meter, is transferrable to the German context.  R. Loch 
from the Consumer Association North Rine-Westfalia (personal communication, June 13, 
2014) raised concerns that German consumers might be unwilling to experiment with a new 
financing mechanism attached to the building’s meter, as consumers tend to have a rather 
conservative relationship to their property (which is well reflected in the German term 
“Eigenheim”). This potential cultural barrier might be even higher if utilities insist on filing a 
lien to the property when providing finance for energy efficiency improvements. This is 
common practice under the How$mart® programme, but is not recommended by the PAYS® 
system. In Germany, an entry in the land registry (Grundbuch) is already applied for leasing 
photovoltaic systems or energy supply contracting models for efficient heating systems. If 
these models prevail, it can be assumed that liens might be more accepted in the future. 
Another legal challenge will be to find the right balance between allowing suppliers to use on-
bill programmes for increasing customer loyalty and prevailing consumers’ freedom to switch 
suppliers. This could possibly be circumvented by limiting the customer retention to a certain 
time period, e.g. 3-5 years, and by legally obliging all utilities to continue the collection of 
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payments and forwarding them to the utility where the initial contract was arranged. As in the 
UK, the new energy supplier that does not benefit from the initial energy efficiency service 
contract could receive a small fee as a reimbursement for the administrative effort. 
5.4  Evaluating the predictability of on-bill policy instruments  
Based on the lessons learned from the analysis of the PAYS® intervention theory and the 
design and performance of the How$mart® programme and Green Deal (see chapter 3), it is 
recommended to encourage on-bill programmes that implement the service-based OBF 
model, with a strong role of the utility as the energy efficiency service and finance provider, as 
well as high levels of consumer protection. Furthermore, it will be crucial to provide utilities 
who engage with OBF programmes with access to low cost finance, as the level of interest is a 
crucial factor for the eligibility of energy efficiency measures. Four design options have been 
developed that vary in their degree of coerciveness for encouraging the introduction of OBF 
models by utilities operating in the German electricity and gas market: 
(1) The policy intervention is limited to creating the required legal conditions (particularly 
for attaching the payment obligation to the meter). It might be complemented by 
public campaigning. In this case it is up to the market to decide if OBF programmes 
are an attractive solution for tapping unexploited energy saving potentials. Utilities 
and where appropriate independent ESCOs cooperating with utilities, can choose to 
offer households and businesses OBF programmes for efficiency improvements. 
(2) Again the required legal conditions are provided by a policy intervention and the up-
take of OBF models is left to the market. However, financial incentives are provided 
to utilities to encourage the introduction of OBF programmes. This could be 
organised through a “Funding Directive” (Förderrichtlinie) which lays down the 
requirements to apply for grants from the Energy Efficiency Fund. 
(3) The legislator requires energy utilities to offer the installation and financing of 
efficiency measures based on the OBF model to their customers. However, no targets 
regarding saved energy, sold products or reached customers are mandated by the 
policy intervention. Utilities only need to prove that they have an OBF programme in 
place. They can decide to outsource the implementation of the OBF programme to a 
third party, for example an ESCO.  
(4) The legislator requires utilities to offer OBF by linking it to an energy company 
obligation system. Here, the government or another public authority establishes 
energy savings targets for certain time intervals. These targets have to be met by all 
gas and electricity suppliers above a certain size through the implementation of 
energy efficiency measures with final energy users. By linking the obligation system to 
OBF the costs for delivering the defined amount of energy savings are not spread 
over the energy prices of all end users. Instead, the household or business that 
benefits from an efficiency measure pays back the investment costs and a margin for 
the utility on the energy bill. Similar to the UK ECO, the legislator could require that 
a certain proportion of the savings must be delivered in specific customer segments, 
for example with the aim of supporting low-income households. To encourage 
deeper renovations the legislator could demand that a further portion of required 
energy savings must be achieved through specific measures. If in these cases costs 
exceed the energy cost savings, the legislator could allow to pass on the incremental 
costs through the energy price to all end users. Again, a negative distributional effect 
on end users who do not benefit from efficiency improvements would be smaller 
than in the conventional utility obligation model. 
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To ensure compliance with all policy options a federal oversight body needs to be installed. 
Furthermore, the introduction of sanctions ranging from financial penalties to a loss of 
operating licenses in case of severe infringements should be considered. 
The predictability of outputs, in terms on-bill programmes on the market, and outcomes, the 
energy efficiency measures installed and financed under these programmes, increases with the 
level of coerciveness. Predicting outputs and outcomes for policy option 1 and 2 was not 
feasible as data was missing with regards to crucial assumptions, e.g. the willingness of energy 
suppliers to introduce on-bill programmes, consumers’ up-take and the amount and type of 
energy efficiency measures installed. For policy option 3, the number of introduced on-bill 
programmes is given, as it is mandated by policy-makers. A quantitative analysis of the 
amount and type of energy efficiency measures provided and energy savings yielded is 
presented in section 5.4.1. Policy option 4 offers an even higher degree of predictability. As 
the amount of energy savings is mandated by policy-makers a bottom-up analysis of energy 
savings would not add value to evaluate the instrument’s effectiveness. Administrative costs 
are difficult to predict under all designs and are excluded from the following assessment. 
5.5 Evaluating a specific policy instrument’s effectiveness in terms of 
energy savings and their persistence 
Out of these four options, option 3 has been chosen for an analysis of its effectiveness in terms 
of induced energy savings. As the legislator obliges energy suppliers to offer an OBF model 
for energy efficiency improvements, all energy consumers would have access to on-bill 
financing. The assumed programme design resembles the How$mart® programme, an OBF 
model run by utilities with access to low cost finance. Therefore, it was assumed that similar 
participation rates would be achieved, even though there is a significant degree of uncertainty 
if the experiences made in the U.S. can be transferred to the German context. To account for 
this uncertainty, instead of an observed participation rate in Kansas of 0.43% of all customers 
per year, it was anticipated that 0.4% of all households and business from the commercial 
sector would be reached. In absolute numbers this would mean that every year 191,290 
households and 63,763 businesses from the commercial sector agree to on-bill financing. 
Based on the economic assessment of specific energy efficiency measures (see Table 5), it is 
assumed that 50% of participating households use OBF for replacing their old gas or oil 
standard boiler with a more efficient gas or oil boiler. Another 20% finance the efficient 
renovation of a single-family house facade, 10% replace their night storage heater and 20% 
exchange their old fridge. Furthermore, it was assumed that all participating businesses use 
OBF for switching to efficient LED lighting systems. Under these circumstances, final energy 
savings would amount to 1.37 PJ electricity and 4.15 PJ fuels (gas and oil) in the first year. If 
on-bill programmes would be introduced in 2015 and run over the next five years yearly 
cumulated final energy savings would amount to 8.23 PJ electricity and to 24.9 PJ fuels in 
2020. The results in terms of final and primary energy savings48 are illustrated in Table 6. 
Cumulated final energy savings from 2015 to 2020, account for 115.9 PJ. With regards to the 
EED “implementation gap” of 502 PJ, the policy design option 3 could therefore potentially 
deliver 23% of the required energy savings. Regarding the instrument’s effectiveness, this 
exemplary calculation suggests that offering OBF for the residential and commercial sector 
                                                 
48 For calculating primary energy savings the conversion factors of the ”Climate Protection Scenario 2050” was applied . For 
the year 2014 and 2020 the same conversion factors were applied, even though it can be assumed that the factor will need 
to be adapted to due an increasing share of renewable energies.   
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will on its own not close the gap between current levels of efficiency improvements and 
politically defined targets. However, it could deliver a significant contribution, even without 
politically mandated energy savings targets for energy suppliers or further economic 
incentives, e.g. in form of grants for energy consumers. 
Table 6 - Induced energy savings of on-bill financing under the policy design option 3 
 Yearly cumulated energy 
savings in 2015 
Yearly cumulated energy 
savings in 2020 
Final energy [PJ] [PJ] 
Electricity 1,37 9,60 
Fuels (oil and gas) 4,15 29,05 
Primary energy [PJ] [PJ] 
Electricity (Factor 2,34) 3,21 22,46 
Fuels (Factor 1,1) 4,56 31,95 
It should be noted that this calculation certainly overestimates actual energy savings as it does 
not account for free rider effects (assuming that some consumers would have installed the 
measure anyway) and reduced energy savings due to low quality installations or technologies. 
Regarding the persistence of energy savings it is assumed that a certain share of energy savings 
induced by energy efficiency improvements under OBF will be offset due to increased thermal 
comfort or convenience. Greening et al. (2000) reviewed 75 studies and indicated that 
estimates for “rebound effects” for space heating range between 10% and 30%. Studies on 
“rebound effects” in the German context identified similar to slightly higher effects (Erhon, 
2007; Kaßner, Wilkens, Wenzel, & Ortjohan, 2010; Rosenow & Galvin, 2013).  
5.6 Evaluating the flexibility regarding future policies 
It is hard to predict which instruments might be introduced in the near- to medium-term 
future. While the discussion on the design of a potential energy company obligation is still on-
going (see: Becker et al., 2014; Bürger, Rohde, Eichhammer, & Schlomann, 2012; Schlomann 
et al., 2012), interviewed experts from the policy arena are sceptical that an introduction is 
politically feasible under current conditions. OBF can be encouraged on a voluntary basis, but 
later linked to an obligation system that mandates energy savings targets for electricity and gas 
suppliers. As the introduction of a new levy can be regarded as very unpopular in light of the 
rising electricity prices and a lot of bad press for the renewable energy levy (EEG Umlage), 
OBF might be an interesting option to mitigate the distributional effects of an energy 
company obligation. Here, costs are largely borne by beneficiaries of efficiency improvements 
and not by all customers in form of higher energy prices (see design option 4).  
Another model to leverage funding for energy efficiency improvements is a tendering model 
(see: Dinges et al., 2014; M. Pehnt & Brischke, 2013). Both studies suggest that market actors 
can access funding for energy efficiency programmes that implement standardised measures, 
e.g. the exchange of heating systems or a switch to efficient lighting systems. Available funding 
could be used to deliver seed capital to energy suppliers that are interested in setting up on-bill 
financing programmes. Furthermore, it could be assessed if these suppliers that voluntarily 
adopt OBF, might receive attractive credit lines with the KfW to provide particularly smaller 
suppliers with access to low-cost capital that they can pass on to their customers. 
Overall, encouraging the introduction of on-bill programmes can be pursued via different 
policy instruments ranging from economic instruments (carrots) to regulatory instruments 
(sticks). A necessary degree of flexibility can therefore be regarded as given. 
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6. Discussion  
This chapter discusses the research’s methodological choices as well the key insights gained on 
on-bill programmes and the context-specific insights of the cases under analysis. Furthermore, 
the findings will be compared to the existing literature on on-bill programmes. 
6.1 Methodological considerations 
With due limitations, the methods for data analysis for the ex-post as well as for the ex-ante 
evaluation have been suitable to systematically assess the two research questions that built the 
foundation for this thesis. Methods for data collection, particularly the survey targeted at 
Green Deal providers, would have been revised, if the amount of information gathered by the 
end of the thesis period had been available at the early stages. Carrying out a trial survey would 
have been helpful. The gathered data would allow for a more thorough interpretation if survey 
participants would have been provided with the specific components of capital costs from the 
beginning and if accreditation costs would have been assessed separately from operational 
costs. Given the current state of knowledge, the survey should have also accounted explicitly 
for providers’ activities in the ECO market. Now, it was often unclear whether the point of 
time when the accreditation process was completed was the same as when the provider started 
to sell Green Deal plans. This caused uncertainties when determining the period of time 
where TCs, ACs and marketing costs were accounted for in relation to total capital costs. 
As probably any other research project, this thesis was constrained by data limitations. The 
principle of triangulation could not be fulfilled in all cases. Semi-structured interviews were a 
major source of empirical data and it was not feasible to back up all quoted statements with a 
second source from literature. Furthermore, the survey did not deliver the desired kind and 
statistical amount of quantitative data. For example, it would have been interesting to derive 
estimates of the scale of ACs, TCs and marketing costs per saved kWh or in relation to the 
capital costs of specific technologies. These results could have provided interesting insights in 
a comparison with the findings from Mundaca (2007) for energy savings delivered under the 
EEC a predecessor of the ECO. The gathered data from the research at hand did not allow 
for such an analysis. Only three Green Deal providers gave an estimate of energy savings 
yielded by the measures installed under their Green Deal plans, ranging from “up to 150,000” 
kWh to “up to 300,000 kWh”. Two respondents evaluated TCs with regard to specific 
technologies, which were assessed as particularly high for biomass boilers, easy-to-treat cavity 
wall insulations and loft insulations (see illustration in Annex III).  
Taking into account these methodological challenges, it would be interesting to carry out a 
second survey in half a year to observe potential learning effects regarding levels of TCs, ACs 
and marketing costs. Other areas for future research are highlighted in the following sections. 
6.2 Key observations from the ex-post evaluation 
The ex-post evaluation showed that carefully designed on-bill programmes can be a suitable 
instrument to overcome certain barriers to energy efficiency investments. In the terms of 
Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) Realistic Evaluation, on-bill programmes are able to trigger 
“mechanisms for change” that counteract old, inhibiting mechanisms.  
The major prerequisite for unsubsidised on-bill programme to work is that significant cost-
effective saving potentials can be leveraged. If there is no need for the consumer to invest 
from her own pocket, one can argue that the barrier high-up front costs paired with lack of 
available capital can be fully overcome. Providing finance in form of an energy efficiency 
service, as suggested by PAYS® and implemented by How$mart, can be regarded as highly 
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attractive for those energy consumers who are traditionally unwilling or unable to finance 
energy efficiency measures from their own pocket or by taking out a loan. Furthermore, by 
strictly tying the repayments to the beneficiary of energy savings, incentives can be aligned in a 
manner that solves the split incentives dilemma between landlords and tenants. Having the 
up-front costs covered by a third-party and attaching the payment obligation to the property 
can be identified as the two essential facilitating factors for encouraging the up-take of 
efficiency improvements. Furthermore, on-bill programmes are able to shift a certain share of 
future energy cost savings to the present by requiring repayments not to exceed a certain share 
of energy savings. This reduces disincentives with regards to long pay-back periods. Even 
though not all consumers react to economic incentives (CCC, 2009), aligning the timing of 
cost and benefits should be a facilitating factor for reducing high levels of inertia related to 
consumers’ implicit discount rates for future savings (Hausman, 1979; Howarth & Sanstad, 
1995). Whether programmes are able to overcome consumers’ risk aversion is highly 
dependent on the design in terms of required warranties and other mechanisms for consumer 
protection. Neither the How$mart® programme, nor the Green Deal delivers the levels of 
consumer protection, e.g. product warranties, as it is envisaged by the PAYS® system.  
From a provider’s perspective investments made under on-bill programmes can be regarded as 
relatively secure. The rate of non-payment is usually below 1% as programme participants risk 
to be disconnected from utility services (Hayes et al., 2011). Even though on-bill programmes’ 
might not be able to deliver a significant rate of return on investments made, they can be a 
suitable instrument for yielding indirect benefits, such as gaining competitive advantage by 
increasing customer loyalty, image campaigning and experimenting with new business areas.  
These general cautiously positive observations are supported by an emerging body of (mostly 
grey) literature (ACEEE, 2012; Bell & Nadel, 2012; Burr, 2013; Zhang, 2013). However, the 
barrier analysis structured by the PAYS® intervention theory should not be understood as an 
exclusive list of barriers to the take-up of energy efficiency measures. Other hindering factors, 
such as the hassle related to construction work, are not overcome by on-bill programmes.  
The findings from the comparative analysis showed that the design of How$mart® is more 
effective in overcoming the analysed barriers than the Green Deal. Based on empirical 
findings as well as theoretical considerations, it can be argued that in general OBF models are 
more effective in overcoming market barriers to energy efficiency than OBR models. Firstly, 
consumer research has shown that consumers are highly reluctant to take on debt. Secondly, 
paying for an energy efficiency service and not for a loan should reduce the hassle related to 
contractual sequences customers have to go through. It is relatively straightforward to argue 
that reducing complexity, e.g. by waiving a check of creditworthiness, can be assumed to 
translate into lower administrative and transaction costs. However, it would be interesting to 
quantify these costs not only on the provider’s, but also on the consumer’s side to back up 
this finding with stronger empirical evidence. Thirdly, becoming a lending institution is 
relatively far from utilities conventional business model. Utilities often lack the know-how on 
consumer lending laws and capacity building to navigate this new business area is often very 
costly. Introducing a tariff under an OBF programme is not as far from the traditional 
business model. A drawback is that in the U.S. utilities have to undergo a regulatory approval 
for introducing a tariff (ACEEE, 2012). It was not assessed how difficult it is for utilities to 
pursue such an approval. Furthermore, no clear answer was found, whether OBR 
programmes are able to deliver higher levels of security for finance providers than less 
formalised OBF programmes. Both questions could be the subject of future research projects. 
Another key observation is that it is advantageous to place one strong actor, usually a utility, at 
the centre of on-bill programmes, independent from the OBF and OBR categorisation. In 
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contrast to ESCOs, utilities can build on existing relationships with their customers, which is 
particularly relevant for local cooperatives. Using customer data and existing payment streams, 
in form of the energy bill, reduces the complexity of the programme design (ACEEE, 2012; 
Bell et al., 2011). Commissioning an ESCO or another third actor to operate the programme 
for the utility should be examined carefully, as sensitive data is at stake. Overall, there is a 
trade-off between keeping on-bill programmes open for high a number of actors, as under the 
Green Deal, and providing a simple and streamlined scheme with high levels of consumer 
protection at reasonable costs. The experience in the UK shows that opening a programme to 
all kind of actors (ranging from small start-ups to experienced energy efficiency providers) 
while still aiming for a high level of consumer protection requires a robust accreditation 
scheme. On the one side, putting a “government stamp” on such an accreditation scheme 
should increase consumer confidence; on the other side, it comes at considerable costs for the 
state, market actors and in the end for consumers. As it was illustrated in section 4.3.7.1., 
accreditation costs were the most significant source of TCs for Green Deal providers. For the 
two providers where data allowed for a direct comparison, accreditation costs even 
outweighed the total investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies.  
In contrast, according to H. Lachman (personal communication, August 4, 2014) a high level 
of quality assurance at little incremental cost is achieved under the PAYS® system by allowing 
utilities to pick the best contractors without a highly formalised accreditation system. As more 
than 50% of approached customers under programmes based on PAYS® tend to say yes to an 
efficiency improvement, it can be regarded as a vibrant market place from a contractor’s 
perspective. This should create an incentive for contractors to provide high quality products 
and services at relatively low costs to qualify as a business partner for the programme 
operator. Through establishing a bidding system the programme operator is able to choose the 
best offers at the lowest cost. It would be highly interesting to compare the costs of such a 
system to the Green Deal. Unfortunately, no detailed data could be gathered for the 
How$mart® programme, which follows the PAYS® system in this aspect. Future research 
could assess the five trademarked PAYS® programmes with regards to quality assurance as 
well as administrative and transaction costs faced by the provider, contractors and consumers. 
6.3 Context specific observations 
The How$mart® programme and the Green Deal were chosen to provide the first in-depth 
comparative analysis between an OBF and an OBR programme, which was so far missing in 
the literature on on-bill programmes. Furthermore, the available literature was either focussing 
on on-programmes in the U.S. or the Green Deal as the first on-bill initiative in Europe 
(ACEEE, 2012; Bell et al., 2011; Bell & Nadel, 2012; Hayes et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2012; 
Lachman, 2013; Rosenow et al., 2013; Zhang, 2013). By carrying out a transregional analysis, 
this gap was aimed to be closed. A drawback of choosing two programmes for a comparative 
analysis that vary in many crucial aspects, is a reduced external validity of the case studies’ 
findings (Yin, 2014). As presented earlier the How$mart® programme is a voluntary initiative 
from a relatively small utility. The Green Deal was a policy framework that aimed to engage as 
many market actors as possible. The design of the Green Deal differed in many crucial 
aspects. Therefore, it is hard to say to which extent the Green Deal’s low effectiveness in 
overcoming the eight barriers (see section 4.5) can be attributed to its design as an OBR 
programme. For increasing the validity of the presented key observations on the OBF and 
OBR programme design it would be useful to analyse another OBR programme that is run by 
a utility in the U.S. This would hold more variables constant and allow clearer statements on 
the effect of designing the repayments as a tariffed utility service (OBF) or a loan (OBR).  
In the following paragraphs it will be discussed how context specific mechanisms might have 
biased the How$mart® and Green Deal’s performance to the better or the worse.  
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6.3.1 Green Deal 
To understand why the Green Deal fell short of expectations the following context specific 
hindering factors need to be taken into account. First, the relatively high interest rate of 6.95% 
can be regarded as a major barrier, as it strictly limits the eligibility of energy efficiency 
measures that can be financed under the Green Deal alone (Holmes, 2011; Rosenow & Eyre, 
2013; UK-GBC, 2014).  
Second, linking the Green Deal to the ECO and the governmental subsidy scheme Cashback 
and HIF, has created a highly complex system with partly conflicting goals. While the ECO 
should have supported the provision of Green Deals, in practice it prevented many Green 
Deal providers from selling Green Deal plans, as solely engaging in the ECO market was 
regarded as more attractive (Green Deal provider, personal communication, June 18, 2014). 
Another Green Deal provider (personal communication, June 17, 2014) argued that providing 
subsidies in form of ECO funding and government grants sends the signal to consumers that 
the Green Deal is actually not such a good deal. These subsidies would therefore defeat their 
own purpose, which is triggering demand for the Green Deal. Other providers regarded the 
subsidy programmes as a facilitating factor for consumer up-take (Green Deal providers, 
personal communication, various occasions). 
Third, the young history of the Green Deal has been characterised by unclear policy signals, 
which created numerous uncertainties. This problem might be even exacerbated in the near 
future. As the Green Deal has not delivered the envisaged amount of low-cost measures, 
DECC proposed to extend the list of eligible measures under the CERO, the first pillar of 
ECO (Stanger, 2013). This pillar was originally designed to provide funding for measures that 
are currently not meeting the Golden Rule, such as solid wall insulation. If the new proposal 
will be implemented, energy companies could deliver highly cost-effective measures, such as 
easy-to-treat cavity wall insulations under the first pillar of ECO. In this case, the Green Deal 
and ECO would become directly competing sources of finance for the same type of energy 
efficiency measures. A Green Deal provider argued that this approach would further 
“devalue” the Green Deal from a customer’s perspective (personal communication, June 17, 
2014). It would also undermine one the major underlying ideas of the Green Deal, to leverage 
highly cost-effective energy saving potentials through a market-based instrument, without 
providing additional subsidies. While the Green Deal was designed to deliver finance for cost-
effective measures, the major component of ECO, should deliver funding for solid wall 
insulations. Steven Heath (personal communication, March 7, 2014) reported that Knauf 
Insulation had heavily invested in solid wall solutions and capacity building based on the 
policy framework developed between 2010 and 2012. These efforts might now be in vain. The 
“stop-and-go” of handing out grants under the Cashback scheme and the HIF is another 
example of the lack of long-term certainty for consumers and market actors.  
The fourth inhibiting factor might be consumers’ attitude towards energy efficiency 
improvements which is likely to work against the market-based logic of the Green Deal. 
Under previous energy company obligations, such as the EEC and CERT, many households 
received energy efficiency measures at artificially low costs or even for free (Mundaca, 2007; 
Rosenow, 2012). As Zoe Leader from the WWF-UK (personal communication, March 6, 
2014) pointed out, consumers can be expected to show little appetite to fully pay for the costs 
of energy efficiency improvements and particularly for deeper retrofits of their homes. This 
finding is supported by consumer research carried out by the UK Committee for Climate 
Change (CCC, 2009). While more than half of property owners would be willing to invest in 
energy efficiency measures with a payback period for up to three years, this share drops 
rapidly for measures which require a payback period for four years and more. Interestingly, 
one third of all households seems to be unwilling to install an energy efficiency measure even 
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if it was provided for free (CCC, 2009). This raises the question if there is a general disinterest 
in energy efficiency improvements. Primary and secondary research provided different 
answers. While the representative from DECC (personal communication, March 6, 2014) 
evaluates the general interest in the reduction of energy costs as very high, Zoe Leader from 
the WWF-UK (personal communication, March 6, 2014) as well as the UK Green Building 
Council (2014) observe a considerable lack of awareness among consumers. An interesting 
interim position was taken by Steven Heath from Knauf Insulation (personal communication, 
March 7, 2014) who stated that there is a surprising disconnect between the extensive media 
coverage on to the poverty debate and an interest in energy efficiency. Commonly named 
reasons for rising fuel costs would be that energy companies are making too much profit and 
high green taxes. Interviewees from civil society and industry (Z. Leader & S. Heath, personal 
communication, March 6&7, 2014) concluded that it is of crucial importance to improve the 
government’s communication strategy and establish a link between energy security, lower 
energy bills, and energy efficiency improvements in the existing building stock. 
6.3.2 How$mart® 
Unfortunately, there is much less data available to put the findings on the How$mart® 
programme into context. No secondary data could be accessed on consumers’ willingness to 
invest in energy efficiency improvements or the state of the building stock in Midwest 
Energy’s service area. It is therefore unclear, if the better performance compared to the Green 
Deal can be partly attributed to untapped highly cost-effective energy saving potentials. 
One interesting observation which deserves discussion is that Midwest Energy evaluated the 
fact that How$mart® was introduced as a voluntary initiative as a crucial enabling factor for 
the good performance of the programme. It is was argued that being independent from any 
type of government intervention gave the utility more freedom in designing the programme 
and would have reduced overall programme costs, for example compared to the solar water 
heaters programme introduced by the Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO), which was 
politically mandated (Johnson et al., 2012). It can be debated if all kind of policy interventions 
necessarily increase programme costs and decrease the utility’s ability to adapt the programme 
design to meet local circumstances. As suggested under section 5.4 policy-makers could only 
require utilities to have on-bill programmes in place and potentially mandate a certain amount 
of energy savings to be achieved in a given period of time. In this case, policy-makers do not 
need to get involved in design questions and leave them to the market.  
6.4 Limitations of on-bill programmes 
6.4.1 On-bill programmes as a purely market driven instrument? 
As presented in the ex-post evaluation of How$mart® and the Green Deal, as well as in the 
ex-ante evaluation for the German context, on-bill programmes that require energy cost 
savings to be equal or to exceed repayments, cannot be regarded as a suitable instrument for 
encouraging costly deep retrofits of existing buildings. In the economic assessment for the 
German context (see section 5.3.2) only highly cost-effective measures revealed to be eligible 
for on-bill programmes, assuming programme costs of €700 per package and a moderate 
interest rate of 3%. This observation is supported by existing literature (Bell & Nadel, 2012; 
Burr, 2013; Fuller, 2008). Without further political support, the impact of on-bill programmes 
can be expected to be low once highly cost-effective savings potentials have been leveraged. 
This key observation raises more questions about the economics and underlying motivations 
of on-bill programme operators. While How$mart® was designed to introduce efficiency 
improvements that are clearly in the customer’s interest, the Green Deal and ECO also 
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promote efficiency improvements that are optimal from a societal perspective, but not highly 
attractive from a private perspective. This shifts the focus from privately cost-effective energy 
efficiency measures to leveraging socially cost-effective energy efficiency measures. Even 
though it is a reasonable goal to address socially cost-effective saving potentials from a policy 
perspective, it is crucial to keep in mind that all market participants need to see a benefit in 
participating in the programme. While under How$mart® the customer should enjoy lower 
energy bills (unless there is a significant rebound effect), it is the utility that only sees indirect 
benefits through increased customer satisfaction. Furthermore, seed capital was accessed 
through a governmental loan programme at subsidised interest rates, which means there is no 
lender is involved that seeks a significant rate of return on energy efficiency investments. 
Under the Green Deal, financing costs have not been lowered significantly through a 
government intervention. However, at an interest rate of 6.95% paired with high programme 
costs, Green Deal providers struggle to sell Green Deal financing plans and for most 
consumers benefits are not convincing enough to participate in the programme. 
The question arises whether energy savings are generally insufficient to provide all actors, the 
customer, the provider, contractor and the lender, with significant financial benefits. Can OBF 
and OBR programmes work in a purely market driven framework, particularly where 
financing costs reflect the perceived risks that conventional banks attach to the programmes? 
Difficulties in covering the programme costs have been  already observed in Merrian (2008) 
and Bell et al. (2011). Furthermore, in existing literature no on-bill programme could be 
identified where financing is fully delivered by the private capital market (Bell et al., 2011; Bell 
& Nadel, 2012). All OBR and OBF programmes in the U.S. where data on the sources of 
finance was available had access to some source of low-cost finance, which allowed them to 
pass on relatively low interest rates to the customer. The financing costs embedded in 
How$mart® are in the medium range compared to other OBR and OBF programmes in the 
U.S. with interest rates between 0% and 6%. Table 7 gives an overview over financing terms 
in other on-bill programmes in the U.S.  
Table 7 - Financing costs of OBR and OBF programmes in the United States based on Bell et al. (2011); 
Bell et al. (2012); Cillo & Lachman (2013) 
Programme name Type Capital source 
Target 
sector 
Loan  size 
Interest 
rate 
Max. 
payback  
Electric Cooperatives 
South Carolina: Rural 
Energy Savings  
OBR USDA’s Rural Economic Loans 
and Grants Program (REDLG) 
Residential 
Commercial 
< $740,000  2.5% 10 years 
Clean Energy Works 
Oregon 
OBR Seed capital ARRA funds, 
CDFI loan fund 
Residential $12,633 
(median) 
5.99% 20 years 
Connectitute: United 
Illuminating 
OBR Seed capital ARRA funds, 
Revolving loan fund 
Commercial $8,000 - 
$12,000 (avg.)  
0% 24-36 
months 
California Investor-
Owned Utilities: SoCal 
Edison OBF 
OBR Ratepayer Funds, 
Revolving loan fund 
Commercial < $ 1,000,000  0%  
Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode 
Island: National Grid 
OBR Seed capital from ratepayer 
and shareholder funds, 
Revolving loan fund 
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
 0%  
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For on-bill programmes having a significant impact, one of the major challenges will be scale-
up new and existing programmes by drawing more private capital into the programmes at 
acceptable financing costs (Bell et al., 2011). As long as private lenders attach high risk 
premiums to capital for on-bill programmes, these are unlikely to be purely market driven in 
the near future. Rising energy prices and lower costs for energy efficiency technologies might 
improve the economics of on-bill programmes. From a policy-perspective, working on the 
internalisation of external costs of the current energy system should be a key strategy to close 
this gap between private and social optimums of investments in energy efficiency. 
Furthermore, policy-makers could provide lenders with deficiency guarantees to reduce 
perceived risk until this innovative financing model is more established. 
6.4.2 Low participation rates 
Even though the analysis showed that on-bill programme can overcome certain barriers, both 
programmes, How$mart® and the Green Deal, are not able to show participation rates and the 
type of energy efficiency measures that would be needed for meeting the EU’s, UK’s or 
Germany’s efficiency and climate targets. Policy-makers should not assume that introducing a 
policy framework for on-bill models will trigger refurbishments of large parts of the building 
stock (as initially expected in the UK), but as one instrument that contributes to tapping 
unexploited energy saving potentials. Furthermore, it needs to be acknowledged that 
consumers are largely passive and many consumers will not respond to pure economic 
incentives (CCC, 2009). This observations has also been made in the U.S. “Consumers  don’t  
seem  to  take  advantage  of  the opportunities  provided  by  a  loan  program  simply  
because  it’s  a  ‘good  deal’ ” (Hayes et al., 2011, p. 6). Even though observed participation 
rates in the U.S. are significantly higher than the Green Deal’s 0.006%, more than half of the 
programmes showed participation rates below 0.5% over their lifetime (Bell et al., 2011). It is 
remarkable that under PAYS® programmes, including How$mart®, more than 50% of 
approached customers have said yes offered efficiency improvements (H. Lachman, personal 
communication, various occasions). However, limited data is available on overall participation 
rates in the target population these programmes. The overall market penetration rate of 
How$mart® was 1.2% over the first three years (Cillo & Lachman, 2013). This suggests that 
establishing a first contact is still a major limitation to the scalability of on-bill programmes.  
6.4.3 Limited applicability for those most in need 
As mentioned before, estimated savings are not guaranteed. A significant rebound effect can 
be expected for households in fuel poverty that reduced energy use by sacrificing in-door 
comfort (Bell et al., 2011; Fuller, 2008). Here, net savings on the energy bill are unlikely to be 
achieved. For consumers with a very low disposable income, this leads to a higher risk of 
disconnection from utility services. This problem could be solved by requiring a higher safety 
margin between on-bill repayments and expected energy cost savings. Furthermore, additional 
financial support in form of grants could be provided for reducing the project costs. 
New Hampshire 
Electric Co-op: NHEC 
SmartSTART 
OBF Ratepayer funds, 
Revolving loan fund 
Commercial  
Industrial 
$10,000 (avg.) 5.41% 5 years 
Midwest Energy: 
Kansas  How$mart® 
OBF Kansas Housing Resources 
Corporation, Efficiency 
Kansas program, Rural 
Economic Development Loan  
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
$ 7,489 (avg.) 0-8% 15 years 
Electric Cities of 
Georgia: OBF 
OBF Federal funding source, 
Revolving Loan fund 
Residential > $5,000  0% 5 years 
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7. Conclusion 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to increase our knowledge on the critical factors that 
facilitate or inhibit the performance of on-bill programmes for energy efficiency 
improvements. The second more specific objective was to assess, if on-bill models could 
complement the Germany policy instruments mix for energy efficiency in an effective manner.  
Addressing the first research question, identified facilitating factors for on-bill programmes are a 
streamlined programme design, concentrating on one or two sources of funding and relatively 
few contractual sequences. Placing a utility at the heart of the programme can be 
recommended for reducing administrative and transaction costs for a number of reasons. 
Utilities are able to build on-bill programmes on existing relationships to their customers and 
can apply targeted marketing strategies based on their customer data. Actively approaching 
potential customers was identified as essential for overcoming consumers’ high levels of 
inertia. Furthermore, having one utility cooperating with a number of contractors can reduce 
costs through economies of scale, compared to a more open design where many auditors and 
installers set-up their own programme. Another crucial facilitating factor for overcoming 
barriers on the consumer’s side is to design the on-bill product as a service. Consumer 
research has shown that a large majority of consumers is unwilling or unable to take out debt 
for financing energy efficiency measures. Furthermore, limiting eligibility criteria for 
programme participation to substantial energy cost savings is reasonable, if the payment 
obligation is tied to the building’s meter. As the provider needs to be prepared for changing 
bill-payers over the payback period, the hassle related to checking the credit worthiness of the 
first consumer does not necessarily pay off in form of a higher degree of security. If these 
factors as well as substantial cost-effective energy saving potentials are given, on-bill models 
are able to overcome several of the traditional barriers to investments in energy efficiency. 
Conversely, inhibiting factors are high administrative and transaction costs due to a complex 
programme design with a high number of actors and multiple sources of finance involved. It 
can be argued that structuring the product as a loan is detrimental for consumer up-take. A 
general limitation is that energy cost savings rarely allow to provide all involved actors, 
comprising the consumer, the auditor, installer, provider and lender, with monetary benefits. 
This situation might change in light of rising energy prices, the internalisation of negative 
externalities and a phase out of subsidies for energy carriers. However, it is unlikely that many 
purely market driven programmes will be implemented in the near future. Access to cross-
subsidised low cost capital or other forms of government support seems to be needed to 
encourage market actors to voluntarily adopt on-bill models. 
With regards to the second research question, it can be concluded that OBF could 
complement Germany’s policy instruments mix in an effective manner. Highly cost-effective 
energy saving potentials could be leveraged that are neither addressed by energy minimum 
performance standards, nor by the KfW’s soft loan programmes (excluding heating systems). 
If a new policy is based on the identified facilitating factors, OBF might be attractive for those 
consumers that are generally open for energy efficiency improvements, but who are not 
willing (1) or unable to take out a loan, (2) to accept risk related to residence periods shorter 
than payback periods and malfunctioning measures, and (3) to go through a significant hassle 
related to searching information about technologies and financing options. 
The critical question might be if utilities will regard OBF as an opportunity to establish new 
business areas or as a threat to their conventional profit centre. Furthermore, in times of 
austerity it will be essential how banks evaluate the risk attached to this innovative financing 
model. Drawing in private capital will be a key factor for scaling up the future impact of OBF. 
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Appendix  
 
Annex I – Guidelines for conducted semi-structured interviews in 
chronological order 
 
[General note: Interviews with Green Deal providers largely followed the survey design. Green Deal providers 
were asked for clarifications and to elaborate on mentioned obstacles and barriers related to the Green Deal. 
Therefore, no interview guidelines were included here. Communications with Michael Blohm followed no strict 
interview guidelines, as they were structured as an open discussion about OBF and OBR programmes. Many 
interviews were followed up by e-mail communications, which are also not presented here.] 
 
Interview with a representative from the UK Department for Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) 
Date: March 6, 2014 
Format: Skype 
 
1. From an outsider perspective discussion around the green deal started in 2009. Who 
developed the idea of introducing the Green Deal? 
2. One basic question, before going into the details - the types of measures that the 
government would like to see installed, like cavity or solid wall insulation, mostly reduce 
the energy consumption from heating. However, costs are recovered on the electricity 
bill, where the savings cannot be seen by the household. How does that go together with 
the concept of the Golden Rule?   
3. The uptake of the green deal finance has been rather slow (1,700 instead of 10,000 during 
the first year). What are the main reasons in your opinion? 
4. Would you regard the interest rate as a major barrier? 
5. Context: Are people interested in deeper renovations of their homes? 
6. Are people interested in the model of on-bill financing? 
7. From going through available literature, I have understood that measures, such as 
external solid wall insulation or double glazing, can often be financed only partially 
through the Green Deal and might not yield a net benefit over a period of 25 years. Is 
that correct?   
8. What kind of measures does the government aim to trigger with the green deal?  
9. The government has announced changes to the green deal and ECO in December. What 
were the main motivations behind these proposed changes? 
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Interview with a Zoe Leader, Energy Efficiency Policy Officer at the WWF-UK, / 
Interview with Steven Heath, Director for Public Affairs at Knauf Insulation Northern 
Europe 
Date: March 6 & 7, 2014  
Format: Telephone 
 
1. The WWF has been very active in the Great British Refurb Campaign. How happy were 
you with results of the campaign? 
2. One basic question, before going into the details - The types of measures that the 
government would like to see installed, like cavity or solid wall insulation, mostly reduce 
the energy consumption from heating. However, costs are recovered on the electricity 
bill, where the savings cannot be seen by the household. How does that go together with 
the concept of the Golden Rule?   
3. The uptake of the green deal finance has been rather slow (1,700 instead of 10,000 during 
the first year). What are the main reasons in your opinion? 
4. Would you regard the interest rate as a major barrier? 
5. Context: Are people interested in deeper renovations of their homes? 
6. Are people interested in the model of on-bill financing? 
7. From going through available literature, I have understood that measures, such as 
external solid wall insulation or double glazing, can often be financed only partially 
through the Green Deal and might not yield a net benefit over a period of 25 years. Is 
that correct?   
8. Was the government using too optimistic assumptions when the Green Deal was 
designed? 
9. The government has announced changes to the green deal and ECO in December. How 
do you evaluate these proposed changes? 
 
 
Interview with Michael Volker, former Director of Regulatory and Energy Services at 
Midwest Energy, Inc. 
Date: March 27, 2014  
Format: Telephone 
 
1. Could you tell me a bit more about your former role at Midwest Energy as the Director 
of Regulatory and Energy Services? 
2. What are the most common measures installed under How$mart? 
3. What are the measures with the highest investment costs installed? 
4. Is the charge for repaying the service located on the electricity or gas bill?  
5. How long do customers pay the charge on utility bill - as long as the measure functions 
or until the investment costs, programme fees and finance costs are paid off? 
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6. Do programme participants technically take out a loan? 
7. Could I get access to the most recent data from the programme evaluation on (a) number 
and types of measures installed (split into types of measures), (b) Yielded  energy savings, 
(c) Investments made, (d) Programme costs 
8. Regarding the level of capital costs - Midwest Energy had access to low cost capital from 
federal programmes? Is this the reason why the interest rate is relatively low? 
9. Has there been research carried out on transaction costs?  
10. Is How$mart a programme to improve customer loyalty or a new strategic business area 
for Midwest Energy?  
11. Is the How$mart programme profitable on its own? Is the incoming money flow 
compensating the losses in the sales of electricity and gas? 
12. In your opinion, what are the success factors for the How$mart programme? 
13. Are you familiar with the Green Deal? [If so, discuss performance and design.] 
 
 
Interview with Reinhard Loch, Head of the Energy Efficiency Unit of the Consumer 
Association North Rhine-Westphalia (VZ NRW) 
Date: June 13, 2014  
Format: Face-to-face  
Note: This interview was conducted in German. 
 
1. Could you tell me a bit more about your role as the Head of the Energy Efficiency Unit 
of the Consumer Association North Rhine-Westphalia? 
2. This research project is analysing so-called on-bill or Pay as You Save® programmes. Are 
you familiar with this concept? [If not, explain essential design features.] 
3. Based on your experiences, do you think that on-bill models could be appealing to 
household segments that would normally not engage with energy efficiency programmes? 
4. In the U.S., several utilities voluntarily introduced the Pay as You Save® programmes in 
their service area. We still have large energy saving potentials in Germany, but the market 
for energy efficiency services, such as energy-performance-contracting are still small. 
How do you explain that these models are applied in the U.S., but not here? [Discuss 
issue of transaction costs and capital costs.] 
5. Do you see problems from a consumer protection perspective? [Discuss disconnection in 
case of non-payment.] 
6. If policy-makers encourage the introduction of on-bill programmes, what would be your 
recommendations? 
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Interview with Frank Schillig, Managing Director at KWA Eviva GmbH 
Date: June 16, 2014  
Format: Face-to-face  
Note: This interview was conducted in German. 
 
1. Could you tell me a bit more about Eviva’s activities in the contracting market? 
2. This research project is analysing so-called on-bill or Pay as You Save® programmes. Are 
you familiar with this concept? [If not, explain essential design features.] 
3. Do you think that on-bill models can overcome market barriers that are still persistent 
under conventional energy-performance-contracting models? 
4. Energy-performance-contracting has been used for the modernisation of heating 
systems. Do you see areas that could be addressed by Pay as You Save® programmes?  
5. Based on your experiences, do you think that on-bill models could be appealing to 
household segments that would normally not engage with energy efficiency programmes? 
6. In the U.S., several utilities voluntarily introduced the Pay as You Save® programmes in 
their service area. We still have large energy saving potentials in Germany, but the market 
for energy efficiency services, such as energy-performance-contracting are still small. 
How do you explain that these models are applied in the U.S., but not here? [Discuss 
issue of transaction costs and capital costs.] 
7. If policy-makers encourage the introduction of on-bill programmes, would this be an 
interesting business area for Eviva? 
8. Assuming that policy-makers introduce an energy company obligation, could this be a 
facilitating factor for the energy service market? 
 
 
2nd Interview with a representative from the UK Department for Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) 
Date: June 18, 2014  
Format: Face-to-face  
 
1. [Show figure of the customer’s journey and ask if all key activities and contractual 
sequences are illustrated correctly.] 
2. Who carries the risk if the measure breaks, e.g. who carries the costs of a broken boiler? 
3. DECC publishes monthly statistics on the up-take of Green Deal financing plans and the 
installation of measures. Does the reported number of measures using Green Deal 
finance refer to measures that were only financed under the Green Deal or also to 
measures where Green Deal finance was blended with other sources of capital?  
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4. DECC’s new study reported that the accreditation process for Green Deal providers was 
simplified. Could you provide me with more details how the accreditation process was 
simplified? Have you measured the effect of this simplification? 
5. There seems to be an unwillingness amongst larger firms to use their own capital for 
investments under the Green Deal. Do you know why? Is the Green Deal perceived as 
risky? 
6. In the Impact Assessment for the Green Deal and ECO, DECC estimated the costs of 
specific energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. Have you compared the 
assumptions about the costs of the measures in the impact assessment as well as the 
Green Deal costs matched to current “real-life” prices? 
7. Outlook: Based on the experience that you made here in the UK with developing a 
whole new Green Deal supply chain, which recommendations would you give to policy-
makers in other countries that are interested in introducing a similar scheme? 
 
 
Interview with a representative from the Green Deal Finance Company (GDFC) 
Date: June 19, 2014  
Format: Face-to-face 
 
1. Could you tell me a bit more about the institutional background of the GDFC? 
2. The Green Deal as a financial product, as an unsecured loan, is this correct? 
3. What is the legal foundation for the transfer of the payment obligation to the next 
resident?  
4. Who is liable if the consumer cannot pay or if the Green Deal provider goes bankrupt? 
5. What kinds of guarantees are given to the consumer? 
6. The interest rate has been criticised as too high. Can you explain how the GDFC arrived 
at the 6.95% p.a.? 
7. Do you have ideas or recommendations how to reduce the capital costs? 
8. Do you have ideas or recommendations how to reduce transaction costs attached to the 
Green Deal? 
 
 
  
Sarah Kloke, IIIEE, Lund University 
90 
1st Interview with Kirsty Neale, a former employee at the UK Department for Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC) 
Date: June 19, 2014  
Format: Telephone 
 
1. You worked for DECC when the Green Deal was designed. Could you tell me a bit 
more about your role in designing the Green Deal? 
2. What were the major assumptions underlying the design of the Green Deal?  
3. During the design phase, did you take a look at the on-bill programmes in the U.S.?  
4. Have you considered to connect the Green Deal with the Energy Company Obligation 
and to obligate energy companies to offer on-bill programmes to their clients?  
5. If you could start from the beginning with the design of the Green Deal, is there 
something you would do differently?  
6. How could transaction costs be reduced?  
7. How could the interest rate be reduced? 
 
 
Interview with Jan Rosenow, Researcher and Senior Consultant at Ricardo-AEA 
Group 
Date: June 24, 2014  
Format: Telephone 
Note: This interview was conducted in German. 
 
1. How do you evaluate the general idea that underlies the Green Deal? 
2. How do you evaluate its implementation? 
3. Why was the level of ambition reduced so drastically (less than 1/3) compared to 
previous supplier obligations in the UK? 
4. If you had the chance to introduce changes to the Green Deal, what would that be? 
5. Discuss idea to connect the Green Deal with the Energy Company Obligation/ oblige 
energy companies to offer on-bill programmes to their clients? Recover costs from 
customers who benefit from energy efficiency improvements, instead of transferring the 
costs to all customers? 
6. Are you familiar with on-bill programmes in the U.S.?  [If not discuss programme design 
features, particularly offering the installation and financing of energy efficiency measures 
as a service.] 
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Interview with Harlan Lachman, Developer of the Pay as You Save® system at the 
Energy Efficiency Institute, Inc. (EEI) 
Date: July 1, 2014  
Format: Telephone 
 
1. What are the main features of the Pay as You Save® system that have to be implemented 
to use the PAYS trademark? 
2. I understand that both the landlord and the tenant have to give their consent. What I am 
not sure is who has the contractual relationship with the provider for the installation and 
financing of the measure?  
3. Do you ask utilities that use the PAYS® system to calculate with a "rebound effect", 
when estimating energy savings?  
4. I have read in your publication that more than 50% of those customers receiving offer in 
the residential PAYS® programmes decided to participate, however, overall participation 
rates are rather around 1%. How do these two numbers go together? Is PAYS® only 
offered to certain customers? 
5. Do tariff based on-bill programmes show a higher performance compared to on-bill 
programmes which are based on a loan? 
6. I have learned from the How$mart Program that Midwest Energy files a lien to the 
property. Is this in line with your PAYS® system? Doesn’t this have a similar effect to a 
loan? 
7. I have also learned about How$mart that Midwest Energy’s costs are not fully recovered 
by the customers’ payments on their bill. It is still attractive to the utility as they achieve a 
very high customer satisfaction, but they are cross-subsidizing it from other business 
areas. Do you know if there are efficiency programmes where are costs are fully covered 
by customers’ payments? 
8. Have you carried out evaluations of the transaction costs involved in providing PAYS® 
programmes?  
9. I wonder why the PAYS® system works in the United States, but has not been 
implemented in Europe yet. Do you think there are major differences regarding (a) 
Energy saving potentials, (b) Transaction costs, (c) Capital costs, (d) Political conditions, 
(e) Mentality. What do you think about this? 
10. In Germany, it is very common that heating expenses are covered in the rent, however, 
after a yearly check of the tenant's actual energy consumption he or she will get money 
back if the monthly payment in the rent was set too high and exceeded energy costs. I 
fear that in this situation the landlord does not have a real incentive to lower the 
properties' energy bills in a PAYS programme. What is your opinion on this issue? 
11. About one third of the German buildings are heated with oil. There is no meter 
measuring the consumption, just an oil tank which needs to be refilled once a year. Could 
a PAYS® system work for these households? 
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12. Why do you think the Green Deal is not such a good deal for consumers? 
13. Depending on the design of the PAYS® programme? 
14. Who is the owner of the measure, e.g. a new boiler, until it is paid off? 
15. How are the costs for an energy efficiency measure calculated, if it is part of a bigger 
renovation, e.g. a house will get a new facade anyway but the provider is only 
encouraging a better insulation? 
16. Where are the benefits from lower energy bills located, if energy costs (both heating and 
electricity) are included in the rent? On the side of the landlord, the tenant or both? 
17. As the payment is attached to the meter, not to the consumer - how can you make sure 
the obligation is legally transferred to the following owner? Is there an entry to some 
kind of property register? 
 
 
Interview with Andreas Mucke, Director of the mini-contracting programme for 
efficient fridges, operated by the German local electricity provider Wuppertaler 
Stadtwerke (WSW) 
Date: July 16, 2014  
Format: Telephone 
[Note: This interview was conducted in German.] 
 
1. Could you tell me a bit more about the mini-contracting programme for efficient fridges, 
operated by the Wuppertaler Stadtwerke? 
2. What kind of fridges do you offer? 
3. Can you describe the process or customer’s journey? 
4. What are the overall costs of the mini-contracting programme and how are these cost 
distributed with regards to investments made in efficiency fridges and administrative, 
marketing and transaction costs? 
5. Who is carrying the risk in case a fridge breaks? 
6. How is the demand for the mini-contracting model from the customer’s side? 
7. Have you heard about Pay as You Save® programmes in the United States? [If not, 
explain the essential design features.]  
8. Given that the legislator would provide a legal foundation, do you think a PAYS® 
programmes could be interesting for the Wuppertaler Stadtwerke? 
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2nd Interview with Kirsty Neale, a former employee at the UK Department for Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC) 
Date: August 5, 2014  
Format: Telephone 
 
1. You explained that locating the liability for defaulting customers and Green Deal 
providers was a major problem. Where is the liability lying now? 
2. Did you have the impression that energy companies are not willing to participate as it 
would interfere with their core business, selling electricity and gas? 
3. What would you recommend to other countries that are interested in designing a policy 
instrument for on-bill models from scratch? 
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Annex II – Questionnaire for the “Survey on the Green Deal from a 
Green Deal Provider’s Perspective” 
 
Survey on the Green Deal from a  
Green Deal Provider’s Perspective 
The objective of the survey is to get information about the obstacles and barriers faced by 
Green Deal Providers. The outcomes will provide useful knowledge to better understand 
what are the major cost drivers that ‘Green Deal Providers’ face and what can be done to 
further facilitate the provision of Green Deal Plans to energy end-users. 
This survey is part of a research project titled ‘Policy Intervention for a Competitive Green 
Energy Economy’, carried out at the International Institute for Industrial Environmental 
Economics at Lund University, Sweden 
Your insights will be a highly valuable input for this research project It will help us to 
develop policy recommendations for the Green Deal and the design of future on-bill 
programmes across European countries.  
Your input, including your name and the name of your company, will be confidential. All the 
figures will be aggregated. It will take you around 20 minutes to complete this survey.  
You will receive the research results by October 2014. Please do not hesitate to contacts us in 
case of any question. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind effort and important contribution to this research 
project. 
Sarah Kloke 
Master’s candidate in Environmental Management and Policy 
International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics  
Lund University 
Tel: +49-30-2977357973 
E-mail: sarah.kloke.029@student.lu.se    
http://www.iiiee.lu.se     
 
 
Further contact: Luis Mundaca 
Associate Professor 
International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics 
Lund University 
P. O. Box 196 
221 00 Lund SWEDEN 
Tel: +46-46-2220257  
Fax: +46-46-2220240 
E-mail: luis.mundaca@iiiee.lu.se      
http://www.iiiee.lu.se   
 
Visiting Professor/Researcher 
Environmental Economics and Agricultural 
Policy Group 
Technical University of Munich 
Alte Akademie 14,  
85354 Freising GERMANY 
Tel: +49-8161-715074 
E-mail: luis.mundaca@tum.de  
http://www.wzw.tum.de/ap/ 
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1. Which of these Green Deal services does your company offer? Please tick the boxes. 
Feel free to add further services related to the Green Deal provided by your company. 
Service  
Arrange Green Deal assessment (with a third party)  
Carry out Green Deal assessment (in-house)  
Arrange installation of measures (with a third party)  
Carry out installation of measures (in-house)  
Green Deal Finance Plans  
  
  
  
 
2. When did your company enter the ‘Green Deal market’? 
 
2013                2014 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr May 
 
 
3. What kind of customer segments have you served? Please indicate the share, for 
example of multi-family apartment buildings, out of all households you served by ticking 
the box. As the categories are overlapping, several groups might have a very high or very 
low share. 
Customer group 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% 
Businesses     
Single-family dwellings     
Multi-apartment buildings  
(1- 3 units) 
 
 
 
 
Multi-apartment buildings  
 (4-7 units) 
 
 
 
 
Multi-apartment buildings  
 (8 or more units) 
 
 
 
 
Homeowners     
Tenants     
 
4. Please indicate the number of households that you provided with a Green Deal Plan 
(a). If the exact number is not easily available or confidential, please give an estimate by 
ticking one of the boxes (b). 
 
a) Exact number: ……………………………………………… 
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b) Estimate of 
No. of Green Deal Plans for 
0- 15 16 - 30 30 - 35 
36 or 
more 
Energy efficiency installations     
Renewable energy installations     
 
5. Please indicate the total capital costs of all measures installed under the Green Deals 
Plans provided by your company. Capital costs include pure technology costs, as well as 
installation and construction labour costs. If the exact number is not easily available or 
confidential, please give an estimate by ticking one of the boxes (b).49  
 
a) Exact number: ……………………………………………… 
 
b) Estimate of 
total capital costs for 
Up to 
£ 30,000 
Up to 
£ 60,000 
Up to 
£ 90,000 
More than  
£ 90,000 
Energy efficiency installations     
Renewable energy installations     
 
6. Please indicate the aggregated energy savings of all energy efficiency measures 
(over their lifetime) installed under the Green Deal Plans you provided. If the exact 
number is not easily available or confidential, please give an estimate by ticking one of 
the boxes (b). 
 
a) Exact number: ……………………………………………… 
 
b) Estimate of energy 
savings over lifetime of 
installed measures 
Up to 
150,000 
kWh 
Up to 
300,000 
kWh 
Up to 
600,000 
kWh 
More than  
600,000 
kWh 
Energy efficiency installations     
 
  
                                                 
49 To provide greater clarity regarding the definition of „capital costs“ this questions was later on changed to: „Please 
indicate the total capital costs of all measures installed under the Green Deals Plans provided by your company. 
Capital costs include pure technology costs, as well as installation and construction labour costs. Total capital costs refer 
to the total amount of money that was invested into the measures under your Green Deal Plans either by your company 
through Green Deal Finance, the consumer or Cashback. If available it would be very much appreciated if you provide 
this data in an disaggregated manner, e.g. under your Green Deal Plans £20,000 were invested through Green Deal 
Finance, £10,000 were invested by customers and £20,000 through Cashback or the Home Improvement Fund.” 
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7. Did you face general obstacles and barriers to implementing energy efficiency 
measures under the Green Deal? Please tick the most relevant boxes. Feel free to add 
additional obstacles or barriers faced by your company. 
 
Obstacles and barriers 
 
Lack of knowledge/information on the Green Deal  
Lack of developers/contractors  
Lack of interest or apathy of end-users   
Uncertainties about the performance of energy efficiency technologies   
High costs of energy efficiency technologies  
Uncertainty about the future development of the Green Deal  
Project implementation and operational risks  
Difficulties in establishing contacts with end-users  
Difficulties in establishing contacts with partners/ contractors  
Lack of access to capital or financing possibilities  
Difficulties in preparing relevant documents (project design, Green Deal 
advice report, Green Deal financing report, administrative procedures, etc.) 
 
Projects were not easily replicable  
Other barriers and obstacles/ other comments:  
  
  
  
  
 
8. Please give an estimate of the share of your marketing costs in relation to the capital 
costs of the measures installed under the Green Deal Plans you provided. Capital costs 
include pure technology costs, as well as installation and construction labour costs.50 
 
Marketing costs: …… % of capital costs 
 
9. Please give an estimate of the share of your administrative costs, such as accounting, in 
relation to the capital costs of the measures installed under the Green Deal Plans you 
provided. Capital costs include pure technology costs, as well as installation and 
construction labour costs. Note: If applicable to your company, please indicate costs for 
providing energy assessments separately (see question 12). 
 
Administrative costs: …… % of capital costs 
10. Please give an estimate of the share of other transaction costs, such as search for 
information or negotiations with end-users or contractors) in relation to the capital costs 
                                                 
50 After carrying out semi-structured interviews with Green Deal Providers it was found that Green Deal Providers faced 
significant accreditation costs. To receive a better picture of the sources and scale of marketing, administrative and 
transaction costs, the formulation of questions 8-10 was changed to “running marketing/ administrative/ transaction 
costs”. Providers were asked to provide information regarding transaction costs related to the accreditation process in 
the comment field.  
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of the measures installed under the Green Deal Plans you provided. Capital costs include 
pure technology costs, as well as installation and construction labour costs. 
 
Transaction costs: …… % of capital costs 
11. Please indicate which of the following activities you would consider as major cost 
drivers, e.g. in-house capacity building was associated with very high costs for the 
company. 
Feel free to add additional activities which are relevant to provide customers with an 
attractive product (other than the installation itself). 
Activities 
Very 
high 
High Medium Low 
Very 
low 
Search for information about the Green 
Deal 
     
In-house capacity building      
Accreditation costs      
Search of partners/contractors      
Negotiation and agreement with 
partners/contractors 
     
Marketing      
Interaction with customers before 
finalisation of the Green Deal Financing 
Plan  
     
Interaction with customers after 
finalisation of the Green Deal Financing 
Plan 
     
Developing Green Deal Financing Plans      
Interaction with Green Deal Finance 
Company 
     
Interaction with end-users’ energy 
suppliers 
     
Project documentation/internal 
management 
     
      
      
      
      
 
 
12. If your company provides energy assessments to end-users, please indicate the costs of 
the assessment itself as well as related administrative, marketing and transaction costs in 
relation to the capital costs. Capital costs include pure technology costs, as well as 
installation and construction labour costs. 
 
Energy assessment: …… % of investment/ technology costs 
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13. Please indicate the product specific programme costs taking into account all kind of 
activities carried out besides the installation itself (such as administrative, marketing and 
transaction costs). For example, due to an underdeveloped supply chain and highly 
individualised customer demands the costs are particularly high for the measure XY.  
Feel free to add further measures installed by your company. 
 
Measure 
Very 
high 
High Medium Low 
Very 
low 
I 
N 
S 
U 
L 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
Easy-to-treat Cavity wall 
insulation 
 
 
 
 
 
Hard-to-treat Cavity wall 
insulation 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Solid Wall Insulation      
External Solid Wall Insulation      
Loft insulation      
Flat roof insulation      
Double glazing      
Floor insulation      
High performance doors      
Hot water cylinder insulation      
Draughtproofing      
      
      
      
 
 
 
H 
E 
A 
T 
I 
N 
G 
 
Condensing gas boiler      
Condensing oil boiler      
Biomass boiler      
Photovoltaics      
Solar thermal panels      
Air source heat pumps      
Biomass boilers      
Biomass room heaters      
Heating controls upgrade      
Flue gas heat recovery      
Thylinder thermostat      
Under-floor heating      
Waste water heat recovery 
systems 
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
       
L Lighting systems      
 
 
14. For the measures where you indicated very high product specific programme costs, 
please explain what the major cost drivers are.  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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15. By experience, which measures are able to meet the Golden Rule on their own and 
which ones need an additional capital injection from the end-user (please tick the 
corresponding box). Feel free to add further measures installed by your company. 
 
 
Measure 
Meets the Golden 
Rule 
Meets the Golden 
Rule only with 
investment of end-
user 
I 
N 
S 
U 
L 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
Easy-to-treat Cavity wall insulation   
Hard-to-treat Cavity wall insulation   
Internal Solid Wall Insulation   
External Solid Wall Insulation   
Loft insulation   
Flat roof insulation   
Double glazing   
Floor insulation   
High performance doors   
Hot water cylinder insulation   
Draughtproofing   
   
   
   
 
H 
E 
A 
T 
I 
N 
G 
 
Condensing gas boiler   
Condensing oil boiler   
Biomass boiler   
Photovoltaics   
Solar thermal panels   
Air source heat pumps   
Biomass boilers   
Biomass room heaters   
Heating controls upgrade   
 
16. Does your company work with other financiers than the Green Deal Finance Company? 
If this is the case, please indicate what kind of financial sources you use. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
17. If you had the chance to introduce changes to the Green Deal, what would you do? 
For example, simplify the accreditation process for Green Deal providers. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
18. Did your customers give you feedback on how to improve the Green Deal to better 
meet their demands? For example, introduce more flexibility for early repayments. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Annex III – Results of the “Survey on the Green Deal from a Green 
Deal Provider’s Perspective” 
Note to the reader: In total six Green Deal Providers have participated in the survey. As not 
all Providers responded to each question there are often less than six reported responses. 
Visualisations have been the preferred way of presenting the results of the survey. However, 
where values with a span from X to Y or up to Z were reported, tables were used instead. 
1. Offered Green Deal Services by Green Deal providers 
 
 
2. Point of time when the company entered the ‘Green Deal market’ 
      2012        2013                2014 
 Jul  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr May Jun 
 
        = starting the accreditation progress  = accreditation completed 
        = fully operational (on-barded with the Green Deal Finance company, IT system in place etc).  
 
3. Shares of served customer segments by Green Deal providers 
 Businesses Single-
Family 
Dwellings 
Multi-
appartment 
buildings  
(1-3 units) 
Multi-
appartment 
buildings  
(4-7 units) 
Multi-
appartment 
buildings  
(>8 units) 
Provider 1 0-25% 76-100%    
Provider 2  76-100%   0-25% 
Provider 3  51-75% 25-50%   
Provider 4 0-25% 51-75% 51-75% 51-75% 51-75% 
Provider 5  51-75%   0-25% 
1 
4 
4 
4 
6 
5 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Arrange Green Deal assessment (with a 
third party) 
Carry out Green Deal assessment (in-
house) 
Arrange installation of measures (with a 
third party) 
Carry out installation of measures (in-
house) 
Develop Green Deal Finance Plans 
Yes 
No 
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 Homeowners Tenants 
Provider 1 51-75% 0-25% 
Provider 2 25-50% 51-75% 
Provider 3 25-50% 25-50% 
Provider 4 76-100% 25-50% 
Provider 5 76-100%  
 
 
 
4. Number of Green Deal plans sold to households 
 Exact number   No. Green Deal plans 
for energy efficiency 
installations 
No. Green Deal plans 
for Renewable energy 
installations 
Provider 1 35 16-30 0-15 
Provider 2 <50 16-30 0-15 
Provider 3 n.a. 0-15 n.a. 
Provider 4 n.a. 0-15 0-15 
Provider 5 23 16-30 0-15 
Provider 6 4 n.a. n.a. 
 
5. Total capital costs of all measures installed under the Green Deals plans sold by 
the responding Green Deal provider 
 Total  For energy efficiency 
installations  
For renewable energy 
installations 
Provider 1 Up to £ 90,000 Up to £ 60,000 Up to £ 30,000 
Provider 2 Up to £ 60,000 Up to £ 60,000 - 
Provider 3 Up to £ 60,000 Up to £ 30,000 Up to £ 30,000 
Provider 4 £ 33,000 - 55,000  n.a. n.a. 
Provider 5 £ 33,400  n.a. n.a. 
Note: It was aimed to clarify with the respondents that total capital costs were defined as the 
total amount of money that was invested into the measures under the Green Deal Plans - 
either by the Green Deal Provider through Green Deal Finance, the consumer or Cashback. 
As responses revealed that Providers applied different interpretations of the term total capital 
costs, all providers were contacted again and asked for clarification. Unfortunately, no 
clarification was received from Provider 2 and 3. Therefore, the collected data and 
particularly comparisons between the reported data should be treated with care. 
6. Aggregated energy savings of all energy efficiency measures (over lifetime) 
installed under Green Deal plans sold by the responding Green Deal provider 
 Energy savings (over lifetime) 
Provider 1 Up to 150,000 kWh 
Provider 2 Up to 300,000 kWh 
Provider 3 Up to 150,000 kWh 
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7. General obstacles and barriers to implementing energy efficiency measures under 
the Green Deal faced by Green Deal providers 
 
 
Comment:  
 “Main obstacles have been: 
o Time taken to complete paperwork and technical requirements for GD ORB and, especially, 
GDFC. 
o Constant changes made by Government to GD and ECO leading to uncertainty and lack of 
momentum 
o Lack of finance available (GDFC is the only option; expensive and time-consuming processes to 
access their finance, and prohibitive interest rate for end customer). 
o Cost and delays to implementation of IT solution (eTech) - used by most of the 'Big Six' and 
Ofgem, so obvious choice, but not fit-for-purpose at point we purchased it.” 
8-10.  Estimate of marketing, administrative and transaction costs in relation to 
         capital costs of the measures installed under Green Deal plans provided by  
         responding Green Deal providers 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Project implementation and 
operational risks 
Difficulties in establishing contacts with 
end-users 
Difficulties in establishing contacts with 
partners/ contractors 
 Lack of access to capital or financing 
possibilities 
Difficulties in preparing relevant 
documents (project design, Green … 
Projects were not easily replicable 
 Lack of knowledge/information on the 
Green Deal 
Lack of developers/contractors 
Lack of interest or apathy of end-users  
Uncertainty about the performance of 
energy efficiency technologies 
High costs of energy efficiency 
technologies 
Uncertainty about the future 
development of the Green Deal 
No barrier 
Barrier 
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 Prov. 1 Prov. 2 Prov.3 Prov.4 Prov. 5 
Marketing costs 36% 5% 0% 15% 29% 
Administrative costs 56% 30% 75% 17% 206% 
Transaction costs 28% 20% 25% 3% 0% 
 
Note: It was aimed to clarify with the respondents that total capital costs were defined as the 
total amount of money that was invested into the measures under the Green Deal Plans - 
either by the Green Deal Provider through Green Deal Finance, the consumer or Cashback. 
As responses revealed that Providers applied different interpretations of the term total capital 
costs, all providers were contacted again and asked for clarification. Unfortunately, no 
clarification was received from Provider 2 and 3. Therefore, the collected data and 
particularly comparisons between the reported data should be treated with care. 
 
 
11. Major cost drivers faced by Green Deal providers when selling Green Deal plans 
 
Comments/ other cost drivers: IT development, marketing, lawyer’s fees, travel costs 
0% 
50% 
100% 
150% 
200% 
250% 
300% 
350% 
400% 
Prov. 1 Prov. 2 Prov.3 Prov.4 Prov. 5 
Transaction costs 
Administrative costs 
Marketing costs 
Capital costs 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0% 33% 67% 100% 
Search of partners/contractors 
 Negotiation and agreement with … 
Marketing 
Interaction with end-users’ energy suppliers 
Interaction with customers 
Interaction with GDFC 
Development of Green Deal Financing Plans 
Search for information about the Green Deal 
 Accreditation costs 
In-house capacity building to qualify as a Provider 
 Project documentation/internal management 
Very High 
High 
Medium  
Low 
Very Low 
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12. Costs of energy assessments itself as well as related administrative, marketing and 
transaction costs in relation to total capital costs. 
 Provider 1 Provider 2 
Assessment 10% 3% 
 
 
13. Product specific programme costs taking into account all kind of activities carried 
out besides the installation itself (such as administrative, marketing and transaction 
costs) faced by Green Deal providers 
 
14. Cost drivers for measures with relatively high product specific programme cost  
Comment:  
 “Measures which need high individualised advice: complicated heating solutions, hybrid solid wall insulation” 
  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Biomass boiler 
Easy to treat cavity wall insulation 
Loft insulation 
Condensing gas boiler 
Heating controls upgrade 
High performance doors 
Hot water cylinder thermosta 
Solar water heating 
Window glazing 
Very High 
High 
Medium  
Low 
Very Low 
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15. Evaluation of measures that meet the Golden Rule on their own (energy cost 
savings exceed repayments) 
 
Comments: 
 “Insufficient experience to comment on all, but only very low cost measures such as ETT cavity wall and 
loft insulation are able to be fully funded” 
 When customers heated with fireplace and changes to central heating,  in 95% the Golden Rule does not 
work 
 
16. Green Deal providers with alternative sources of finance besides Green Deal 
Finance Company 
 “Not yet, but about to start relationship with a local Credit Union” 
 “Blending Cashback with Green Deal Finance; seeking alternative finance providers (upcoming Barkleys 
finance product) to top-up on the Green Deal Finance for measures which can't” 
 Access to ECO funding from British Gas, bilateral as well as brokerage 
 
17. Recommendations for improving the Green Deal from the Green Deal providers’ 
perspective 
 “Simplify the red tape for the consumer” 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
0% 50% 100% 
Easy to treat Cavity wall … 
Hard to treat Cavity wall … 
Internal Solid Wall Insulation 
External Solid Wall Insulation 
Loft insulation 
Flat roof insulation 
Double glazing 
Floor insulation 
High performance doors 
Hot water cylinder insulation 
Draughtproofing 
Condensing gas boiler 
Condensing oil boiler 
Biomass boiler 
Photovoltaics 
Solar thermal panels 
Air source heat pumps 
Biomass boilers 
Heating controls upgrade 
Meets Golden Rule 
Does not meet Golden Rule 
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 “Too many to mention! Completely change it from the start - ECO should only be used to support whole-
house retrofit, in conjunction with GD where appropriate. Financing should be Government-funded, at a 
very low interest rate (i.e. 2%) to maximise take-up. Strict efficiency targets should be set (i.e. minimum 
EPC ratings) for owner-occupiers and landlords, to ensure participation and bring the most inefficient 
homes up to a better standard. etc...” 
 “Relax the Golden Rule to allow more measures to meet the requirements, reducing the amount of 
customer contribution needed.” 
 1) lower the interest rate, 2) GD Home Improvement Fund is fantastic, 3) lack of consumer awareness 
 “There need to be a simplified process for the end user, but still need to protect.” 
 
16. Recommendations for improving the Green Deal from the customers’ perspective 
 “Just that it took too long and understanding the process” 
 “Lower interest rate. Make it easier to understand.” 
 “Streamlining the paperwork process” 
 Happy with new cashback scheme; make lower interest; make it simpler 
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Annex IV - On-bill financing (OBF) programmes in the United States 
based on the Pay as You Save
®
 system 
 
State Utility OBF Programme 
California Municipal Water Utility of the Towns of Windsor Windsor Efficiency PAYS® 
Municipal Water Utility of the City of Hayward Green Hayward PAYS® 
Hawaii Hawaiian Electric Company Solar$aver 
Maui Electric Company, Ltd.  “ 
Hawaii Electric Light Company, Inc. “ 
Kansas Midwest Energy, Inc. How$mart® 
Kentucky Big Sandy RECC How$martKY 
Fleming-Mason RECC “ 
Grayson RECC “ 
Jackson Energy “ 
New Hampshire Public Service of New Hampshire SmartSTART (expired) 
New Hampshire Electric Cooperative SmartSTART  
 
Source: H. Lachman (personal communication, September 2, 2014); Cillo & Lachman (2013) 
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Annex V - Overview over the provisions under the three components 
of the UK Energy Company Obligation  
 
 Component 1: 
Carbon Saving  
Obligation (CERO) 
Component 2: 
Carbon Saving 
Communities 
Obligation (CSCO)  
Component 3: 
Affordable Warmth  
Targets for51 
1) March 2013 
2) March 2014 
3) March 2015 
[extend to March 2017] 
Emissions reduction: 
4.18 MtCO2 
8.36 MtCO2 
8.36 MtCO2 
[reduce level of ambition by 33%] 
Emissions reduction: 
1.36 MtCO2 
2.72 MtCO2 
2.72 MtCO2 
Heating cost reduction: 
£0.84bn 
£1.68bn 
£1.68bn 
Household segment All households 15% most deprived areas 
measured on the English, 
Welsh and Scottish indexes 
of Multiple deprivation 
[extend to 25%] 
Consumers living in 
private tenure 
properties that receive 
particular means-tested 
benefits 
Eligible measures Solid wall and hard-to-treat 
cavity wall insulations52 
[include loft insulation and easy-
to treat cavity walls, but min. 
100,000 solid wall insulations 
delivered by 2017] 
All insulation measures Heating and insulation 
measures 
Funding (annually) £760 million £540 million 
 
Source: Based on data from gov.uk (2014) and Stanger (2013) 
 
                                                 
51 Phase 1: 1st January to 31st March 2013, Phase 2: twelve months ending with 31st March 2014, Phase 3: twelve months 
ending with 31st March 2015 (The Electricity and Gas (Energy Companies Obligation) Order 2012). 
52 In properties where solid walls or hard-to-treat cavity walls insulations are installed, energy suppliers are allowed to deliver 
additional measures which reduce the heat loss, such as loft insulation, efficient glazing or draught proofing, under the 
Carbon Saving Obligation (DECC, 2012d) 
